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SYNOPSIS 
The main thrust of this thesis entitled A Critical Study of 
Russell's Socio-Political Philosophy and its Cont emporary 
Relevance is to analyse Critically Russell's social and 
political philosophy and to examine whether his views have 
any relevance today or have become ohselete with the passage 
of time. His social philosophy has been compared with such 
thinkers as J.5, Mill, Karl Marx, Peter Kropotkin, G.E. 
Moore, Karl Popper, G. Santayan and Leaonard Woolf. 
Some thinkers opine that Russell's social philosophy 
was only a sustained attempt to repair that of John Stuart 
Mill. In this thesis I have made an attempt to show that 
though Mill's influence on Russell is an undeniable fact, 
yet Russell's social philosophy should not be regarded 
merely as an endeavour to rehabilitate Mill's position. The 
problems Russell dealt • with in his social philosophy were 
somewhat, and sometimes radically different from those of 
Mi 11's . 
In the Introduction I have first discussed Russell's 
life and the important occurrences of his time which dragged 
him violently from philosophy to politics. It has been shown 
that it is the first world war and people's reaction to it 
that brought about this change in him. Secondly, a lucid 
explanation of the main tenets of Mill's philosophy has been 
given. This explanation facilitates to understand exactly 
where Russell concurs with Mill. Thirdly, a general 
introduction to various forms of socialism has been 
presented in order to evaluate Russell's own views on 
Socialism and his criticism of closed Communist party-
controlled barbarian, inhuman system. 
Chapter I is devoted exclusively to Russell's 
political philosophy. Here, first, it has been shown that 
most of the social thinkers have neglected one vital element 
in human beings which is the source of a large number of 
human activities. This source is what Russell called 
impulse. On the basis of his phi 1osophy of impulse, Russell 
has advocated a kind of socialism which is by and large akin 
to Guild Socialism. Secondly, his criticisms of Capitalism 
and other forms of Socialism have been presented. Thirdly, 
we have delineated his active participation in the peace 
movement. To avoid future catastrophe Russell has advocated 
a new kind of policy to regulate int ernat i onal relat i ons. We 
have givena brief outline of these policies. 
Chapter II is devoted to the three important 
constituents of his social philosophy his theory of 
education, population policy, and his views on sex and 
marriage. It has been shown that his findings in the 
experi ementati on of child education and his views on higher 
education have not lost their relevance though many years 
have elapsed in between. Secondly, his population policy has 
been critically discussed. To tackle the problem of 
over-population various countries are adopting the same 
measures what Russell have suggested many decades ago. 
Thirdly, his strong plea to change our attitude towards sex 
has been discussed. 
Chapter III is devoted to Russell's moral and 
religious philosophy. In moral philosophy a critical 
assessment of the three successive phases of his ethical 
views has been given. Secondly, in his philosophy of 
religion we have shown that despite his polemics against 
religion at the bottom of his heart he was deeply religious 
and this attitude had bearings on his other philosophical 
writings. 
Chapter IV has been divided into two sections. In the 
first section I have made some critical remarks about 
Russell's views discussed in the previous chapters. My main 
aim has been to show that Russell's contention that 
political and economic reforms are sufficient to cure all 
the evils of our society is not f lawl ess. In the second 
section we have mentioned some of the important 
contributions made to this world by this great philosopher . 
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INTRODDCTION 
Bertrand Russell was b o m on 18th of May, 1872 
and died on 2nd of February, 1970. In the intervening 
ninety-seven years much had happened, both in the world 
of ideas and in the world of politics. Russell's 
contribution to both fields was outstanding. His more 
than one hundred books and countless articles travelled 
a range of thought as wide as the scope of man's quest 
of knowledge. Mainly his seminal contributions to 
philosophy of mathematics and symbolic logic brought 
his name in the forefront of philosophical discussion. 
In the world of politics his contributions caused him 
to become known to a wider public. Russell puts his two 
missions thus: "I wanted, on the one hand, to find out 
whether anything could be known, and, on the other 
hand, to do whatever might be possible toward creating 
a happier world,"^ 
The breadth of his interests and variety of his 
writings have made Russell one of the most widely read 
and critically discussed of our contemporaries. 
1. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory, Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1965, p.54. 
In his Autobiography Russell mentioned three 
passions, which were although simple yet overwhelmingly-
strong, that governed his life. These passions are : the 
longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable 
pity for the suffering of mankind. Russell Writes: "These 
passions, like great winds, have blown me hither and 
thither, in a wayward course, over a deep ocean of anguish, 
2 reaching to the very verge of despair." 
He has given three reasons for his passion for love. 
First, he sought it because it brings ecstasy-ecstasy so 
great that he would often have sacrificed all the rest of 
life for a few hours of this joy. Second, love relieves 
lonliness. Third, in the union of love he had seen, "in a 
mystic miniature, the prefiguring vision of the heaven that 
saints and poets have imagined." 
With equal passion he sought knowledge and wished to 
understand the hearts of man. 
Love and knowledge, two noble passions, led him 
upward towards the heaven, but always pity brought hira back 
to earth. Echoes of cries of pain resonated in his heart. 
2. Russell, B., The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 
(1872-1914), George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978, p.13 
Children in famine, victims tortured by oppressors, helpless 
old people a hated burden to their son, the whole world of 
loneliness, poverty, and pain reverberated in him. He 
thought he must do something, however little that might be, 
to alleviate all these evils. In pursuance of his relentless 
efforts to allay all these evils he had to undergo a series 
of gruelling ordeals. Although he was the victim of 
extraordinary bigotary, that did not in any way cause him to 
recant his open views. His main concern was to show how 
dogmatic authority in its innumerable forms has been, and 
still remains, one of the great obstacles to human 
advancement, in terms of an increase in scientific knowledge 
on the one hand and a decrease in human misery on the other. 
According to him, what the world needed was an attitude of 
love and compassion for humanity. 
Russell grew up in an atmospher of politics and was 
expected by his elders to take up a political career. 
Philosophy, however, interested him more than politics. When 
it appeared that he had some aptitude for philosophy, he 
decided to make it his main work. Everything was done by his 
family members to show that his path would be smooth if he 
chose politics. Even they brought pressure to bear upon him 
in every way they could think of. For sometime Russell 
hesitated, but in the end "the lure of philosophy proved 
irresistible" in his case. 
After he chose a career in philosophy, everything 
went smoothly for a long time. He lived mainly in an 
academic atmosphere. All went well until 1914. But in 1914 
the outbreak of First World War shook him out of his many 
prejudices and made him think afresh on a number of 
fundamental questions. Although he did not completely 
abandon logic and abstract philosophy, he became more and 
more absorbed in social issues, especially in the cause of 
war and the possible ways of preventing it. As Russell puts 
it tersely: 
I have at times been paralyzed by scepticism, 
at times I have been cynical', at other times 
indifferent, but when the war came I felt as 
if I heard the voice of God. I knew that it 
was my business to protest, however futile 
protest might be. My whole nature was 
involved. As a lover of truth, the national 
propaganda of all the belligerent nations 
sickened me. As a lover of civilization, the 
return to barbarism appalled me. As a man of 
thwarted parental feeling, the massacre of the 
young Wrung my heart. I hardly supposed that 
much good would come of oppsoing the war, but 
I felt that for the honour of human nature 
r <.j 
those who were not swept off their feet should 
•3 show that they stood firm. 
From the above it is clear that Russell's life has 
been sharply divided into two periods, one before and one 
after the outbreak of the First World War. Though 1914 is 
regarded as the cut-off line, it does not mean that Russell 
ignored social issues before this cut off line. The 
diference is that in pre-war period his political interest 
has been secondary (philosophy being primary) whereas in the 
post-war period it has turned to be primary. Some of his 
pre-war involvement were his study of German Social 
Democracy, his support of Boer War, and his decision (after 
the completion of Principia Mathematica in 1910) to stand 
for Parliament. 
In an autobiographical essay Russell has written that 
although he had been an Imperialist in the 1890s and had 
even supported the Boer War, in early 1901 he had an 
experience not unlike what religious people call 
"conversion",. In the course of a few minutes he "changed his 
mind about the Boer War, about harshness in education and in 
the Criminal law, and about combativeness in private 
relations." The outcome of this experience has been 
3. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory, Pp. 27-28 
delineated in his "A Free Man's Worship." In 1910 the 
completion of Principia Mathematica, what Russell called a 
herculean task, provided him a new degree of mental freedom. 
It made him ready intellectually as well as emotionally for 
the redirection of his thoughts that was brought about by 
the war. 
First World War provided Russell a new kind of 
activity. Ever since he became more and more absorbed in 
social questions. He consciously concentrated on human 
misery and folly. Before War Russell had the conception that 
war was not welcomed by people but was forced upon them. But 
soon this belief was shattered. During the first days of war 
he was amazed by seeing that people actually enjoyed it. The 
observation of warlike crowd inspired him to think in a way 
which had much affinity with psychoanalysts. He was struck 
by the importance of the connection of politics and 
individual psychology. It occurred to him that a peaceful 
world cannot be built on a b^is of population that enjoy 
fighting and killing. He thought that some inward and 
outward defeat lead people to impulses of violence and 
cruelty. Furthermore he felt that this was due to a variety 
of social ills, some of which were educational. 
Through psychoanalysis Russell came to the conclusion 
that the feelings of adult individuals were a product of 
many causes like experiences in infancy, education, economic 
struggles, and success or frustation in private relations. 
Men, on the average, will be kindly or hostile in their 
feelings toward other in proportion as they feel their lives 
successful or unsuccessful. Certainly there are exceptions 
to this general rule. For instance, a saint can endure any 
misfortune without becoming hostile. But, holds Russell, 
politics depends mainly upon the average mass of mankind and 
the average mass will be fierce or kindly according to 
circumstances. All this made Russell to believe that no 
reform of social and political institution could be stable 
unless it altered the feelings of individuals. He became 
convinced that the only stable improvements in human affairs 
are those which increase kindly feeling and diminish 
ferocity. 
Russell realized that what masses of men agreed to do 
was the result of passions which they feel in common. But 
these passions were not those that Russell found emphasized 
by most political theorists. So he attempted to work out a 
politcal theory which would actually pinpoint the causes of 
ills and would supply the framework of a better order of 
society. The two books which resulted out of this attempt 
were Principles of Social Reconstruction, which was 
published in 1916, and Roads to Freedom, which came out two 
years later. 
Russell felt ostracized for his opposition to war. 
During the war he hoped that peace would embody a rational 
determination to avoid future great wars. But his hope was 
belied. The seed of Second World War was sown in the peace 
deal of the First War. 
In 1917 when the Russian Revolution first broke out 
Russell welcomed it. But in 1920, when he visited Russia, he 
came to the conclusion that everything that was being done 
there and everything that was being intended was totally 
contrary to what any person of a liberal outlook would 
desire. The visit to Russia was a turning point in his life. 
His experiences in Russia were depicted in his book The 
Practice and the Theory of Bolshevism. There he stated that 
the Bolshevik regime was abominable. During his stay there, 
he felt a gradually increasing horror which became an 
intolerable oppression. The country seemed to him "one vast 
prison in which the jailers were cruel bigots." About his 
experience in Russia Russell Writes : 
"When I visited Russia in 1920, I found there 
a philosophy very different from my own, a 
philosophy based upon hatred and force and 
despotic power_. I had become isolated from 
conventional opinion by my views on the War, 
and I became isolated from left-wing opinion 
by my profound horror of what was being done 
in Russia. I remained in a political solitude 
until, bit by bit, left-wing opinion in the 
west became aware that the Russian Communists 
4 were not creating a paradise." 
He was invited to China in 1921. He spent there 
nearly a year. There Russell became vividly aware about the 
problems concerning Asia. He found that while Russia had too 
much government, China had too little. China at that time 
was in a condition of anarchy. But he found many things 
admirable in Chinese tradition. But it was obvious to him 
that none of these admirable tradition could survive the 
onslaughts promoted by Western and Japanese rapacity. 
After his return from China the birth of his two 
children caused Russell to become interested in early 
education. To this he devoted, for some time, most of his 
energy. Russell did not like conventional education and also 
thought that "progressive education" was deficient on the 
purely scholastic side. It appeared to him that in a 
technically complex civilization such as ours conventional 
education would not render much result. So he started a 
school of his own. But a school is an administrative 
4. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory, p.34. 
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enterprise and he found himself deficient in skill as an 
administrator. The school, therefore, was a failure. 
The psychological and social problems involved in 
education first occupied Russell's attention during the war 
when he saw that most people actually enjoyed it. For him, 
this was due to a variety of social ills some of which were 
educational. Accordingly he thought it imperative to reform 
educational system first. He observed that while individual 
parents can do much for their children, largescale 
educational reform must depend upon the state. A certain 
amount of force, according to Russell, is indispensible in 
education. But he was convinced that methods could be found 
which would greatly diminish the necessary amount of force. 
This problem has both private and political aspects. As a 
rule, children or adults who are happy are likely to have 
fewer destructive passions, and therefore need less 
.restraint than those who are unhappy. Profound unhappiness 
and instinctive frustation is apt to produce a deep grudge 
against the world. It may consequently give rise to cruelty 
and violence, sometimes in a roundabout way. That is why 
Russell repeatedly reminded that educational reform is must 
for any meaningful political and social reforms. 
From 1920 onward much of Russell's Writing deals 
exclusively with social and political problems. He made use 
11 
of a swift and sharp wit to express and expose the evil 
passions of human minds-like, suspicion, fear, lust for 
power, hatred, and intolerance-which stand in the way of a 
more benevolent world. 
Russell possessed one important quality which was 
rare among social critics. It is that his criticism was 
always constructive. A commentator puts it beautifully-he 
(Russell) did not wantonly destroy an edifice, nor did he 
dismantle an institution without showing how to build a 
Better One. 
The peculiarity is that although Russell opposed the 
First World War, he supported the Second. There had been a 
period in the late 1940s when he argued that United States 
should coerce Russia by threatening to use the atom bomb. 
The super-powers' politics that followed the Second '.'orld 
War generated deep anguish in his mind. He was chiefly moved 
to action by his belief in probability of a Third World War 
in which , he feared, the use of atomic weapons would bring 
about the destruction of the greater part of human 
civilization. His mental anxiety is vividly expressed in the 
following lines: 
I am writing at a dark moment, and it is 
impossible to know whether the human race will 
last long enough for what I write to be 
12 
published, or, if published, to be read...The 
most important question before the World at 
the present time is this: Is it possible to 
achieve anything that anyone desires by means 
4 
of war. (These lines were written in July 
1961) 
By the middle of fifties Russell had come to the 
conclusion that the only hope for peace lay in the 
renunciation of atomic weapons. 
The long-term political solution given by Russell was 
the establishment of a World Government. For this he 
compaigned actively in the 1950s. In 1955 he induced a 
number of leading scientists of the World, including 
Einstein and Joliot Curie, to sign a manifesto in favour of 
co-operation for peace. In 1958 he became President of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
Thereafter Russell's activities broadened out. He 
corresponded with heads of states and intervenced both in 
the Cuban crisis of 1962 and in Sino-Indian border dispute. 
He took up the cause of Jews in Russia, the Arabs in Israel 
and political prisorners in East Germany. In 1964 he 
4. Russell, B., Has Man a Future?, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, 1962, p.119. 
13 
established the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and, to 
raise funds for it, later sold his archives to McMasters 
University in Ontario. By then he had come to think that the 
action of the United States represented the greatest danger 
to the world peace. The last book he wrote, apart from his 
autobiography, was entitled War Crimes in Vietnam. The 
International War Crimes Tribunal, set up by Russell, of 
which Jean-Paul Sartre was a prominent member, arraigned 
President Johnson. The proceedings of the tribunal were 
ill-received at that time but the evidence which has since 
come to light has very largely vindicated them. 
In his old days he spent his time by writing against 
the war, making speeces at pacifist meetings and taking an 
active part in such movements as the Union of Democratic 
control. He was aware that these activities could not have 
much effect but thought it his duty to do whatever he could. 
On 2nd February, 1970, the intellectual world lost one of 
its most distinguished members when Russell died in his 
ninety-eighth year. 
Russell's greatest gift to mankind was his 
unfaltering courage and the fearless stand that he took in 
his campaign to preserve humanity. Among the many honours 
that Russell received some are Nobel Prize for literature. 
14 
conferred on him in 1950, Order of Merit, bestowed upon him 
by Kinf George VI in 1949, and the Sonning Prize given for 
his contribution to European culture by the University of 
Copenhagen in 1960. Perhaps he will be remembered best as a 
philosopher who watched, waited, guided, and understood. 
**** AAA* 
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II. MILI!S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
In this section-\\e propose to gi've an outline of J. S.Mill's 
philosophy. It is necessary because some thinkers, e.g. 
Richard Wollheim, are of the opinion that Russell's social 
philosophy was a sustained attempt to repair Mill's social 
philosophy: i.e., to supplement its deficiencies, to relate 
it to new ideas, and to demonstrate its applicability to the 
ever-changing realities of the twentieth century.^ Again, 
there are Writers, .e.g. George Nakhnikian, who challenge this 
view. An outline of Mill's philosophy, therefore, will help 
us to judge objectively how much Russell has been influenced 
by his 'godfather' (Mill) and the originality of his 
philosophy. 
After one year of Russell's birth, i.e., in 1873, 
John Stuart Mill, passed away. Naturally, in this period, 
Mill's ideas on political and social matters were in the 
ascendency in advanced and liberal circles. Russell was not 
an exception in this regard. 
One of the major works of Mill is his Principles of 
Political Economy. The first edition of it appeared in 1848, 
but it was followed by a substantially modified edition in 
1. The article of Richad Wollheim "Pertrand Russell and the 
Liberal Tradition" has been reprinted in Bertrand 
Russell's Philosophy, (ed.) by George Nakhnikian, 
Duckworth, 1974. 
16 
the next year. The difference was mainly concerned with the 
question of socialim . In the first edition, Mill criticized 
socialism. But this shocted his grandmother, Mrs. Taylor, and 
she induced mill to make very considerable modifications in 
the next edition. Despite his changed attitude to socialism 
in the second edition it was by no means uncritical. In that 
edition he still feels that there are difficulties relating 
to socialism which socialists do not adequately face. He 
says that it is the common error of socialists that they 
overlook the natural indolence of mankind. And on this 
ground Mill fears that a socialist community might stagnate. 
In the same book J.S. Mill envisages a society in 
which he hopes to see production in the hands of voluntary 
societies of workers. He could not concur with the Marxian 
Socialists who favoured production to be in the hands of the 
state. The Socialism to which Mill looks forward was that of 
Pre-Marxian that did not aim at increasing the power of the 
state. Mill argues emphatically that even under Socialism 
there would have to be competition, though the competition 
will be between rival societies of workers, not between 
rival capitalists. He is inclined to admit that in such a 
Socialist system the total production of goods might be less 
than under capitalism. Still he contends that this would be 
no great evil provided everybody could be kept in reasonable 
comfort. 
17 
Mill was a passionate believer in liberty. The power 
of governments, he says, is always dangerous since it tends 
to curtail liberty. Future ages, he maintains, will be 
unable to credit the amount of government interference which 
has hitherto existed. 
Mill distinguishes between Communism and Socialism. 
The distinction, as he explains, is that Communists object 
to all private property while Socialists contend only that 
"land and the instruments of production should be the 
property, not of individuals, but of communities or 
associations, or of the Government." Mill preferred 
Socialism to Communism. He even sometimes criticized 
communism. In the following famous passage he expresses his 
opinion on communism: 
If...the choice were to be made between 
communism with all its chances, and the 
present state of society with • all its 
sufferings and injustices; if the institution 
of private property necessarily carried with 
it as a consequence, that the produce of labor 
should be apportioned as we now see it, almost 
in an inverse ratio to the labor the 
largest portions to those who have never 
worked at all, the next largest to those whose 
.18 
work is almost nominal, and so in a descending 
scale, the remunaration dwindling as the work 
e 
grows hard@>r and more disagreeable, until the 
most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labor 
cannot count with certainty on being able to 
earn even the necessaries of life, if this or 
commuism were the alternative, all the 
difficulties, great or small, of Communism 
would be as dust in the balance. But to make 
comparison applicable, we must compare 
Communism at its best, with the regime of 
individual property, not as it is, but as it 
might be made. The principle of private 
property has never yet had a fair trial in any 
country. 
Another important book written by Mill is On Liberty. 
This book contains the central tenets of his social 
philosophy. As the title of this book suggests, the main 
concern of Mill here is to demarcate the proper limits of 
individual liberty, on the one hand, and of state 
intervention, on the other. In this book Mill points to 
Russia as a country so dominated by bureaucracy that no one, 
not even the individual bureaucrate, has any personal 
liberty. 
19 
In order to define the limits of state intervention 
Mill divides the desires, and hence actions that spring 
from desires, into two broad groups the self-regarding 
and the other-regarding. He opines that as far as 
self-regarding desires are concerned, the state has no right 
to interfere with its satisfaction. In this area the 
individual enjoys complete freedom. But as far as 
other-regarding desires are concerned, the state has an a 
priori right to interfere with its satisfaction. But whether 
this a priori right may be justifiably exercised depends 
upon a further calculation. It is that whether such 
interference would increase the overall happiness of the 
community. This view reflects Mill's utilitarian attitude. 
Mill was anxious to safeguard the minorities against 
the tyranny of the majority. He was of the view that the 
growth of the state tended to reduce individuals to a cannon 
type and to swamp them in the tyranny of collectivism. But 
it appeared to Mill that social progress depended upon giving 
to each individual the fullest opportunity for free 
development. Accordingly he favoured unhampered freedom of 
discussion. He believed that truth would survive in the 
struggle of ideas. Mill argues that individuals and 
associations should be left unmolested unless their actions 
seriously interfere with the interests and rights of 
others. He laid stress upon the value of originality and the 
20 
social benefits resulting from a variety of ideas and 
actions. Mill even opposed state education on the ground 
that it is a contrivance for moulding people to be exactly 
like another. 
Mill, however, does not pretend that actions should 
be as free as opinions. For him, freedom of action is 
conditional. He writes : 
Acts of whatever kind, which without 
justifiable cause, do harm to others may be, 
and in the more important cases absolutely 
require to be controlled .by the unfavourable 
sentiments, and when needful by the active 
interference of mankind. The liberty of the 
individual must be thus far limited, he must 
g 
not make himself a nuisance to other people. 
Now the question arises: What is the limit of the 
authority of society over the individual? Or, what is the 
sovereignty of the individual over himself? Mill's replay 
contains in the following lines : 
Each will receive its proper share, if each 
has that which more particularly concerns it. 
6. Mill, J.S., On Liberty, p. 49 colleted form Political 
Philosophers, Carlton House, New York. 
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To individuality should belong the part of 
life in which it is chiefly the individual 
that is interested; to society, the part which 
7 chiefly interests society. 
But Mill has not amply made it clear as to how one 
can distinguish that part of individuality which concerns 
society with the other part of his individuality, i.e., 
self-regarding. He, however, offers two maxims to assist the 
judgement in holding the balance between them and to clear 
any doubt. These maxims are : 
First, that the individual is not accountable 
to society for his actions in so far as these 
concern the interests of no person but 
himsel'f. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and 
avoidance by other people if thought necessary 
by them for their own good, are the only 
measures by which society can justifiably 
express its dislike or disapprobation of his 
conduct. 
Secondly, that for such actions as are 
prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable,and may be subjected 
7. Ibid, p. 66. 
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either to social or to legal punishment, if 
society is of the opinion that the one or the 
Q Other is requisite for its protection. 
Although Mill's views were in the ascendency in 
advanced circles for quite some time, with the passage of 
time many thinkers started to challenge it. His ideas had 
come to be seen as thin and irrelevant: intellectually thin 
and politically irrelevant. As R.B. Mecoallum writes in his 
introduction to Mill's book On Liberty 
Mill's attempt to distinguish between 
self-regarding acts and other-regarding acts 
have been assailed again and again, and it is 
not difficult to discredit any particular 
example. The principle on which he acts are 
particularly open to attack by moral 
philosophers. They are probably more 
acceptable and natural to a judge on the 
bench, who is constantly reminding juries of 
what they may consider to be relevant to the 
charge against the prisoner and is merely a 
matter of private conduct and judgement. But 
8. Ibid, p.84. 
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the essential question to the political 
theorist is not what particular acts may be 
regarded as within the competence of public 
authority t6 correct and punish, but whether 
there is to be any limit made at all. The 
battle on this question is not where any 
particular line is to be drawn, but whether 
9 the drawing of any line is permissible. 
9. Ibid. p. xxvi 
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III. GROUNDWORK OF RUSSELL'S SOCIO-POLITICAL IDEALS 
Russell's attitude to Mill's theories was ambivalent. 
Sometimes he criticizes Mill and sometimes he pays tribute 
to Mill by approving his theories. 
The sort cf Socialism Mill advocated in his Political 
Economy has been called Utopia by Russell. Moreover Russell 
thinks that Mill was misled , both in his prophecies and in 
his hopes, by not foreseeing the increasing power of great 
organizations. This applies not only in economics, but also 
in other spheres. He maintained, for example, that the state 
ought to insist upon universal education, but ought not take 
up the task of educating itself. Criticizing Mill's view 
Russell says that Mill never realized that, so far as 
elementary education is concerned, the only important 
alternative to the state is the Church, which Mill hardly 
would have preferred. Russell comments that Mill's 
principles, given in Political Economy, are derived from his 
orthodox predecessors with only minor modifications. 
Russell considers Mill's book On Liberty as very 
important one. It is important because the cause which it 
advocates has been less successful. There is, on the whole, 
much less liberty in the world now than the time Mill wrote. 
With the values, which Mill emphasized in On Liberty, 
Russell found himself in complete agreement. He feels that 
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Mill is entirely right in emphasizing the importance of the 
individual in so far as values are concerned. Even these 
values are more desirable in our day than it was in Mill's 
time. 
But Russell is of the view that those who care for 
liberty in this day have to fight different battles from 
those of the nineteenth century. They have to devise new 
expedients if liberty is to be safeguarded. The term 
'liberty' was the watchword of the radicals and 
revolutionaries from the seventeenth century to the end of 
the nineteenth. But the word has been usurped by 
reactionaries and consequently its meaning has been 
distorted. It is labeled as part of "rotten bourgeois 
idealism" and is regarded as a middle-class fad, Russell 
says that so far as one person is responsible for this 
change of meaning, the blame must fall on Marx, who 
substituted Prussian discipline for freedom as both the 
means and the end of revolutionary action. 
What has changed the situation since Mill's day is 
the great increase of organization. Every organization is a 
combination of individuals for a purpose. If this purpose is 
to be achieved, it requires a certain amount of 
sub-ordination of the individuals to the whole. If the 
purpose is one in which all the individuals feel a keen 
interest, and if the executive of the organization commands 
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confidence, the sacrifice of liberty may be very small. But 
if the purpose for which the organization exists inspires 
only its executive, to which the other members submit for 
extraneous reasons, the loss of liberty may be very great. 
The large the organization, the greater becomes the gap in 
power between those at the top and those at the bottom. 
Despite the above drawback Russell does not favour 
the abolition of large organizations. Springing up of 
organizations, according to him, fias both advantage and 
disadvantage. The advantages of large organizations are So 
great and obvious that it would be absurd to wish to return 
to an earlier condition. In order to avert the disadvantages 
of such organizations we need to devise some other methods. 
Let us now turn our attention to Russell's social 
philosophy. In his treatment of social issues two distinct 
parts are clearly visible. The first part consists of his 
analysis of human psychology and in the second part he 
theorises on the basis of the fact found in the analysis. It 
occured to Russell that without proper understanding of 
human psychology it would not be an act of prudence to 
advocate any social or political system because any system 
which was not in conformity with the psychology of its 
people was likely to be rejected or overthrown sooner or 
later. 
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Russell in his Principles of Social Reconstruction, 
which is the finest expression of his political attitude, 
writes in the 'Prefeace'— 
My aim is so suggest a philosophy of poltics 
based upon the belief that impulse has more 
effect than conscious purpose in moulding 
men's lives. 
The important word here is 'impulse'. Although 
'impulse' has been contrasted with 'conscious purpose', 
essentially it is contrasted with 'desire'. In the sa:ne book 
Russell Writes, "All human activity springs from two 
sources: impulse and d e s i r e . T h i s contrast remains a 
theme throughout his social philosophy. 
Desire aims for its object something which is 
distant, possibly both in space and time. Furthermore, the 
belief that the object desired will somehow or other satisfy 
one if he gets it is integral or essential to a desire. 
Impulse, by contrast, is immediate. It is directed "owards 
something which one wants to do or have, here and now. 
Again, it is unmediated by the belief that that "owards 
which one has an impulse will have desirable results or 
10. Russell, B., Principles of Social Reconstruction, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1960, p.6. 
11. Ibid, p.11. 
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satisfying consequences. Impulse lies in the moment, desire 
is shaped by foresight. Making the distinction between 
impulse and desire, Russell intends to point out that any 
political philosophy that holds that only desire is to be 
taken into account, and overlook impulse, is to that degree 
inadequate. 
Here we find a point where both Mill and Russell 
concur. Both of them agree that in some limited sense 
desires are amenable to reason. Though every desire has a 
core that is not amenable to reason, argument can secure a 
hold on desire insofar as every desire contains a belief 
about means to end — a belief that what is desired will .bring 
satisfaction. Indeed Mill went on to think that when the 
state recorded its opposition to a certain desire by 
associating a punishment to its satisfaction, it thereby 
constructed a practical argument calculated to dissolve that 
desire. For though the object that was desired might bring 
satisfaction by or in itself, it certainly would not if it 
always came attended by punishment. 
Russell was insistent that impulses are not amenable 
to reason even in the limited sense in which desires are. 
This follows from the fact that impulses do not contain a 
belief about means and ends —--that is to say, they have no 
constituent upon which argument can gain a grip. 
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We have seen the feature of impulses, that set them 
in contrast to desires, is that they cannot be regulated by-
reason. In his Reith Lectures, and published under the title 
Authoriy and the Individual, Russell made another point of 
distinction between impulse and desire. Here he says that 
impulses, just because of their immediacy, can find 
substitute satisfactions in a way not open to desires. 
Having divided the sources of human actions into 
desires and impulses, Russell says that one of the marks by 
which a political institution is to be judged is the degree 
to which it succeeds in moulding impulses and desires in a 
favourable direction i.e., moulding it in such a way that 
it ceases to run counter to the legitimate exercise of state 
action. 
Russell further divided desires and impulses into two 
groups desires and impulses which are possessive; and 
desires and impulses which are creative. This distinction, 
repeated throughout Russell's writings, turns out to be a 
distinction of great political significance. The creative 
desires and impulses of man are inherently harmonious, 
whereas the possessive desires are inherently conflictive. 
The different creative desires and impulses of a single 
individual cohere, and so do the creative desires and 
impulses of different individuals. But the possessive 
30 
desires and impulses of individuals are disharmonious or 
incompatible. 
In his book Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 
Russell borrows a term from Leibniz to distinguish between 
right desires and wrong desires. This term is 'compossible'. 
He defines the term 'compossible' thus:" I call a number of 
desires 'compossible' when all can be satisfied by the same 
state of affairs; when they are not compossible, I call them 
12 incompatible." 
Now Russell says that right desires will be those 
that are capable of being compossibele with as many other 
desires as possible. Wrong desires will be those that can 
only be satisfied by thwarting other desires. On the basis 
of this distinction Russell in the same book formulates the 
principle of state interference. He calls this principle 
'the Principle of Growth'. 
Mill's social philosophy contains both a principle 
and a practical maxim for the determination of state action. 
Russell's Principle of Growth seems to take over the 
function of both. It is the unique determinant of legitimate 
state action. In formulating the Principle of Growth Russell 
12. Russell, B., Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London 1963, p.59. 
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seems to have been more interested in separating those 
actions where the state had no right to intervene, however 
this came about, a priori or a posteriori, from those 
actions where it had such a right. 
In the light of above discussion a- question can be 
legitimately asked: Whether Russell and Mill would be likely 
to find themselves in agreement on the actual desires (or 
actions that spring from these desires) with which the state 
is entitled to interfere? This is a contentious issue and 
any reply, positive or negative, is likely to evoke a sharp 
response from the commentators. Perhaps on account of the 
complexity of the issue Russell dithered to give any 
outright answer. In his Portraits from Memory Russell gives 
a broad rule but hastens to add that the carrying out of 
this rule in detail is very complex, and hence the problem 
of the proper limitations on human freedom remains 
unresolved. Writes Russell : 
The broad rule is a simple one: that men 
should be free in what only concerns 
themselves, but that they should not be free 
when they are tempted to aggression against 
others. But although the broad rule is simple. 
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the carrying out of it in detail is very-
complex, and so the problem of the proper 
limitations on human freedom remains. 
Again Russell says when individuals cultivate 
creative impulses and desires he should be free, i.e. state 
should not interfere with this. In fact when Russell replies 
in terms of creative desires, the issue becomes more 
complex. For he does not tell us how we are to classify 
desires seemingly of one kind but instrumental to the 
satisfaction of desires of another kind i.g., desires 
which are at their face value possessive desires but which 
are motivated by creative desires. For instance, I may 
desire a table (which is a possessive desire) on which to 
write the book that I desire to write (which is a creative 
desire). Without an answer to this, it is not possible to be 
certain whether the two authors will be in agreement about 
their recommendations. 
But one thing regarding the above point can 
definitely be answered. Even if there were a total 
concurrence between the two authors about what actions they 
think the state could legitimately interfere with and what 
actions it should not, the grounds on which they would think 
this would certainly differ. 
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It has been seen that according to Russell creative 
energies of individuals are harmonious whereas possessive 
energies are conflictive. Now Russell argues that it is 
legitimate for the state to curb the possessive energies of 
individual. He opined that this energy, in excess of a 
certain degree,is not merely other-regarding, but also 
anti-social. Russell makes it clear that when he talks of 
possessive energies he does not refer exclusively r,c that 
which draws men to possess property. The ^possessive energy 
also includes the cause which drives men to hanker for 
power. This, according to Russell, is the supreme menace in 
society. For this reason state has the legitimate right to 
curb this energy. 
Russell says that the love of power is the strongest 
of all the possessive impulses and desires. In Power he 
argues by saying that the love of property in its 
objectionable form where it is boundless and so in 
principle unjustifiable is just a manifestation of the 
13 
love of power. It is regarded as supreme menace in society 
because it attacks that area of others which is most 
precious to them. For Russell, the best life is that which 
cultivate creative or constructive energies and the 
indispensible requirement for the individual who wishes to 
13. Russell, B., Power, Unwin Books, London 1962, p.10. 
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be creative is his freedom. Russell is aware that freedom is 
only an instrumental value, but instrumental for all those 
which are more significant than itself. He writes in Roads 
to Freedom : "...freedom is the greatest of political 
goods" adding in a footnote "9 do not say freedom is the 
greates of all goods: the best things come from 
within they are such things as creative art, and love, and 
14 
thought." Of course, Russell acknowledges that the 
individual needs also material security. But this need 
amounts to no more than "a moderate competence". He writes, 
"It is true that poverty is a great evil, but it is not true 
that material prosperity is in itself a great good." 
Russell thus comes to the conclusion that freedom is 
the greatest of political goods, and it is the prerequisite 
for cultivating creative energies. Now let us turn our 
attention to his theory of society in which he thinks this 
greatest good can be best realized. 
When we look to see what kind of society Russell 
thinks desirable for the realization of the Principle of 
Growth, we find that every proposal he makes follows 
directly from psychological considerations. Every change in 
institutions that he recommended was designed either to curb 
the last for power or to provide the freedom necessary for 
14. Russell, B., Roads to Freedom, Unwin Books, George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1966, p.82. 
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cultivating creativity or directly to stimulate creativity. 
It is with this objective in mind that he advocated a wide 
range of reforms, such as equality of wealth, economic 
security in the form of a basic wage, democratic 
institutions with insistence that the constituencies should be 
small, workers control in industry, the freedom of women, 
the revitalization of work (its technique and conditions), 
the spread of leisure, the rejection of superfluous 
technology, and the establishment of World Government. 
Russell was not content with the mere existence of a 
certain kind of institution. He thinks it necessary that the 
institution should achieve the end for which it is 
introduced. In Political Ideals he writes that by democracy 
two different things may be meant; it may mean parliamentary 
democracy or it may mean the actual participation of the 
people in affairs. The first form has failed to provide the 
intended results. That is why Russell thinks the second form 
desirable. 
Russell was a sharp critic of capitalism. He traced 
the roots of two world wars, which the present century 
witnessed, in capitalism. It does not mean that he was an 
unequivocal supporter of socialism. He agrees with the goal 
of socialism but criticizes the various means through which 
it tries to attain the objective. His criticism of various 
forms of socialism will be presented in the next chapter but 
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here a brief historical descriptions of some important forms 
of socialism will be attempted to make our job easy. 
Some important forms of socialism are Communism, 
Anarchism, Syndicalism and Guild Socialism. The differences 
in their view turn largely upon the kind of democracy (using 
the term 'democracy' in a wider sense) which they desire. 
Orthodox Socialists are content with parliamentary democracy 
in the sphere of government. They think that evils apparent 
in this form of constitution at present would disappear with 
the disappearance of capitalism. Anarchist and syndicalist, 
on the other hand, object to the whole parliamentary 
machinery. They advocate a different method for regulating 
the political affairs of the community. 
But in some respects they are all alike. For 
instance, they all are democratic in the sense that they aim 
at abolishing every kind of privilege and every kind of 
artificial inequality. All of them are champions of the 
wage-earners in existing society. All of them also have much 
in common in their economic doctrine all three regard 
capital and the wage systems as a means of exploiting the 
labourer in the interests of the possessing classes. They 
hold that communal ownership, in one form or another, is the 
only means of bringing freedom to the producers. But within 
the framework of this common doctrine there are many 
divergencies. 
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SOCIALISM 
Though before Marx there were socialist theories in 
Europe, they did not have considerable influence. It is 
Marx, who in collaboration with Engles, formulated a 
coherent body of socialist doctrine which dominated the 
minds of a vast number of persons. The titanic force 
unleashed by Marx gave a sharp shock to our world. Though 
the epicentre of this shock was Europe, it did not remain 
confined there. Its effect was felt, although sporadically, 
also in other parts of the globe. 
The essentials of Marx's doctrine can be discussed 
under four heads: (1) the materialistic interpretation of 
history, (2) the law of the concentration of capital, (3) 
the class war, and (4) the theory of surplus value. The 
first three are given in Manifesto and the last one in Das 
Capital. 
1. The Materialistic Interpretation of History : 
Marx holds that in the main all the phenomena of 
human society have their origin in material conditions, and 
these he takes to be embodied in economic systems. Political 
constitutions, laws, religions, philosophies all these he 
regards as expressions of the economic regime in the 
society that gives rise to them. According to him, economics 
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mould character and opinion and are thus the prime source of 
much that appears in consciousness. He applies this doctrine 
in particular to two revolutions one in the past, the 
other in the future. The revolution in the past is that of 
the bourgeoisie against feaudalism. Another revolution he 
predicted is between the wage-earners, or proletariat, and 
the bourgeoisie. This will be directed against the 
bourgeoisie to establish the Socialist Commonwealth. The 
whole movement of history is viewed by him as necessary, as 
the effect of material causes operating upon human beings. 
Marx points out that capitalists are under an inherent 
necessity to behave cruelly so long as private ownership of 
land and capital continues. But their tyranny will not last 
for ever, because it generates the forces that must in the 
end overthrow it. Marx does not so much advocate Socialist 
revolution as predict it. 
2. The law of the Concentration of Capital : 
According to Marx, the capitalist undertakings tend 
to grow larger and larger. He supposed that on account of 
this tendency the number of capitalist enterprises must 
diminish as the magnitude of single enterprises increased. 
Accordingly, he expected that men would be continually 
driven fror. the ranks of the capitalists into those of the 
proletariat. In the course of time the capitalists would 
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grow numerically weaker and weaker. This process was to make 
more and more glaring the evils and injustices of the 
capitalist system and thereby to stimulate more and more the 
forces of opposition. 
3. The Class War : Marx conceives the Wage-earner and the 
capitalist in a sharp antithesis'. He imagines that every man 
is, or must soon become, wholly the one or the other. The 
wage-earners, who possess nothing are exploited by the 
capitalists, who possess everything. As the capitalist 
system works itself out and its nature becomes more clear, 
the opposition of have-nots and haves becomes more and more 
marked. The two classes, since they have antagonistic 
interests, are forced into a class war which generates 
within the capitalist regime internal forces of disruption. 
The exploited learn gradually to combine against their 
exploiters, first locally, then nationally, and at last 
internationally. When they have learnt to combine 
internationally they must be victorious. They will then 
decree that all land and capital shall be owned in common. 
Exploitation will cease. The tyranny of the owners of wealth 
will end. There will no longer be any division of society 
into classes and all men will be free. 
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4. The Theory of Surplus Value : 
Marx's theory of surplus value explains the actual 
mechanism of capitalist exploitation. The mechanism is that 
the capital is acquired by an employer by giving to the 
labourer only the me£».ri3 of subsistence and appropriating for 
himself the remaining part of the worker's labour. 
The Communist Manifesto ends with a call to the 
wage-earners of the world to rise on behalf of Communism : 
The Communists disdain to conceal their views 
and aims. They openly declare that their ends 
can be attained only by the forcible overthrow 
of all existing social conditions. Let the 
ruling classess tremble at a communistic 
revolution. The proletarians have nothing to 
lose but their chains. They have a world to 
15 win. Working men of all countries, unite! 
In all important countries of the continent, except Russia, 
a revolution followed quickly on the publication of 
Manifesto. 
SYNDICALISM 
Syndicalism has its birth in France as a revolt against 
political socialism. The ideas of Syndicalism are the 
natural outcome of the peculiar political and economic 
situation of France 
The war of 1870 put an end for the time being to the 
15. Source : Capital and other Writing of Karl Marx, (ed.) 
Max Eastman, Carlton House, New York, p.355. 
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socialist movement in France. In 1877 Jules Guesde made an 
attempt to revive it. But here socialists were split into 
many different factions. In the early eighties there was a 
split between the Parliamentary Socialists and the Communist 
Anarchists. Communist Anarchists thought that the first act 
of the social revolution should be the destruction of the 
state, and hence there is no room for parliamentary 
politics. The socialists, on the other hand, contended that 
the state will disappear after the socialist society has 
been firmly established. 
Disputes between the various factions of socialists 
caused difficulties. Efforts towards a rapproachment between 
the various groups were seriously hampered by an event which 
had considerable importance for the whole development of 
advanced political ideas of France. Many French politicians 
who have risen to power have begun their political career as 
Socialists. But once they gained power they ceased to be 
socialists and even frequently used the army to oppress the 
strikers. Opponents of political action pointed to this 
development as showing the vanity of political triumphs. All 
this development produced a certain cynicism in regard to 
politics among the more class conscious of French 
wage-earners. This state of mind greatly assisted the spread 
of syndicalism. 
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'Syndicalism' was originally only the French name of 
Trade Unionism. But the Trade Unionists of France were 
divided into two sections the Reformist and the 
Revolutionary. It is the Revolutionary group who professed 
the ideas which we now associate with syndicalism. 
Syndicalism stands essentially for the point of view 
of the producer as opposed to that of the consumer. It is 
concerned with reforming actual work and the organization of 
industry. It does not remain content merely securing greater 
rewards for work. It aims at substituting industrial for 
political action. It intends to use Trade Union Organization 
for purposes for which orthodox socialism would look to 
Parliament. 
The essential doctrine of syndicalism is the class 
war. But it is to be conducted by industrial rather than 
political methods. The chief industrial methods advocated 
are the strike, the boycott, and the sabotage. Strike is 
regarded as the most important. Though ordinary strikes are 
regarded as rehearsals, what, according to them, actually 
needed is the General Strike. 
Syndicalists aim at using the strike not to secure 
such improvements as employers may grant, but to destory the 
whole system of employer and employed and to win the 
complete emancipation of the worker. For this purpose they 
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advocate General strike, the complete cessation of work by a 
sufficient proportion of the wage-earners to paralyse 
capitalism. They wish to destroy the state, which they 
regard as a capitalist institution designed essentially to 
terrorize the workers. They refuse to believe that it would 
be any better under state socialism. Syndicalists desire to 
see each industry self-governing. They are 
internationalists, since they believe that the sole 
interests of the working man everywhere is to free himself 
from the tyranny of the capitalist. 
GUILD SOCIALISM 
Guild Socialists aim at autonomy in industry with consequent 
curtailment, but not abolition, of the power of the state. 
The first pamphlet of the 'National Guilds League' sets 
forth their main principles. These can be summed up in the 
following way. 
In industry, it wants, each factory is to be free to 
control its own methods of production by means of elected 
managers. The different factories in a given industry are to 
be federated into a National Guild which would deal with 
marketing and the general interests of the industry as a 
whole. The state would own the means of production as 
trustee for the community. The Guilds would manage them and 
would pay to the state a single tax or rent. Any Guild that 
chose to set its own interests above those of community 
would be violating its trust. It would have to bow to the 
judgement of a tribunal equally representing the whole body 
of producers and the whole body of consumers. This joint 
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committee would be the ultimate sovereign body, the ultimate 
appeal court of industry. It would fix not only Guild 
14 taxation, but also standard prices. 
Guild Socialism borrows from syndicalism the view 
that liberty is not to be secured by making the state the 
employer. It regards the state as consisting of the 
community in their capacity as consumers, while the Guild 
will represent them in their capacity as producers. Thus the 
Parliament and the Guild Congress will be two co-equal 
powers representing consumers and producers respectively. 
Above both will be the joint committee of Parliament and the 
Guild Congress for deciding matters involving the interests 
of consumers and producers alike. Guild Socialists think 
that State Socialism takes account of men only as consumers, 
while Syndicalism takes account of them only as producers. 
The problem, says the Guild Socialists, is to reconcile the 
two points of view. It is this task what National Guilds set 
out to do. 
Although Guild Socialism represents an attempt at 
adjustment between two equally legitimate points of view, 
its impulse and force are derived from what it has taken 
14. Source : Russell, B., Roads to Freedom, Unwin Books, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, 1966. 
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over from Syndicalism. Like Sy:ndicalisn], it wants not 
primarily to make work better paid, but to secure this 
result along with others by making it in itself more 
interesting and more democratic in organisation. 
ANARCHISM 
Anarchism is the theory which is opposed to every 
kind of forcible government. It is opposed to the state 
since it regards state as the embodiment of force. Such 
government as Anarchism can tolerate must be free 
government. It is not the government assented to by 
majority, but by all. Anarchists object to such institutions 
as the police, the criminal law, etc. They say that by means 
of such institutions the will of one section of the 
community is forced upon another section. In their view, the 
democratic form of government is not very enormously 
preferable to other forms so long as minorities are 
compelled by force to submit to the will of the majorities. 
Liberty is the supreme good in the Anarchist creed. They 
seek to achieve liberty by abolishing all forcible control 
over the individual by the community. 
The modern Anarchism is associated with belief in the 
communal ownership of land and capital. In this respect it 
is akin to Socialism. Socialism and Anarchist Communism 
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alike have arisen from the perception that private capital 
is a source of tyranny by certain individuals over others. 
The difference in them is that whereas orthodox Socialism 
believes that the individual will become free if the state 
becomes the sole capitalist, Anarchists do not subscribe to 
this view. Anarchists fear that in that case the state might 
merely inherit the tyrannical propensities of the private 
capitalists. Accordingly, it seeks for a means of 
reconciling communal ownership with the utmost possible 
diminution in the powers of the state, and indeed ultimately 
with the complete abolition of the state. 
In the same sense in which Marx may be regarded as 
the founder of modern Socialism, Bakunin may be regarded as 
the founder of Anarchist Communism. But Bakunin did not 
produce, like Marx, a finished and a systematic body of 
doctrine. It is his illustrious follower, kropotkin, who 
completed the unfinished task. 
Kropotkin has devoted much of his writing to 
technical question of production. He has set himself to 
prove that if production were more scientific and better 
organized, a comparatively small amount of quite agreeable 
work would suffice to keep the whole population in comfort. 
The system at which kroptkin aims is one which 
demands a very great improvement in the methods of 
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production. He desires to abolish wholly: the system of 
wages, not in the sense as most socialists desire, but in 
the sense that a man is to be paid rather for his 
willingness to work not for the actual work demanded of him. 
There should not be iuay obligation to work and all things are 
to be shared in equal proportions among the whole 
population. In kropotkin's evisaged world everyone will 
prefer work to idleness, because work, will not involve 
overwork or slavery. Work will be merely, a pleasent activity 
for certain hours of the day, giving a man an outlet for his 
spontaneous constructive impulses. Writes kropotkin: 
Overwork is repulsive to human nature not 
work. Overwork for supplying the few with 
luxury not for the well-being of all. Work, 
labour, is a physiological necessity, a 
necesssity of spending accumulated bodily 
energy, a necessity which is health and life 
itself. If so many branches of useful work are 
so reluctantly done now, it is merely because 
they mean overwork, or they are improperly 
, 15 organized. 
In such a society there is to be no compulsion, no 
15. Kropotkin, Anarchist Communism, Freedom Press, 127 
Ossulston Street, N.V/.I. 
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law, no government exercising force. But there will still be 
acts of the community, but these acts are to spring from 
universal consent, not from the enforced submission of even 
the smallast minority. 
One fundamental difference between Socialist and 
Communist Anarchist is the way of governing. Anarchist 
communists demand that government shall require the consent 
of all the governed, and not only of a majority. They hold 
that the rule of a majority may be almost as hostile to 
freedom as the rule of a minority. A strong democratic state 
may easily be led into oppression of its best citizens. 
Experience of democratic parliamentary government has shown 
that it falls far short of expectation. So the Anarchists' 
revolt against this is not surprising. 
In regards to the distribution of world's goods 
communist Anarchists differ from Socialists. Socialism, at 
any rate in most of its forms, would retain the system of 
payment for work or for willingness to work. It intends to 
make willingess to work a condition of subsistence (except 
in the case of persons incapacitated by age or infirmity). 
Anarchism, on the other hand, aims at granting to everyone 
just as much of all ordinary commodities as he or she may 
care to consume. They are not in favour of putting any 
condition whatever. In case of rare commodities, of which 
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the supply cannot be indefinitely increased, they propose to 
divide these rare commodities equally among the population. 
Thus Anarchism would not impose any obligation of work. 
Russell thinks that though Anarchism should be the 
ultimate ideal to which society should continually 
approximate, for the present it is impossible to practice. 
On the other hand, both Maxian Socialism and Syndicalism, in 
spite of many drawbacks, is calculated to give rise to a 
happier and better world than that in which we live. But 
neither of them can be regarded as the best practicable 
system. Marxian Socialism, Russell fears, would give too 
much power to the state, while Syndicalism, which aims at 
abolishing the state, whould find itself forced to 
reconstruct a central authority in order to put an end to the 
rivalries of different groups of producers. the best 
practicable system, according to Russell, is Guild 
Socialism. In the next chapter we shall see for what reasons 
Russell favours this system. 
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CHAPTER - I 
A PHILOSOPHER IN THE FIELD OF POLITICS 
The political philosphy of Russell can be broadly 
divided into two parts, negative and positive. In the 
negative part he points out the drawbacks of existing 
systems and in the positive part he attempts to evolve a new 
system. His new system is an assortment in the sense that in 
that system he only conflated the best things of existing 
systems with some modifications wherever necessary. 
Russell opines that political ideals must be based 
upon the ideals of the individual. To think, speak, and act 
without interference is the most cherished freedom of an 
individual. Hence in judging, an institution we shall have 
to see whether it promotes these values or becomes an 
hindrance in promoting these. Russell puts it succintly thus 
in his Political Ideals : 
Political ideals must be based upon ideals for 
the individual life. The aim of politics 
should be to make lives of individuals as good 
as possible. There is nothing for the 
politician to consider outside or above the 
various men, women and children who compose 
the world. The problem of politics is to 
adjust the relations of human beings in such a 
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way that each severally may have as much of 
good in his existence as possible.^ 
Russell uses this philosophy to examine capitalism, 
different forms of Socialism, public control, national 
independence and internationalism. His conclusion is that 
politics should aim at enabling every man to exercise his 
natural creativity. 
The above point inevitably leads us to the question 
what it is that can be regarded as good in the individual 
life. Russell believes that it is not single ideal for all 
men, but a separate ideal for each separate man that should 
be regarded as good. Every man has some natural capacity. It 
can be developed into something good or something bad. It is 
the circumstances of the society in which he lives that will 
determine whether his capacities for good are developed or 
crushed. Again, it is the same thing (i.e, his 
circumstances) that will determine whether his bad impulses 
are strengthened or gradually diverted into better channels. 
Nevertheless Russell thinks that there are some broad 
principles which can be used to guide our estimates as to 
what is possible or desirable. He states these broad 
principles on the basis of his philosophy of impulse. 
1. Russell, B., Political Ideals, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 
1977, p.9. 
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I. PHILOSOPHY OF IMPULSE 
According to Russell, all human activities spring 
from two sources desire and impulse. In a previous section 
we have seen the distinction between the two sources. 
Russell says that the role played by desire in human 
activity has been sufficiently recognised by the previous 
thinkers. Accordingly political philosophy hitherto has been 
almost entirely based upon desire as the source of human 
actions. But, says Russell, desire governs only a part of 
human activity. Even this part is not the most important but 
only the more conscious, explicit and civilized part. He 
writes, "In all the more instinctive part of our nature we 
are dominated by impulses to certain kinds of activity, not by 
2 
desire for certain ends." Russell gives such instances like 
instinctive acts which are done out of impulse, not out of 
desire. Although instinctive acts normally achieve some 
results (expectation of results is the mark of desire), yet 
they are not performed from desire for these results. Again, 
Russell cites such examples as running and shouting of 
children as those acts which are done out of impulse. 
Children run and shout, says Russell, not because of any 
good which they want to realise, but because of direct 
impulse of running and shouting. 
2. Russell, B., Principles of Social Reconstruction, George 
Allen S; Unwin Ltd., London 1960, p. 12. 
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Hence Russell emphatically says that a greater part 
of human activity is done out of impulse. When an impulse is 
not given free expression in the moment in which it arises, 
there grows up a desire for the expected conseqeunces of 
indulging the impulse. If some of the consequences which are 
reasonably to be expected are disagreeable then a conflict 
arises between foresight and impulse. If the impulse is 
weak, foresight conquers in the conflict. It is this 
situation what Russell calls acting on reason. But if the 
impulse is sufficiently strong then either foresight will be 
falsified or even the disagreeable consequences will be 
recklessly accepted. But, says Russell, such strength and 
recklessness are rare events. In most of the cases, when 
impulse is strong, we subconsciously persuade ourselves in 
thinking that agreeable consequences will follow from the 
indulgence of our impulses. In this way whole philosophies 
and whole system of ethical evaluation spring up. 
When an impulse is restrained, i.e., it is not given 
free outlet, we feel discomfort and even violent pain. We 
may then give free expression to our impulse in order to 
escape from this pain. When it is done then our action has a 
purpose. Our impulse is then directed to an act yet, says 
Russell, impulse itself remains without a purpose. 
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Russell asserts that impulse is at the basis of our 
many activities and its share is much more than desire. On 
account of the complexity of the nature of impulse we cannot 
always identify it distinctly. Impulses are sometimes even 
accompanied by fictitious desires. It makes us feel that we 
desire the results which will follow from indulging the 
impulses and that we are acting for the sake of these 
results. But this actually is not the case. Russell writes: 
"...direct impulse is what moves us, and the desires which 
3 we think we have are a mere garment for the impulse." 
Russell is conscious that impulse being erratic and 
anarchical is not suitable for a well-regulated system. It 
may be tolerated in children and in artists. But it is not 
proper for those who are hoped to be taken seriously. Desire 
has a large and increasing share in regulating their lives. 
Another characteristic of impulse, as mentioned by 
Russell, is that it is essentially blind, in the sense that 
it does not spring from any prevision of consequences. The 
man who does not share the same impulse will form a 
different estimate as to what the consequences will be. 
Again, there will be disagreement about the desirability of 
the consequences. Though the basis of this difference of 
_ p.14. 
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opinion may seem to be ethical or intellectual, its real 
basis is a difference of impulse. Russell admits that blind 
impulses sometimes lead to destruction and death. But at 
the same time it is this blind impulse what gives the world 
the best things that it contains: blind impulse is the 
source of war, but it is also the source of science, art, 
and love. It is not the weakening of impulse, insists 
Russell, that is to be desired, but the direction of impulse 
"towards life and growth rather than towards death and 
decay." 
Russell does not subscribe to the moralists view who 
say that impulses should completely be controlled by will. 
He writes: "A life governed by purposes and desires, to the 
exclusion of impulse, is a tiring life; it exhausts 
vitality, and leaves a man, in the end, indifferent to the 
very purposes which he has been trying to achieve. When a 
whole nation lives in this way, the whole nation tends to 
become feeble, without enough grasp to recognize and 
4 overcome the obstactes to its desires." 
As to the psychology of impulse Russell thinks that 
they are moulded partly by native disposition of the agent 
and partly by opportunity and environment. A direct 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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preaching can do very little to change our impulse. He 
admits that on account of direct preaching one may restrain 
the direct expression of them. But it will only force the 
impulse to remain in a concealed state and whenever it gets 
opportunity it will surface, sometimes even in twisted form. 
Owing to this, recommends Russell, once it has been 
discovered what kind of impulses are desirable, we must not 
remain content with preaching. What is to be done is to 
alter our institutions in the way that will modify the life 
of impulse in the desired direction. 
Russell gives various divisions of impulse in 
different books. In Principles of Social Reconstruction he 
divides impulses into those that 'make for life' and those 
that 'make for death'. He mentions such examples as impulses 
embodied in war and impulses that move somebody, to oppose 
war. The former one is the instance of impulse that makes for 
life and the latter one that makes for death. But in some 
other books such as in Human Society in Ethics and Politics 
and in Political Ideals, Russell gives another division of 
impulse: those which are possessive and those which are 
creative. This distinction turns out to be of great 
importance and it has become integral to his social 
theories. 
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Goods (e.g. material goods) of which individual 
possession is possible are direct expression of 
possessiveness. The kind of impulse which correspond to this 
type of good is called by Russell possessive impulse. It 
aims at acquiring or retaining private goods that cannot be 
shared. For example, the food and clothing of one man is not 
the food and clothing of another. If the supply is 
insu-fficient, what one man has is obtained at the expense of 
some other man. Possessiveness is either defensive or 
aggressive : it seeks either to retain against a robber, or 
to acquire from a present holder. In either case an attitude 
of hostility toward others is of its essence. 
Again, there are goods in which all can share alike, 
e.g. mental and spiritual goods. If one man becomes a great 
artist or a poet that does not prevent others from painting 
pictures or writing poems. Rather it helps to create the 
atmosphere in which such things are possible. The impulses 
corresponding to this type of goods are called by Russell 
creative or constructive impulses. This kind of impulse aims 
at brining into the world or making available for use the 
kind of goods in which there is no privacy or no possession. 
There is no possession because there is not a definite 
amount to be shared. Any increase anywhere tends to produce 
an increase everywhere. 
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For Russell, the best life is that in which creative 
impulses have preponderance. Possessive impulses lead to 
unhealthy competition. It is the source of all moral evils 
that infest this world. Material possession, as we have 
seen, can be taken away by force. But goods which are the 
result of creative impulses are free from these evils. They 
cannot be taken away by force. A stronger person may kill an 
artist, but by doing this he cannot rob the artist's skill. 
MilA* AMU A*AAaAM*A 
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II. RUSSELL'S POLITICAL IDEALS : 
Having given a lucid explanation of the two dominant 
impulses of human beings, Russell states, in terms of this 
distinction, what is desirable in an individual life. In 
Plitical Ideals he gives a list of desirable goods. These 
are: strong creative impulses; overpowering and absorbing 
the instinct of possession; reverence for others; respect 
for the foundamental creative impulse in overselves.^ 
In the list of desirable goods prominent place has 
been accorded to strong creative impulse. But for 
cultivating this sort of good, fulfilment of some basic 
needs is a prerequisite. Without some possessive goods many 
of the goods which all might share (i.e., creative goods) 
are difficult to acquire. For example, a great artist cannot 
devote his time on his art if he is required to spend a 
greater portion of his time for earning his livelihood. For 
this reason Russell lays stress on the point that if men are 
to have free play of their creative impulses, they ought to 
be given security for the necessities of a tolerable life. 
Moreover, they should also have a sufficient amount of share 
of power which can enable them to exercise initiative. The 
necessity of power is that without it there is no scope for 
taking initiative. At present our institutions rest upon 
5. Russell, B., Political Ideals, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 
1977, p.13. 
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property and power and both are very unevenly distributed. 
In the first chapter of Political Ideals Russell 
enunciates the criterion for the appraisal of political and 
social institutions. His criterion is this: 
Political and social institutions are to be 
judged by the good or harm that they do to 
individuals.^ 
He gives us some clues in the form of 
questions to facilitate our judgement. These 
are : 
Do they encourage creativeness rather than 
possessiveness? 
Do they embody or promote a spirit of 
reverence between human beings? 
Do they preserve self-respect? 
Making use of these clues Russell gives an assessment of our 
present institutions. His conclusion is that in all these 
respects the institutions under which we live are indeed far 
from what they ought to be. 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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Institutions, mainly the economic systems, have a 
profound influence in moulding the characters of their 
people. Our present economic system, which is wholly built 
on competition, is unjust. It gives honour to wealth instead 
of wisdom. In such an atmosphere even the men who have been 
richly endowed with creative gifts become infected with the 
element of competition. In such a milieu men combine in 
groups to attain more strength in the scramble for material 
goods. The burning example of such groups are our present 
trade Unions. Though they are largely inspired by the hope 
of a radically better world, their immediate object is to 
secure a larger share of material goods. Russell admits that 
what trade unions are doing is in accordance with justice. 
But, he says, something larger and more constructive is 
needed as a political ideal. If we lack such an ideal there 
is a possibility, and indeed there are plethora of 
instances, that the victors of today may become the 
oppressors of the day next. 
Present economic systems help to concentrate 
initiative in the hands of a few individuals. Those who are 
not capitalists have to sell themselves to some large 
organisation for earning their livelihood. They do not have 
any say in the management of the organisation at which he 
works. Here the individual has no liberty and is treated 
just like a machine. A journalist , who .is engaged in 
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writing for a newspaper is forced to write in tune with his 
master's voice with whose politics he may disagree. 
Economic affairs, holds Russell, touch men's lives 
much more intimately than political questions. For fear of 
destitution men become increasingly docile, increasingly 
ready to submit to the dictation of their masters. They are 
compelled to forgo the right of thinking for themselves. But 
where there is fear of destitution, creative life cannot 
grow. In such a situation a man naturally gives most of his 
time for accumulating wealth. Russell feels that the hope of 
possessing more wealth and power than a man should have is 
bad in its effects. It forces men to close their minds 
against justice. Again, it prevents them to think honestly 
on social issues. Hence Russell underlines the need to 
rendering impossible the injustice of destitution as well as 
accumulating more wealth than actual need. 
But, for Russell, economic security and liberty are 
only negative conditions for good political institutions. 
Once they have been achieved, we need to be concentrated on 
positive condition. This positive condition is encouragement 
of creative energy. Security alone may produce a smug and 
stationary society. Therefore creativeness is needed to keep 
alive the adventure and interest of life and the movement 
towards perpetually new and better things. There can be. 
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says Russell, no final goal for institutions. The best 
institutions are those that provide us more and more 
encouragement for progress toward others which are still 
better. Without effort and change human life cannot remain 
good. Hence Russell writes, "It is not a finished Utopia 
that we ought to desire, but a world where imagination and 
7 hope are alive and active." 
Another defect of our present institutions is its 
large size. On account of vastness of organisations people 
are governed by those who know and care little for the lives 
of those whom they control. The captains of organisations 
owing to their ignorance of those whom they control kill 
their individuality and freedom of mind thus forcing men 
more and more to conform to a uniform pattern. Russell makes 
our present educational system largely responsible for this. 
Hence he advocates a drastic change in the present 
educational system. He proposes such educational system 
where children will be encouraged to think and fell for 
themselves, and not to acquisce passively in the thoughts 
and feelings of others. 
In spite of its drawbacks, Russell does not favour 
the abolition of vastness of organisations. He thinks that 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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such vast organisations are inevitable in modern life. What 
is needed is reformation of organisations in such a way that 
it gives greatest possible scope for individual initiative. 
One important step according to Russell, in this direction 
would be to democratise the government of every 
organisation. At present almost every limited company is run 
by a small number of self-appointed or co-opted directors. 
There can be no real freedom or democracy until the men who 
do the work in an organisation also control its management. 
Another measure, suggested by Russell, in this 
direction is gracing self-government to subordinate groups 
like geographical or economic or defined by some common 
be]ief such as religious sects. The reason for doing this is 
that a modern state is very large and its complicated 
machinery is little understood. That is why even when a man 
has a right to vote he does not feel himself any effective 
part of the force which determines its policy. In such 
circumstance the government remains like a remote impersonal 
phenomen which must be simply tolerated just like weather. 
Russell upholds the view that by a share in the control of 
smaller bodies a man might regain some sense of personal 
opportunity and responsibility. 
Russell maintains that the best form of government 
would be that one which grants total liberty of actions in 
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all matters which are not of great importance to the outside 
world. But in matters which affect outside world complete 
freedom is not desirable. Some control is needed in this 
area. Russell accedes that IJterty demands self-government, 
but at the same time he is also aware that to secure 
greatest degree of liberty some sort of determinative 
mechanism is inevitable. As Russell puts it, "The greatest 
Q 
degree of liberty is not secured by anarchy." 
Russell, like all other political theorists, faces 
the problem that arises out of conflict between individual 
liberty and governmental control. The essence of government 
demands the use of force in accordance with law to secure 
certain ends. The holders of power consider these ends 
desirable. On the other hand, the coercion of an individual, 
or a group, by force is always in itself more or less 
harmful. But if there is no controlling mechanism, the 
predatory instinct of men will urge the stronger to exploit 
the weaker. Hence some amount of force is necessary to 
achieve greatest liberty. Russell mentions one purpose for 
which the use of force by the government is desirable. The 
purpose is to diminish the total amount of force used in the 
world. For example, the legal prohibition of murder 
diminishes the total amount of violence in the world. A man 
Ibid, p.17. 
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cannot be given such liberty which will allow him to 
perpetrate violence. Hence Russell maintains that although 
individuals and societies should have the utmost freedom as 
to their own affairs, they ought not to have complete 
freedom as regards their dealings with others. From all this 
Russell's theory of legitimate use of force in human affairs 
becomes clear. "Force should only be used against those who 
attempt to use force against others, or against those who 
will not respect the law in cases where a common decision is 
necessary and a monority are opposed to the action of the 
9 majority." 
Though Russell thinks that a government must have the 
power to use force, he suggests several ways to diminish its 
use. He urges the reformers on aiming at such institutions 
which will diminish the need for actual coercion. To cite an 
instance he says that most of us abstain from theft, not 
because it is illegal, but because we feel no desire to 
steal. He is of the opinion that when our creative impulse 
will have preponderance our inclination to misdeeds will 
diminish grdually. Russell writes, "The more we learn to 
live creatively rather than possessively, the less their 
wishes will lead them to thwart others or attempt violent 
interference with their liberty. 
9. Ibid, p.21 
10. Ibdi, p.21. 
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Most of the conflict of interests which lead 
individuals and organisations into squabble are, according 
to Russell, purely imaginary. He is confident that this fact 
will become clear once we aim more at the goods which all 
can share and less at those private possessions that are the 
source of strife. In proportion as men live creatively, they 
cease to wish to interefere with others by force. Russell 
thinks that good political insti'tulions, achievement of which 
should be the aim of reformer, would weaken the impulse towa-
rd force and domination in two ways : 
First, it will be accomplished by increasing the 
opportunities for the creative impulses and by shaping 
education so as to strengthen these impulses. 
Secondly, a good political institution will diminish 
the outlets for the possessive instincts. In a good 
political instituion there will be diffusion of power, both 
in political and the economic sphere. It would greatly 
diminish the opportunities for acquiring the habit of 
command out of which the desire for exercising tyranny is 
apt to spring. Autonomy at all level would diminish the 
number of occasions when government will be needed to make 
decisions as to other people's concerns. 
Russell says emphatically that many of the evils from 
which we suffer are wholly avoidable. By a united effort all 
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these evils can be abolished within a couple of years. His 
optinism is vivid in the following lines : 
If a majority in every civilised country so 
desired, we could, within twenty years, 
abolish all abject poverty, quite half the 
illness in the world, the whole economic 
slavery which binds down nine tenths of our 
population; we could fill the world with 
beauty and joy, and secure the regain of 
universal peace. It is only because 
imagination is sluggish, and what always has 
been is regarded as what always must be. V/ith 
good-will, generosity, intelligence, these 
things could be brought about.^^ 
* * * * 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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III. RUSSELL AS A CRITIC OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM 
Capitalism and the wage system, the 'twin monsters' 
as Russell called it, generate many evils which are actually 
preventable. Under this system all men, from the highest 
rung to the lowest, are absorbed in economic struggle the 
struggle to acquire what is their due or to retain what is 
not their due. Material possessions dominate the outlook of 
every person. It is moreover wasteful and unjust wasteful 
on the production side and unjust on the distribution side. 
It involves a life of slavery to economic forces for the 
great majority of the community, and for the minority a 
degree of power over the lives of others which no man should 
have. Russell regarded material possession, or 
possessiveness, as the foundation of all ills from which the 
political world was suffering. In place of capitalism and 
wage system, he says, we need a system which will on the one 
hand, check man's predatory impulses and. Oxi the other, will 
diminish the economic injustice that allows some persons to 
be rich in idleness while others remain poor in spite of 
unremitting labour. 
The main reason for Russell's opposition to 
capitalism is that the causes of war are rooted in it. Apart 
from this, even in time of peace, this system is not free 
from evils. Under this system most men are subjected to 
monotonous labour for a mere pittance, most women are 
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condemned to drudgery, and most children are compelled to 
grow up in ignorance. On the other hand, the fortunate few 
live a parasitic life, with unjust privileges continually 
growing richer and richer. 
Capitalism is defended on the ground that it 
facilitates the greatest production of goods as well as 
technical progress. Repudiating this argument Russell says 
that "it only does this in a very short-sighted way, by 
methods which are wasteful in the long run In order to 
augment the production of goods capitalism continually 
brings new portions of earth's surface under the sway of 
industrialism. By this means it causes immense damage to 
mankina. Healthy and vigorous people are lured by monetary 
gain and are forced to lead a sweating and slum life which 
reduce their vitality. What is true of human resources is 
equally true of natural resources. The mines, forests and 
other natural resources are exploited at a rate in the name 
of greatest production that they are bound to exhaust at no 
distant time. 
Another glaring evil of capitalism is the 
encouragement given by it to predatory impulses. There are 
two ways, says Russell, of acquiring wealth one by 
1. Russell, B., Political Ideals, Unwin Paperbacks, London 
1980, p.25. 
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Production, the other by robbery. Though robbery is 
forbidden under capitalism, notwithstanding there are many 
ways of becoming rich without contributing anything to the 
wealth of the community. Ownership of land or capital, 
acquiried or inherited, gives a legal right to a permanent 
income to its holder. Although most people are made to work 
in order to live, a privileged minority are able to live in 
luxury without producing anything at all. Since these are 
the men who are not only the most fortunate but also the 
most respected in society, there is a general desire to 
enter their rank. In such a circumstance men try to amass 
fortunes not by means of useful inventions or of any other 
action which increases the general wealth of the community, 
but by skill in exploiting or circumventing others. It is 
not only among the rich that it promotes acquisitive spirit, 
but the constant risk of destitution compels most men also 
to fill a great part of their time and thought with the 
economic struggle. 
The most obvious evil of capitalism is that it allows 
2 
economic injustice. Russell says that it is utterly absurd 
to think that the men who inherit great wealth deserve 
better than those who have to work for their living. 
Economic justice, for Russell, does not mean exact equal 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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income for everybody. He holds that some kinds of work 
require a larger income for efficiency than others do. But 
it is economic injustice when a man has more than his share, 
unless it is because af his efficiency in his work which 
deserves it or as a reward for some great service. When 
Russell says that capitalism allows economic injustice he 
has in mind this sort of injustice. 
Finally, the most important shortcoming of 
capitalism is that it gives great scope of tyranny to the 
employer. Here employers are empowered to dismiss the 
workers from their job. Armed with this power employers even 
interfere with the workers' such activities which lie 
outside their working hours. A man may be thrown out of his 
job because the employer dislikes his religion or politics. 
He may be dismissed because he tries to produce a spirit of 
independence among his fellow employees. It is often argued 
that the right of dismissal by the employer is essential to 
stimulate the workers. But Russell counteracts this by 
saying that as men grow more civilized, stimulation based on 
hope become increasingly preferable to those that are based 
on fear. To put it in his own words: "It would be far 
better that men should be rewarded for working well than 
3 
that they should be punished for working badly." 
3. Ibid, p.28. 
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To curb the evils of* capitalism and for a radical 
reconstruction, which is calculated to give rise a happier 
and better world than our present one, many thinkers 
advocate socialism. In course of time socialism has assumed 
different forms, main difference being the ways of realizing 
the goal. Russell had shown full sympathy to the goals of 
Socialism though he disagreed with the means adopted by the 
various groups of Socialists. 
About Syndicalism, which is an important form of 
Socialism, Russell says that it really preaches dramatic 
conception. According to Syndicalists, as we have seen in 
the introduction, everything has to wait for the General 
Strike. After adequate preparation one day whole workers 
would refuse to work unanimously. The capitalists would than 
acknowledge their defeat and would agree to abandon all 
their privileges. This type of conception is a dramatic 
conception. Russell is of the view that men cannot be 
trained, except under very rare circumstances, to do 
something suddenly which is very different from what they 
have been doing before. Hence there is little possibility of 
success of the Syndicalists' programme. Russell thinks that 
for any economic reform, if it has any hope of success, it 
must have some proximate end as well as an ultimate end. 
Syndicalism lacks the former and emphasizes only the 
latter. The drawback of a programme which is inte'ded to be 
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realized at some remote time by a revolution or a General 
Strike is that enthusiasm flags when there is nothing to do 
meanwhile. A proximate goal trains men for those that are to 
be ultimately carried out and also encourages the workers by 
achievements of the near goals. 
Syndicalists aim at only economic reform and are 
opposed to all political action. Russell comments that this 
attitude only reduce their hope of success. Even if the 
General Strike were to succeed the victors would be 
compelled at once to form an administration, to create a 
police force to prevent locating and wanton destruction, and 
to establish a provisional government. But on account of 
their opposition to political action they would feel (after 
their victory) that they were departing from their principle 
in taking the necessary political steps. Again, they would 
find themselves inexperienced in this field because of their 
previous abstention from politics. For these reasons it is 
likely that even after a Syndicalist revolution actual power 
would fall into the hands of men who were not really 
Syndicalists. 
Syndicalists want to make trades fully self-governing 
without having any control of central authority. Russell 
says that in such a system economic justice cannot be 
secured. For some trades are in a much stronger bargaining 
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position than others. Coal and transport, for instance, can 
paralyse the national life and hence in a stronger position 
to bargain whereas school teachers can rouse little terror 
by a threat of strike. Hence Russell observes' "Justice can 
never be secured by any system of unrestrained force 
exercised by interested parties in their own interests. For 
this reason the abolitin of the state which the Syndicalists 
seem to desire, would be a measure not compatible with 
4 economic justice." 
Notwithstanding all these drawbacks of Syndicalism, 
Russell says that it has undoubtedly contributed greatly to 
the revival of the Labour Movement. Instead of remaining 
content with the mere increase of the material well-being 
of the workers, it has underscored the need of procuring 
freedom in work which is of fundamental importance. Paying 
tribute to Syndicalism he writes : 
They have revived the quest for liberty, which 
was growing somewhat dimmed under the regime 
of parliamentary Socialism, and they have 
reminded men that what our modern society 
needs is not a little tinkering here and 
there, nor the kind of minor readjustments to 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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vJbich the existing holders of power may 
readily consent, but a fuEdamental 
reconstruction, a sweeping away of all the 
sources of oppression, a liberation of men's 
constructive energies, and a wholly new way of 
conceiving and regulating production and 
economic relations. This merit is so great 
that, in view of it, all minor defects become 
insignificant.^ 
Russell seems to have been fascinated by the 
Anarchists' programme. In particular he was profoundly 
influenced by the exposition of Kropotkin. Russell was aware 
that for the present it was imposible to implement their 
plan, yet, he says, pure Anarchism should be the ultimate 
ideal to which the society should continually approximate. 
The Anarchists' proposals consist of two parts: one, 
that all commodities should be supplied ad lib to all 
applicants; second, that no obligation to work or economic 
reward for work should be imposed on anyone. As regard to 
first proposal, Russell thinks that it can be carried out 
even now with regard to some commodities. It can be carried 
out with regard to many more objects in no very distant 
5. Russell, B., Roads to Freedom, Pp.66-67. 
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future. It is a flexible plan, article of 
consumption could be placed on the free list or taken off if 
circumstances so demand. It has many advantages. Hence 
Russell concludes that this part of the Anarchists' plan 
might well be adopted bit by bit reaching gradually the full 
extension that they desire. 
But Russell expresses doubt about the practicability 
of the second proposal, i.e. there should be no obligation 
to work and no economic reward for work. Anarchists assume 
that if their schemes were put into operation practically 
every one would work. Kropotkin writes : 
As to the so-often repeated objection that 
nobody would labour if he were not compelled 
to do by sheer necessity, we heard enough of 
it before the emancipation of slaves in 
America, as well as before the emancipation of 
serfs in Russia; and we have had the 
opportunity of appreciating it at its just 
value. So we shall not try to convince those 
who can be convinced only by accomplished 
facts. As to those who reason, they ought to 
know that, if it really was so with some parts 
of humanity at its lowest stages and yet, 
what do we know about it? or if it is so 
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with small communities, or separate 
individuals, brought to sheer despair by 
ill-success in their struggle against 
unfavourable conditions, it is not so with the 
bulk of the civilized nations. With us work is 
a habit, and idleness an artificial growth. 
It is exactly at this point that Russell disagrees with the 
Anarchists. He thinks that in a community where industry had 
become habitual through economic pressure, public opinion 
may be sufficiently powerful to compel most men to work. 
But, adds Russell, it is always doubtful how far such a 
state of things would be permanent. If public opinion is to 
be really effective, it will be necessary to have some 
method of dividing the community into small groups. Each 
group than be allowed to consume only the equivalent of that 
amount what it produces. This will make the economic 
motive operative upon the group which, supposing it small, 
will feel that its collective share is appreciably 
diminished by each ideal individual. Russell opines that 
6. Kropotkin, 'Anarchist Communism' (Freedom Press, 127, 
Ossulston Street, N.W.I.) p.36. 
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though the anarchists plan might be made feasible in this 
way, yet it would be contrary to the whole spirit of 
Anarchism. 
As regard to Marxian theory of Socialism Russell 
raises two questions: One, are his (Marx's) law of 
historical development true? Second, is Socialism desirable? 
Marx did not give any clear-cut answer to the second 
question, he was mainly concerned to show that Socialism 
must come. He scracely concerns himself to show that when it 
comes it will be a good thing. 
As regard to first point Russell says that past 
developments do not sufficiently prove the truth of Marx's 
prediction. Marx has predicted that on account of 
class-consciousness nationalism will diminish and it will be 
superseded by cosmopolition tendencies. But nationalism 
instead of diminishing, says Russell, has rather increased 
and could not have been conquered by cosmopolitionism. 
Marx's prediction that under capitalism wage-earners 
would remain at the bare level of subsistence has been 
falsified by recent developments. They have instead profited 
by the general increase of wealth, though in a lesser degree 
than the capitalists. Hence Russell comments, "The supposed 
iron law of wages has been proved untrue, so far as labour 
in civilized countries are concerned. If we wish now to find 
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examples of capitalist cruelty analogous to those with which 
Marx's book is filled, we shall have to go for most of our 
7 material to the Tropics..." 
Again, Russell thinks that the clear-cut logical 
antithesis between the workers who have nothing and the 
capilatists who have everything, as drawn by Marx, has not 
been sufficiently proved to be true by historical 
developments. The skilled worker of the t>resent day is an 
aristocrat in the world of labour. It is a question with him 
whether he should ally himself with the unskilled workers 
against the capitalists, or with the capitalists against the 
unskilled workers. Very often he himself is a capitalist in 
a small way. Hence the sharpness of the class war has not 
been maintained. 
Russell says that to judge any political doctrine two 
questions must be asked: First, are its theoretical tenets 
true; Second, Is its practical policy likely to increase 
human hapiness? As far as the theoretical tenets of Marxim 
are concerned Russell is of the view that they are false. 
His two objections to Marx are: "that he was muddleheaded" 
and "that his thinking was almost entirely inspired by 
hatred". Russell says that Marx has arrived at the doctrine 
7. Russell, B., Roads to Freedom, p.34. 
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of surplus value, which demonstrates the exploitation of 
wage-earners under capitalism, by surreptitiously accepting 
Malthuse'^doctrine of papulation (which Marx and his disciples 
explicitly repudiate), and by applying Ricardo's theory of 
value to wages. "He (Marx) is entirely satisfied with the 
result", Russell writes, "not because it is in accordance 
with the facts or because it is logically coherent, but 
because it is calculated to rouse fury to wage-earners. 
Marx's doctrine that all historical events have been 
motivated by class conflicts is a rash and unture extension 
to world history of certain features prominent in England 
and France a hundred years ago. His belief that there is a 
cosmic force called Dialectical Materialism which governs 
human history independently of human volitions, is mere 
mythology. His theoretical errors, however, would not have 
mattered so much but for the fact that ...his chief desire 
was to see his enemies punished, and he cared little what 
g 
happened to his friends in the process." 
Having shown that the theoretical tenets of Marxism 
are not flawless, Russell attempts to show that its 
practical maxims are such that it would enormously increase 
human misery. Taking the instance of Sovie t Union (now 
defunct) he tries to prove this point. 
8. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory,pp.229-30. 
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Russell found two sorts of error in the Marxist 
philosophy, as interpreted in Moscow one of theory and one 
of feeling. The theoretical error consists in believing that 
the only undesirable form of power over other human beings 
is economic power, and that economic power is co-extensive 
with ownership. In this theory other forms of power like 
military, political and propagandist, etc. are ignored. It 
was supposed that exploitation and oppression must disappear 
if the state become the sole capitalist. They did not 
realize that this would confer upon the state officials all 
the powers of oppression formerly possessed by individual 
capitalists. So long as they control the army, they are able 
to wield despotic power even if they are a small minority. 
These officials could govern as they pleased so long as they 
retained the support of soldiers. 
Secondly, Bolshevik's theory is that a small minority 
are to seize power and are to hold it until communism is 
accepted practically universally. Russell refutes this 
argument by saying that power is sweet and few men surrender 
it voluntarily. It is especially sweet to those who govern 
without popular support. Hence Russell raises the question: 
"Is it not almost inevitable that men placed as the 
Bolsheviks are placed in Russia, and as they maintain that 
the communists must place themselves wherever the social 
revolution succeeds, will be loath to relinquish their 
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monopoly of power, and will find rasons for remaining until 
9 -some new revolution oust them?" 
Finally, Russell thinks it sheer nonsense to pretend 
that the rulers of a great empire, when they have become 
accustomed to power, would retain their proletarian 
psychology. Again, it is wrong to think that their (rulers') 
class-interest is the same as that of the ordinary working 
men. Writes Russell, "The Government has a 
class-consciousness and a class-interest quite distinct from 
those of the genuine proletarian....In a capitalist state, 
the Government and the capitalists on the whole hang 
together, and form one class; in Soviet Russia, the 
Government has absobed the capitalist mentality together 
with the governmental, and the fusion has given increased 
strength to the upper class. But I see no reason whatever to 
expect equality or freedom to result from such a system, 
except reasons derived from a flase psychology and a 
mistaken analysis of the sources of political power. 
The other error related to feeling consists in 
supposing that a good state of affairs can be brought about 
by a movement of which the motive force is hate. Russell 
9. Russell, B., The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London 1962, p.106. 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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traces the ultimate source of the whole train of evils (in 
Sovient Russia) in the Bolshevik outlook on life in its 
dogmatism of hatred and in its belief that human nature can 
be completely transformed by force. Says Russell, "In the 
principles of Bolshevism there is a more desire to destroy 
ancient evils than to build up new goods; it is for this 
reason that success in destruction has been so much greater 
than in construction. The desire to destroy is inspired by 
hatred, which is not a constructive principle... 11 is only 
out of a quite different mentality that a happier world can 
be c r e a t e d . R u s s e l l argues that those who are inspired 
mainly by hatred of capitalists and landowners, have 
acquired the habit of hating. Even after their victory they 
are impelled to look for new objects of detestation. From 
errors in psychological and political theory the Bolsheviks 
created a hell instead of a heaven. 
On account of all these defects Russell rejected 
Bolshevism. He concludes that the price mankind has to pay to 
achieve communism, by Bolshevik methods, is too terrible.And 
even after paying the price the results would not be what 
the Bolsheviks desire to achieve. 
11. Ibid, p.123. 
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Russell confessed that when the spectale of the then 
Russia forced him to disbelieve in Bolshevik methods, he was 
at first unable to see any way of curing the essential evils 
of capitalism. He was contemplating to abandon political 
thinking considering it as a bad job. It occurred to him 
that the strong and ruthless must always exploit the weaker 
and the kindlier sections of the population. "But this is 
not the attitude that can be long maintained by any 
vigourous and temparamentally hopeful persons", he writes. 
Hence he attempts to give a better system which will be free 
of the evils of Bolshevism. 
Two things, says Russell, must be admitted : One, 
that many of the worst evils of capitalism might survive 
under communism; second, that the cure of these evils cannot 
be sudden, since it requires changes in the mentality of 
average men. 
Russell does not think that mere inequality of 
wealth, in itself, is a very great evil. He aruges that if 
everybody has enough, the fact that some persons have more 
than enough would hardly matter. With a very moderate 
improvement in methods of production, even under capitalism 
it would be possible to ensure that everybody gets enough. 
According to him, the problem of poverty is by no means 
insoluble within the existing system. 
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For Russell, the graver evils of capitalist system 
arise from its uneven distribution of power. The possessors 
of capital wield an influence quite out of proportion to 
their numbers or their services to the community. They 
control almost the whole education and press. They decide 
what the average man shall know or not know. Men are 
compelled to work much harder and more monotonously then 
they ought to work. Wherever workers are weak or 
disorganized, appalling crueltices are practised for private 
profit. Economic and political organizations become more and 
more vast, leaving less and less room for individual 
development and initiative. According to Russell, it is this 
sacrifice of the individual to the machine that is the 
fundamental evil of the modern world. 
It must be admitted that these evils cannot be cured 
very easily. After all, says Russell, efficiency is promoted 
by sacrificing the interests of the individual to the smooth 
functioning of a vast organisation, whether military or 
^industrial. He admits that some sacrifice of individual 
interest is of course essential to the existence of an 
ordered community. This degree of sacrifice is not 
regrettable even from the individual^ point of view. But 
what is demanded in a highly militarized or industrialized 
nation goes far beyond this very moderate degree. If a 
society is to allow greater freedom to the individual it 
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must be strong enough. It should not be anxious about home 
defence. It should be moderate enough to refrain from 
difficult external conquest and rich enough to value leisure 
and a civilized existence. 
But the problem is that where the above material 
conditions exist, the psychological conditions are not 
likely to exist there, unless power is very widely diffused 
throughout the community. Where the power is concentrated in 
a few, it will inevitably happen, unless those few are very 
exceptional people, that they will value tangible 
achievements in the way of increase in trade cr empire. The 
joys of victory are especially great to the holders of 
powers, while the evils of a mechanical organization fall 
almost exclusively upon average men. Hence Russell strongly 
advocates diffusion of power. He 'writes: "I do not believe 
that any community in which power is much concentrated will 
long refrain from conflicts ofthe kind involving a sacrifice 
. 12 of what is most valuable in the individual." 
Ft r ail this Russell thinks that equalization of 
power must go hand in hand with the equalization of wealth. 
He is conscious that equalization of power is not a thing 
that can be achieved in a short period. It requires a 
11. Ibid, p.123. 
88 
fij-
considerable amount moral, intellectual and technical 
education. In his own words, "It requires a long period 
without extreme crises, in order that habits of tolerance 
and good nature may become common. It requires vigour on the 
part of those who are acquiring power, without a too 
desperate resistance on the part of those whose share is 
diminishing. This is only possible if those who are 
acquiring power are not very fierce, and do not terrify 
their opponents by threats of ruin and death. It- cannot be 
done quickly, because quick methods require that very 
mechanism and subordination of the individual which we 
13 should struggle to prevent." 
Hence Russell concludes that inequality of power is 
the greatest of all political evils . This evil cannot be 
cured by the class-war and by the dictatorship of the communist 
party. Only peace and a long period of gradual improvement 
can bring it about. 
At this point a question can be legitiamately raised 
: Does Russell think that capitalism will be the best system 
if some changes are brought about in it or does he favour 
any specific sort of socialism? In the introduction to his 
Roads to Freedom Russell answers to this question thus : 
11. Ibid, p.123. 
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'My own opinion...is that pure Anarchism, 
though it should be the ultimate ideal, to 
which society should continually approximate, 
is for the present impossible, and would not 
survive more than a year or two at most if it 
were adopted. On the other hand, both Marxian 
Socialism and Syndicalism, in spite of many 
drawbacks, seem to me calculated to give rise 
to a happier and better world than that in 
which we live. I do not, however, regard 
either of them as the best practicable system. 
Marxian Socialism, I fear, would give far too 
much power to the state, while Syndicalism, 
which aims at abolishing the state, would, I 
believe, find itself forced to reconstruct a 
central authority in order to put an end to 
the rivalries of different groups of 
producers. The best practicable system, to my 
mind is that of Guild Socialism, which 
concedes what is valid both in the claims of 
the state Socialists and in the Syndicalist 
fear of the state, by adopting a system of 
federalism among trades for reasons similar to 
3(1 
those which are recommending federalism among 
14 nations. 
The above view has been expressed in the Introduction 
to the first edition of Roads to Freedom in 1918. A third 
edition of this book came out in 1948. Meanwhile Russell 
discarded many beliefs and embraced new one. But he remained 
steadfast to his view about Guild Socialism. In the 
'Preface' to this third edition he writes : "Guild 
Socialism...still seems to me an admirable project, and I 
15 could wish to see advocacy of it revived." 
In Political Ideals Russell envisages a political 
system which by and large follow the line of Guild 
Socialists. Here he says that owing to scientific 
advancement we have reached such a stage that, if we have a 
wise economic system, by a few hours of manual work a day a 
man can produce as much as is necessary for his own 
subsistence. If a man is willing to forgo luxuries, that is 
all that the community can demand of him. It ought to be 
open to all, who so desires, to do short hours of work for 
litte pay. They ought to be allowed to devote their leisure 
to whatever pursuit that happens to attract them. In such a 
14. Russell, B., Roads to Freedom, p.15. 
15. Ibid, p.6. 
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system even if a great majority spend their time in mere 
amusement, they would not become parasite upon the labour of 
others. Even then there would be a minority who would give 
their leisure hour to science, art, literature, or some 
other pursuit out of which fundamental progress may come. 
Says Russell, "In all such matters, organisation and system 
can only do harm. The one thing that can be done is to 
provide opportunity, without repining at the waste that 
results from most men failing to make good use of the 
•f 
opportunity." 
Russell is confident that if such opportunity is 
given most men would choose to do a full day's work for a 
full day's pay, except persons of unual laziness or 
eccentric ambition. The important measure must be taken here 
is that ordinary work should, as far as possible, afford 
interest, independence and scope for initiative. These 
thirds are important than income as soon as a certain 
minimum has been reached. For securing all these Russell 
considers Guild Socialism as the best way 
The economic system Russell wished to see is one in 
which the state would be the sole recipient of economic rent 
while private capitalistic enterprises should be replaced by 
16. Russell, B., Political Ideals, p.31. 
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self-governing combinations of those who actually do the 
work. The workers in a given industry should all be combined 
in one autonomous unit, and their work should not be subject 
to any outside control. The state should keep the right to 
fix the price of the goods, but should leave the industry 
self-governing in all other respects. In fixing prices the 
state should, as far as possible, allow each industry to 
profit by any improvements. At the same time state should 
endeavour to prevent undeserved loss or gain through changes 
in external economic conditions. According to Russell, in 
"this way there would be every incentive to progress, with 
the least possible danger of unmerited destitution. And 
although large - economic organisations will continue, as they 
are bound to do, there will be a diffusion of power which 
will take away the sense of individual impotence from which 
17 men and women suffer at present." 
Russell anticipates an objection against his 
political view. It may be argued that though such a system 
is desirable, it is impossible to bring it about, and hence 
it is prudent to concentrate on more immediate objects. 
He meets this objection by saying that a political 
party should have proximate aims as well as a more distant 
17. Ibid, p.32. 
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aim. Orthodox Socialism, Syndicalism and Anarchism lack 
either the former or the latter. Most of these systems have 
only a distant aim which is to be realised suddenly at some 
remote date by a sudden revolution. Russell says that such 
type of dramatic conception is fraught with dangers. He 
thinks that men usually cannot be trained to do something 
suddenly which is very different from what they have been 
doing before. Even if such method were to succeed, there is 
every possibility that their success will be subverted by 
opportunistic elements from within or without. 
Another important flaw of a programme which is to be 
realised suddenly at some remote date by a revolution or a 
general strike is that enthusiasm flags when there is 
nothing to do meanwhile. The only sort of movement, thinks 
Russell, which can succeed by such methods is one where the 
sentiment and programme are both very simple, e.g. in the 
case of rebellions of oppressed nations. But the line of 
demarcation between capitalist and wage-earner is not so 
sharp. "Those who have advocated the social revolution have 
been mistaken in their political methods, chiefly because 
they have not realised how many people there are in the 
community whose sympathies and interests lie half on the 
side of capital, half on the side labour. These people make 
a clear-cut revolutionary policy very difficult." Russell, 
therefore, declares— 
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Those who aim at an economic reconstruction 
which is not likely to be completed tomorrow 
must, if they are to have any hope of success, 
be able to approach their goal by degrees, 
through measures which are of some use in 
themselves, even if they should not ultimately 
lead to the desired end. There must be 
activities which train men for those that they 
are ultimately to carry out, and there must be 
possible achievements in the near future, not 
18 only a vague hope of a distant paradise. 
At the same time Russell believes no less firmly that 
really vital and radical reform requires some vision beyond 
the immediate future, some realisation of what human beings 
might make of human life if they chose. Without some such 
hope, men will not have the energy and enthusiasm necessary 
to overcome opposition, or the steadfastness to persist when 
their aims are for the moment unpopular. 
In a good community, Russell is fond of saying, the 
production of the necessaries of existence would be merely 
interesting part of life of the majority. He thinks that it 
is not in the least necessary that economic needs should 
10. Ibid, p.106-7. 
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dominate men's thinking as they do at present. This is 
rendered necessary at present, partly by the inequalities of 
wealth and partly by the fact that things of real value, 
e.g. good education, are difficult to acquire. 
Russell did not favour private ownership of land and 
capital. Main objections given against this system : One, it 
stunts the lives of men and women; Second, it impells men to 
fill the greater part of their time and thought with the 
acquisition of purely material goods thus putting a terrible 
obstacle to the advancement of civilization and creative 
energy. 
Delivering a clear verdict in favour of gradual 
reform Russell concludesj 
The approach to a system free from these evils 
need not be sudden, it is perfectly possible 
to proceed step by step towards economic 
freedom and industrial self-government. It is 
not true that there is any outward difficulty 
in creating the kind of institutions that we 
have been considering. If organised labour 
wishes to create them, nothing could stand in 
its way. The difficulty involved is merely, 
the difficulty of inspiring men with hope, or 
giving them enough imagination to see that the 
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evils from which they suffer are unnecessary, 
and enough thought to understand how the evils 
are to be cured. This is a difficulty which 
can be overcome by time and energy. But it 
will not be overcome if the leaders of 
organised labour have no breadth of outlook, 
no vision, no hope beyond some slight 
superficial improvement within the framework 
of the existing system. Revolutionary action 
may be unnecessary, but revolutionary thought 
is indispensible, and, as the outcome of 
19 thought, a rational and constructive hope. 
* * * * * * * * 
19. Ihid. p.36. 
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IV. RUSSELL : THE VANGUARD OF PEACE MOVEMENT 
Though Bertrand Russell's preoccupation with the :iuestion of 
peace and war was lifelong, it was mainly from 1914 onwards 
that his thought came to centre round this grave peril that 
threatened to annihiliate mankind from the globle. When a 
greater part of the world was engaged in killing each other 
during the first world war, Russell was horrified seeing the 
folly of mankind. He saw it as going back to the primitive 
stage of our civilization. In order to stave off the 
impending danger he embraced pacifism and spearheaded many 
movements which aimed at preventing this danger. 
Two distinct phases are clearly visible in Russell's 
pacifism. The period between the two world wars constitues 
the first phase. During this time he mainly used his pen to 
analyse human psychology, to pinpoint the fountain of all 
the social evils in general and war in particular and to 
evolve out a better political system. It is in this time 
that he espoused pacifism and proved the strength of his 
convictions by going to jail for his pacifist views. But the 
use of atom bombs in the second world war convinced Russell 
that people are too dazzled to see the truth and hence he 
abandoned former methods and adopted new one to do something 
to avert the imminent danger, it is this period that is 
being referred to here as the second phase of his political 
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activism. During this period instead of remaining as a 
passive rational social observer he had become an active 
pacifist and intensified his activities by using all 
available means. 
Russell's first anti-war campaign started in 1914 
when England decided to participate in the first world war. 
The decision of the British government upset him. He 
exchanged views about the prevailing situation with his 
combridge colleagues and fellows, collected signatures of a 
large number of professors and fellows to a statement 
opposing the participation of England in war and sent it to 
leading newspapers to make their opposition known. 
Describing his tremendous mental anxiety of these days 
Russell Writes in his Autobiography. 
The prospect filled me with horror, but what 
filled me with even more horror was the fact 
that the anticipation of carnage was 
delightful to something like ninety per cent 
of the population. I had to revise my views on 
human nature. At that time I was wholly 
ignorant of psycho-analysis, but I arrived for 
myself at a view of human passions not unlike 
that of psycho-analysts. I arrived at this 
view in an endeavour to understand popular 
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feeling about the war. I had supposed unitl 
that time that it was quite common for parents 
to love their children, but the war persuaded 
me that it is a rare exception. I had supposed 
that most people liked money better than 
almost anything else, but I discovered that 
they liked destruction even better. I had 
supposed that intellectuals frequently loved 
truth, but I found here again that not ten per 
cent of them prefer truth to popularity.^ 
In 1915 he wrote Principles of Social Reconstruction. 
In this book he suggested a philosophy of politics which is 
based upon the belief that impulse has more effect than 
conscious purpose in moulding men's lives. In 1916 war 
assumed a fiercer form and there was a crack-down on 
pacifists to silence them. The war brought Russell "to the 
verge of utter cynicism". At the height of despair, he wrote 
an open letter to President Wilson (U.S.A. being still 
neutral) appealing him to use his good office to bring the 
war to an end. With the help of American pacifists he got 
this letter published in American leading newspapers. 
Meanwhile his relation with the British Government started 
1. Russell B. , The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 
vol.2, p.17. 
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to worsen. In 1916 he worte a leaflet about conscientious 
objectors who had been sentenced to imprisonment in defiance 
of the conscience clause. This writing incensed the 
authority and after prosecution he was fined for this. This 
was the first direct confrontation of Russell with the 
authority in the course of his anti-war compaign. For his 
anti-war speeches his movement was restricted and it was 
ordered that he should not be allowed in any prohibited 
area. Interestingly, all these restrictions, as he wrote in 
his Autobiography, failed to crush his spirit and instead 
helped immensely to rejuvenate it. The changes that have 
been brought about in his life by the war can be put thus in 
his own words : 
The War of 1914-18 changed everything for me. 
I ceased to be academic and took to writing a 
new kind of books. I changed my whole 
conception of human nature. I became for the 
first time deeply convinced that Puritanism 
does not make for human happiness. Through the 
spectacle of death I acquired a new love for 
what is living. I became convinced that most 
human beings are possessed by a profound 
unhappiness venting itself in destructive 
rages, and that only through the diffusion of 
instinctive joy can a good world be brought 
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into being. I saw that reformers and 
reactionaries alike in our present world have 
become distorted by cruelties. I grew 
suspicious of all purposes demanding stern 
discipline. Being in opposition to the whole 
purpose of the community, and finding all the 
everyday virtues used as a means for the 
slaughter of Germans, I experienced great 
difficulty in not becoming a complete 
Antinomian. But I was saved from this by the 
profound compassion which I felt for the 
sorrows of the world. I lost old friends and 
2 made new ones. 
I 
Right from the outbreak of War till his visit to 
China in 1921, Russell was preoccupied with social issues. 
His main endeavour in this period, as is evident from his 
Writings, was to show that it was really possible for 
mankind to live in some less painful way. After that there 
was a period of lull in his political activism. Once the 
dusts of war settled down he reverted to philosophy. But the 
probability of the second world war pulled him again to the 
political scene.When the cloud of war started to gather in 
late 1930s there was a considerable vacillation in him. 
2. Ibid, pp.38-39. 
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Surprisingly, he decided to support the war thus abandoning 
his non-resistance creed. Describing his vacillation Russell 
writes, "My whole nature had been involved in my opposition 
to the First War, whereas it was a divided self that 
favoured the second." Though he was wholly convinced that 
circumstances demanded war yet his emotion was reluctant to 
follow reason. 
Charges have often been brought against Russell for 
his support of the Second World War. In bringing such 
charges against him critics had really missed the point that 
Russell never espoused total pacifism. For him, it was the 
First World War that was wrong. Russell attributed all 
subsequent disasters from Italian and German fascism to 
•the Second World War to the First World War. Refuting the 
allegation Russell writes in his Portraits from Memory : 
Neither then nor later did I think all war 
wrong. It was that war (First World War), not 
3 all war that I condemned. 
Actually there are opposing stands taken by him 
during the Second War which might have been caused by "his 
divided self." In 1937, when the prospect of a second 
inter-imperial world conflict seemed imminent, Russell 
3. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory, p.6. 
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opposed all sides equally. In his mock obituary written in 
that year he predicted : 
In the Second World War, he (Russell) took no 
public part, having escaped to a neutral 
country before its outbreak. In private 
conversation, he was wont to say that 
homicidal lunaties were well employed in 
killing each other but that sensible men would 
keep out of their way while they were doing 
it.4 
But in Which Way to Peace? Russell recommended that invading 
German troops should be treated as tourists. Later he 
admitted that he was ashamed of that book and of the 
pacifist stance he took towards Hitler's Germany, He came to 
realize that Britian and France were in conflict with 
Germany for reasons of imperial rivalry, monopoly of 
markets, and colonial domain. Since both sides were seeking 
markets and were inspired by evil Intentions Russell thought 
it better to oppose all these regimes rather than to support 
one against the other. 
Nonetheless, when Hitlerism became transparent, 
Russell abandoned his earlier view. Thus, he found himself 
4. Russell, B., Unpopular Essays, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, 1950 pp.174-75. 
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supporting conservative regimes because of the circumstance 
of their oppsotion to Hitler. Russell was now caught in a 
familiar dilemma : he wanted to oppose Nazism but he also 
distrusted the governments of the Western powers. He 
perceived no alternative to supporting these regimes, i.e. 
western powers. That these regimes were concerned solely 
with establishing an imperial order of their own was an idea 
Russell himself had voiced on many occasions. 
With the end of the Second World War, Russell was 
pre-occupied by two questions : nuclear weaponry and 
Stalin's police tyranny. It became obvious that a nuclear 
war would bring the civilization to an end. It was sure to 
occur sooner or later unless some changes were effected in 
the policies of all camps. Actually nuclear war and dangers 
concommitant to it were lurking in Russell's mind, as he 
admitted later, from the early twenties. But in those days 
except a few physicists the majority turned aside the 
prospect of an atomic war. In the Second World War when 
America dropped atom bombs in two Japanese cities only then 
people realized the dangers of brinkmanship. In 1945 in the 
House of Lords he drew the attetion ot the members to the 
likelihood of a general nuclear war and the certainty of its 
causing universal disaster, if it occured. He forceast and 
explained the making of nuclear bombs of far greater power 
than those used upon Heroshima and Nagasaki. Unless, he 
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argued, disarmament occured before arms race had begun, it 
would produce a war of global destruction. In the House 
everybody applauded his speech and not a single peer 
suggested that his fears were excessive. Yet nobody took it 
very seriously thinking that it was a question for their 
grandchildren. 
Russell realized that the time to plan and to act in 
order to stave off the approaching dangers was first running 
out. He could find no method or political stratagem for 
avoiding this calamity. He favoured a world government which 
was to be effected through agreement by member states who 
would surrender their sovereignty to the world body. But 
this was not an easy proposition. The problem with this plan 
lay in the fact that the rulers of states with clashing 
economic and political interests were to be the authors of a 
world order which presupposed transcending those interests. 
When Bernard Baruch called in 1947 for a pooling of 
nuclear energy under the aegis of the United Nations, 
Russell supported this plan as a concrete step towards a 
monopoly of nuclear arms by a world authority. He saw a ray 
hope in this proposal. The Baruch plan had two objectives. 
It planned to freeze nuclear weapons before Russia could 
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develop its own weaponary, rendering American nuclear 
hegemony permanent. Second, it intended to make the UN the 
regulatory and inspecting body. 
But Russia was well aware that the United States 
financed the UN and also controlled it politically. Hence 
under the garb of disarmament plan it was designed to 
legitimize rapid US rearmament. Hence she rejected the 
Baruch proposal, Stalin's rejection frustated Russell. At 
* 
this juncture in Cominon Sense and Nuclear Warfare Russell 
suggested that the only remedy might be the threat of 
immediate war by the U.S. on Russia for the purpose of 
forcing nuclear disarmament upon her. He was sure that 
Russia was likely to yield to the demands of the West. This 
remedy ceased to be probable after Russia had made a 
considerable fleet of nuclear planes. 
The advocacy of preventive war on Russia had been 
severely criticized by many. Answering to this charge 
Russell writes in his Autobiography. 
I believe that some wars, a very few, are 
justified, even necessary. They are usually 
necessary because matters have been permitted 
to drag on their obviously evil way till no 
peaceful means can stop them. Nor do my 
critics appear to consider the evils that have 
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developed as a result of the continued Cold 
War arid" that might have been avoided, along 
with the Cold War itself, had my advice to 
threaten war been taken in 1948.^ 
Another main concern of Russell in post-war period 
was Stalin's tyranny. Though it proclaimed to represent a 
political movement of liberation and equality, for Russell 
it was more than Bonapartist degenaration. His apprehension 
was that this was a probable fate of revolutionary poltics 
and revolutionary parties. Stalin's Russia presented a 
picture of secrete police, brutal suppression of all 
political and cultural freedom, concentration camps, and the 
cynical use of Aesopian language to describe official 
policy. Russell reacted to Stalin's Russia with revulsion 
ana fear. He was mainly concerned in this period to expose 
the dangers of Stalinism and to act against its threat to 
liberty. 
On account of his obsession with anti-stalinism, 
Russell did not immediately perceive the thrust of post-war 
American policy. The advent of the American empire remained 
obscured to him by the fact that Stalin's tyranny permitted 
the American power to present its rapacity in defensive 
5. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol.3, p.18. 
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terms. Till then he was convinced that Western bourgeois 
democracy possessed greater liberty and less inclination to 
impose war on mankind than did Stalin's Russia. But Russell 
soon discovered that his anti-communist colleagues were not 
truly distressed by Stalin's hostility to civil liberty, for 
they eagerly supported the eliminiation of the civil 
liberties of communists, critics of American policy, and 
opponents of capitalism in capitalist countries. Thus he 
hated the lack of freedom is Russia, one the one hand, and 
also would not tolerate a witch-hunt in the United States, 
on the other. Many intellectuals and politicians were 
shocked to discover that Russell's anti-stalinism was 
principled. 
Thus two interlocking developments began to cause a 
shift in Russell's thinking. First, the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and Second, the rampant 
assult on civil liberty, academic freedom, and critical 
intelligence in the United States. The FBI and the 
investigating committees, which aimed at preventing any 
opposition to foreign wars or the consolidation of 
capitalist power, began to shake Russell in his estimate of 
the political democracy practised in the West. 
The Bikini tests of 1954 were a Watershed in 
Russell's political life. H-bombs in production posed the 
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question of annihilation of the planet. He pulled sharply 
away from the political direction of the previous ten years. 
It was felt that the human race would die out, and soon, 
unless an international authority could achieve disarmament, 
especially nuclear disarmament. He undertook to organize a 
movement of scientists from East and West to propose 
solutions to the arms race. He wrote to Einstein, who signed 
jointly with him to an appeal he drafted. I.t v/as entitled 
"Man's Peril" and Russell read it over the BBC which 
concluded thus : 
Thus lies beofre us, if we chose, continued 
progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. 
Shall we choose death because we cannot forget 
our quarrels? I appeal as a human being to 
human beings. Remember your humanity and 
forget rest. If you can do so the way lies 
open to a new Paradise, if you cannot, nothing 
lies before you but universal death. 
The mood was much accentuated by Stalin's death. The 
prospect of change in Russia influenced Russell. He now 
engaged khrushchev, Eisenhower and Dulles in an exchange. 
Khrushchev's conciliatory tone in the debate influenced him 
further. 
6. Portraits from Memory, p.238. 
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At this juncture Russell was very much affected by 
the invasion of Suez as it showed the dominating colonialism 
of Western capitalism to be intensely alive. Gradually 
Russell saw that the United States was presssing the arms 
race both because the military expenditure stabilized 
capitalism and because the world was to be policed for 
counter-revolution. He began to accept that militarism was 
economically linked to American capitalism. Moreover, he 
thought that American militarism was part of an imperial 
thrust designed to defend markets, install puppet regimes 
and crush any social revolution which dared challenge this 
global control. This emerging view of American power and of 
capitalism was slow to come. But it shattered almost all his 
political preconceptions about the cold war and the nature 
of Stalinism. 
Russell began to reasses his view of Stalin and his 
regime. Whereas before Russell had considered that the 
threat of military expansion to emanate from Russia, now, in 
retrospect, he began to see Stalin as the constant maker of 
global deals with Hitler, with Churchill and so on. These 
deals, according to him, aimed not at advancing revolution 
but at aborting it in exchange for capitalist support for 
his own regime. Now he started to see the Soviet pursuit of 
accommodation as a different kind of crime, not as a virtue. 
For if the thrust towards world domination and world 
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intervention were American, then acquiescence in this by the 
Soviet Union was to be regarded in a very different light. 
It entailed a willingness to police the world jointly with 
the capitalist states. Thus over this ten-year period 
beginning in 1955 Russell moved from a view of Stalin and of 
Soviet policy which saw them as agreessive to one which 
viewed them as conciliatory. He came to view the Soviet 
deals with the capitalistic regimes like those made by 
gangster trade union leaders with large corporations at the 
expense of the rank and file. Soviet tyranny now was 
associated not with foreign adventure but with avoidance of 
international revolution, for fear of revolutionary 
consequences within Russia itself•Russell's secretary Ralph 
Schoenman described this gradual change thus : "The path 
upon which Russell set his foot in 1955 led him slowly to a 
political posture one hundred and eighty degrees from his 
starting point." 
Pugwash movement was Russell's first organized effort 
to advance disarmament programme. It was thought that 
scientists who had expert knowledge on the subject of 
disarmament need only to arrive at agreement on the 
technical facets of disarmament and the governments would be 
obliged to pay heed to their findings. The gathering of 
eminent men of science, particularly from the countries of 
NATO and the Warsaw pact, was to seek together the basis for 
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disarmament and then put pressure on their respective 
governments for the acceptance of their agreements. 
The scientists, however, found themselves divided 
along political lines. Some American scientists opposed 
proposals which went beyond limited arms controls. They were 
covert defenders of their governments's intransigence. The 
movement, therefore, failed to yield the intended results. 
Russell was moving too quickly to be contained within 
Pugwash politics. He started to oppose nuclear testing 
through a British Committee set up for the purpose. This 
quickly evolved into a full Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
advocating unilateral British abandonment of nuclear 
testing. With mass rallies and marches the movement acquired 
substantial support. 
If CND (committee for Nuclear Disarmament) and 
Committee of One Hundred threw Russell actively into a 
struggle against US militarism and NATO, the Vietnam episode 
dragged him violently into the revolutionary politics. He 
not only recorded his opposition to the Vietnam War but also 
instituted War Crimes Tribunal to identify the criminal. 
American policies in Vietnam offended his liberal 
sensibilities both by the fact of American intervention and 
the manner in which the United States and South Vietnam 
conducted the war. Many of his early attacks were based upon 
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the way in which the war was being conducted the use of 
chemicals, napalam,and defoliation, the uprooting of civilian 
populations, and the establishsment of political prisoners 
camps by the South Vietnamese, to mentiona few-^ 
The War Crimes Tribunal was a nobel conception and it 
include prominent scholars, men of letters, and political 
and social leaders. The Tribunal was a reaffirmation of 
Russell's faith in the rule of law and internarionalism> 
Though Russell's hope that through the Tribunal "the 
peoples of the world shall be aroused as never before" was 
not accomplished, yet the Tribunal over the long run served 
some purposess. It did provide the first docunented evidence 
of American violations of the laws of war in Vietnam. The 
Tribunal had six international investigation teams, 
containing surgeons, biochemists, lawyers, directors of 
clinics and hospitals, trade union executives, and 
journalists, who gathered evidence. The physical evidence and 
the testimony of eye-witnesses provided powerful proof of the 
disastrous effects of American weaponary upon the population 
and land of Vietnam and of unlawful conduct by some A merican 
ground troops. The Tribunal also served as an experiment in 
attempts by private citizens to find ways to enforce 
international law.Such tribunal, Russell thought,might have 
an impact upon the actions of powerful nations. He expressed 
this philosophy in his introduction to the published 
proceedings of the Tribunal, entitled Against, the Crime of 
Silence: 
War Crimes are the actions of power whose arrogances 
leads them to believe that they are above the law. 
Might, they argue, is right. The world needs to 
establish and apply cetain 
7. War Crimes in Vietnam, pp. 99-100. 
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criteria in considering inhuman actions by 
great powers. These should not be criteria 
convenient to the victor, as at Nuremberg, but 
those which enable private citizens to make 
compelling judgements on the justice committed 
9 by any great power. 
Despite its obvious limitations and defects, the 
Tribunal served as a reminder of the power of moral 
persuasion and the determination of the peoples of the world 
not to permit the standards of Nuremberg to be subordinated 
to national interests or to be lost because of ineffective 
means of enforcement. Giving his assessment of the utility 
of the Tribunal Edward F. Sherman Writes : 
The force of such a tribunal his not in its 
power to impose sanctions, for it has none, 
but in its ability to invoke the moral outrage 
of the peoples of the international community. 
It recoganizes that although the nations have 
failed to implement the international law 
standards established at Nuremberg and in the 
9. J. Duffett (ed.). Against the Crime of Silence : 
Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes 
Tribunal, Flanders, N.J., and London, 1968. 
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international conventions regulating the laws 
of war, moral opprobrium is still a potent 
force. It also helps to maintain international 
common law standards which might otherwise be 
lost by failure of nations to recognize them 
as customary international law.^*^ 
Whether War Crimes Tribunal and all other organized 
movements masterminded by Russell were a success or failure 
is a debatable point. But it is undoubtedly true that this 
sort of compaign is not a permanent solution of the 'evils 
Russell intended to fight. After all wars and other social 
evils are irretrievably part of the fabric of capitalist 
society. Russell was aware about this and hence he gives us 
a guidline of international policy as a permanent solution 
to these evils. 
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
According to Russell, the policies on international 
relations ought to be made in such a way that they serve two 
important purposes. These are: One, avoidance of wars and 
second, prevention of the oppression of weak nations by 
strong ones. As to first objective what is needed is the 
identification of the root cause of war and eradication of 
10. Nakhnikian, George (ed.), Bertrand Russell's 
Philosophy, Duckworth, London, p.1974, p. 263. 
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it. The question, therefore, naturally arises : What 
promotes war? Socialists are inclined to think that certain 
capitalistic factors promote war. One such important factor 
is the desire to find new fields of investment in 
undeveloped countries. This desire gives rise to competition 
which eventually leads to war. 
Russell is at one with the socialists in believing 
that capitalism promotes war and that abolition of private 
ownership of land and capital is a necessary step towards 
any world in which the nations are to live at peace with one 
another. But, argues Russell, though this step is necessary, 
this alone will not suffice to achieve the objective. Among 
the causes of war there are others that go deeper into the 
roots of human nature. 
If the peace of the world is ever to become secure, 
Russell believes that there will have to be, along with 
other changes, a development of the idea which inspired the 
project of a League of Nations. Probably no civilized nation 
would embark upon an aggressive war if it were fairly 
certain in advance that the aggressor would be defeated. 
This could be achieved (i.e., aggressor could be defeated) 
if most great nations came to regard the peace of the world 
as of such importance that they would side against an 
aggressor even in a quarrell in which they had no direct 
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interest. It is on this hope that the League of Nations is 
based. 
But the above measure will be by no means sufficient 
if it is not accompanied or quickly followed by other 
reforms. Such reforms if they are to be effective, must be 
international. The world must move as a whole in these 
matters, if it is to move at all. One such obvious reforms 
Russell reminded time and again is a measure of disarmament. 
So long as the present vast armies and navies exist any 
measure is bound to be proved inadequate in preventing the 
risk of war. It is for this reason that simultaneous 
disarmament is needed of all great powers. For success of 
such measure a different mentality is needed, according to 
Russell. Emphasizing the need of such mentality Russell 
Writes : 
A different mental and moral atmosphere from 
that to which we are accustomed in 
international affairs will be necessary if 
agreements between nations are to succeed in 
averting catastrophes. If once such an 
atmosphere existed, it might be perpetuated 
and strengthened by wise institutions; but it 
cannot be created by institutions alone. 
International co-operation requires mutual 
l i s 
goodwill, and goodwill, however it has arisen, 
is only to be preserved by co-operation. The 
international future depends upon the 
possibility of the initial creation of 
goodwill between nations.^^ 
Another objective Russell sought to achieve through 
international relations is the prevention of the oppression 
of weak nations by strong ones. Exploitation of inferior 
races became one of the main objectives of European 
statecraft in the last and the first half of the present 
century. Almost entire Africa and Asia were divided by 
European nations in the name of racial superiority. So long 
as strong nations would dominate weak nations peace is bound 
to elude us. In order to end this tyranny Russell advocates 
the establishment of a World Government, rl^e gives an 
elaborate outline of the World Government which will have 
the necessary power to tackle inter-State disputes and will 
thus usher in the path of stability, peace and development. 
At present, every powerful State claims absolute 
sovereignty not only in regard to its internal affairs but 
also in regard to external actions. This claim of absolute 
sovereignty leads it into conflict with similar claims of 
other States. Such conflicts are decided only by war or 
11. Roads to Freedom, p.106. 
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diplomacy, and diplomacy is in essence nothing but the 
threat of war. Russell thinks that there is no more 
justification for the claim to absolute sovereignty on the 
part of a state than there would be for a similar claim on 
the part of an individual. The claim to absolute sovereignty 
is, in effect, a claim that all external affairs are to be 
regulated by force. This is nothing but primitive anarchy. 
It is reminder of primitive practice when it was customary 
to settle private disputes by duels. The only way to end 
this anarchy, according to Russell, is to establish an 
international authority giving it adequate power to enforce 
its decisions. For the establishment of such an authority 
willingness of the States to part with their absolute 
sovereignty as regards their external relations is a 
precondition. 
The World Government, as envisaged by Russell, will 
be the sole authority for settling the dusputes which 
transcend the boundary of a particular state. It will have 
legislative as well as judicial power. It is also necessary 
that there should be a body capable of enacting 
international law. This body will even have to have the 
power of transferring territory, which is cne of the main 
causes of interstate disputes, from one State to another 
when it is convinced that adequate grounds exist for such a 
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Transference. Rejecting the concept of status quoism Russell 
Writes : 
Friends of peace will make a mistake if they 
unduly glorify the status quoism. Some nations 
grow, while others dwindle; the population of 
an area may change its character by emigration 
and immigration. There is no good reason why 
states should resent changes in their 
boundaries under such onditions, and if no 
international authority has power to make 
changes of this kind, the temptations of war 
12 will sometimes become irresistable. 
Another measure suggested by Russell for the success 
of World Government is that it must possess an army and 
navy, and these ought to be the only army and navy in 
existence. Just as the police are necessary to prevent the 
use of force by private citizens, so an international police 
will be needed to prevent the lawless use of force by 
separate states. Russell is of the view that so long as men 
are free to indulge their predatory instincts, some men or 
groups of men will take advantage of this freedom for 
oppression and robbery. In order to prevent them in their 
indulgence of such instincts international police are 
indispensible. 
12. Political Ideals, p.70. 
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CHAPTER - 2 
RUSSELL'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
There exists no difficulty in desigcaiing Russell as a 
social philosopher. He has expressed specific opinions, 
although somewhat urconventional, about all issues usually 
considered to be the constituents of social policy . He has 
taken position on social issues and has suffered the usual 
consequences when his opinions have run counter to those of 
majority or of those in power. Still more significant, he 
a-cfeually carried some of his social beliefs into experimental 
practice. For istance, he organized and operated a school 
for children in which his principles of education were 
exemplified. His views in the realm of marriage, sex, and 
family life elicited more public interest than his basic 
philosophy. 
Eduard C. Lindeman in his article "Russell's Concise 
Social Philosophy"^ Writes that a distinguishing mark of a 
social philosopher is to be found in an adopted cluster of 
values which describes his sense of direction. V/ithin this 
cluster a single value stands out clearly as the guidling 
principle of that philosopher. Whatever organization and 
1, Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Bertran<l-Russell, 
Evanston, 111., 1994. 
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self-consistency, Lindeman opines, is to be found in any 
philosopher's value-system seems to be derived from this one 
value which acts as leader. Such a dominant value, according 
to Lindeman, in Russell's philosophy has always been 
Freedom. All of his social policies derive from and may be 
explained in terms of his overwhelning belief in liberty for 
the individual person. 
Lindeman is absolutely right in singling out liberty 
or human freedom as Russell's dominant value. Russell's 
iconoclasm was merely the reverse side of his deep and 
abiding concern for human freedom. There is an undeniable 
truth in his contention that social organization as it 
actually exists is to a large extent a conspiracy against 
freedom. From the moment that a child is born he is 
subjected to a process of initiation into a group culture 
which decides in advance what he is to believe and how he is 
to act. Whatever the character of a particular culture, it 
sets the pattern for the development of all its members. By 
and large, all social pressures are in the direction of 
conformity. A good child is he who is docile, does what he 
is told and has no inclination to questioning the beliefs of 
his elders. Freedom in important matters disappears under 
the weight of social disapproval. Education becomes a tool 
of moulding the individual in conformity to a 
pre-established pattern. In other words, it becomes, as a 
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thinker puts it, the art of taking advantage of defenceless 
childhood. It is for this reason that Russell denounced old 
loyalties and repeatedly reminded that the road to freedom 
is a road away from the old patterns of thinking and 
judging. 
We often see independent youth brings them in 
conflict with their elders or masters. The famous 
Urdui Persian poet Ghalib expressed the same idea in the 
nineteenth century : r' 
m 
(0 father don't quarrel with me, see the 
2 
example of Azar's son. Everyone who 
cultivated original insight did revolt against 
his forefathers' faith.) 
Russell social philosophy is very wide. It is not 
possible to discuss the entire gamut in this thesis and 
hence we shall choose only three important constituents of 
his social philosophy. First, his educational philosophy 
2. Azar is supposed to be the prophet Abraham' s father or 
uncle who sculptured and worshipped idols, which were 
broken by Abraham one day. In poetic metaphor this 
couplet anticipates Russell's view on education. 
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will be run through, second, we shall see his two-pronged 
solution of over-population problem, and then we shall 
briefly discuss his view on sex and marriage. Our choice of 
his educational theory is caused by the fact that according 
to Russell educational reform should form the basis of all 
other reforms. We are prompted to discuss his population 
policy considering its contemporary relevance. His view on 
sex and marriage has set off a strom of protest and hence 
our choice. 
I. RUSSELL'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
Although Russell's contributions to education have not been 
as great as his contributions to mathematics and philosophy, 
still the impact of his views on education were 
considerable, he was an ardent leader of those who held that 
education ought to emphasize scientific methods of inquiry 
rather than transmission of a settled body of knowledge. On 
account of his refusal to compromise with those who favoured 
conservatism, strict discipline, concesorship and other 
controls over education he was termed an enemy of tradition 
and morality. For Russell, what is needed in education are 
not systems of dogma but rather a spirit of scientific 
enquiry. Students ought to be taught to base their beliefs 
upon observation and inference objectively and as much 
devoid of dogmatic bias as far as possible for human beings. 
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Russell believed that traditional education was 
responsible for planting seeds of fear, hate and 
intolerance. History records numerous instances of the 
dreadful consequences of this sort of education. Hitler's 
Germany is a case of educational and ideological 
regimentation in point that led to a world war. If peace 
isto be ever secured, according to Russell, there will have 
to be liberalisation and great changes in educational 
system. At present the youth are taught to love their 
country to the exclusion of other countries. Again, they are 
especially taught to admire those compatriots who have shown 
their tendency to eliminate others considering them as 
aliens. This sort of education does contribute to the 
negation of peaceful co-existence. Only a new kind of 
education which inculcates new set of humanistic values of 
tolerance will make it possible to keep the world in harmony 
and peaceful existence. 
In his book On Education, Russell sets forth the aim 
of right education. Distinguishing two types of qualities he 
says that some qualities are desirable in a certain segment 
of mankind and others are desirable universally. We need 
artists, but we also need men of science, able 
administrators, industrialists, management experts and so 
on. The qualities which produce a man of great eminence insone 
specialized field are often such as might be undesirable in 
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the terms of universality. On the other hand, some qualities 
jointly form the basis of ideal character. Russell mentioned 
four such qualities in some of his works. These are 
vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence. But in 
On Education Russell doubts the completeness of this list. 
Still he thinks that although this may not be a complete 
list, it carries us towards alight path. Moreover, he firmly 
believes that by proper physical, emotional and intellectual 
care of the young, these qualities could all be made very 
common. A community of men and women possessing vitality, 
courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence, in the highest 
degree that education could produce, would be very different 
from a society that has hitherto existed. Writes Russell : 
The main causes of unhappiness at present are 
: ill-heath, poverty, and an unsatisfactory 
sex-life. All of these would become very rare. 
Good health could be almost universal, and 
even old age could be postponed. Poverty, 
since the industrial revolution, is only due 
to collective stupidity. Sensitiveness would 
make people wish to abolish it, intelligence 
would show them the way, and courage would 
lead them to adopt it.^ 
1. Russell, B., On Education, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, London, p.1928, p.65. 
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In his theory of education Russell seems to have 
given much emphasis on child education in comparison with 
adult education. The cause is that the malleable young minds 
are more receptive than adult minds. He was hostile to the 
present educational system because under this system 
children themselves are not considered as individuals they 
are merely regarded as soldiers to be recruited into a 
community of fanatic drtheother, e.g. into one religion or a 
state or a particular political party. He writes, "If 
children themselves were considered by either party, 
education would not aim at making them belong to this party 
or that, but at enabling them to choose intelligently 
between the parties, it would aim at makign them able to 
think, not at making them think what their teachers 
think...If we respected the rights of children, we should 
educate them so as to give them the knowledge and the mental 
habits required for forming independent opinions; but 
education as a political institution endeavours to form 
habits and to circumscribe knowledge in such a way as to 
2 make one set of opinions inevitable." 
It is important to note that when Russell criticises 
traditional education his criticism is directed mainly 
2. Russell, B., Principles of Social Reconstruction, p.101. 
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against teaching of history, religion and kindred matters in 
which, he thinks, the actual instruction is positively-
harmful. Barring these fields, according to him, 
instructions imparted in other fields under the traditional 
system are not pernicious, but only inadequate. He agrees 
with the traditional theory of education in maintaining that 
all children must universally be taught how to read and 
write and some must continue to acquire knowledge needed for 
special professions as medicine or law or engineering. These 
qualities of traditional system, maintains Russell, would 
have to form a part of any educational system. 
In his On Eudcation, Russell delineates a full scheme 
of child education. Generally it is regarded that the first 
year of life of a child lies outside the sphere of education. 
Refuting this view Russell says that a child learns more in 
first twelve months than it will ever learn later in the 
same space of time during his whole life. For this reason, 
the right moment to begin the requisite moral training is 
the moment of birth. An infant's desire to learn is so 
strong that parents need only to provide opportunity. He is 
just to be given a chance to develop and his own efforts 
will do the rest. By the age of six a child's moral 
education ought to be nearly completed. After this age any 
virtue, which may be required in later years, ought to be 
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developed by the child spontaneously as a result of good 
habits already existing. 
Among the moral qualities to be taught Russell gives 
importance to such virtues as truthfulness, 
constructiveness, affection, sympathy and the like. He 
thinks that if these moral qualities are taught to children 
man J' of the social evils could easily be warded off. To take 
an instance, every child, as soon as he is old enough wants 
to kill flies and other insects. Later this instinct leads 
him on to the killing of larger animals and ultimately of 
human beings. This attitude indicates" that his instinctual 
behaviour is not disciplined properly. 
A question can legitimately be asked here : Does 
Russell advocate suppression of instinct to avoid such 
untoward incidents? Russell answers to this question by 
saying that it is not the suppression of instinct, but the 
cultivation of it that is desirable. He thinks that human 
instincts are very vague and can be satisfied in a great 
variety of ways. Education and opportunity can turn them 
into many different channels. The raw material of instinct 
is ethically neutral, they can be shaped either to be good 
or evil under the influence of the environment. Russell says 
emphatically that most people's instincts are capable of 
being developed into good forms. The aim of right education 
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is to impart such kinds of skill which will lead a man to 
employ his instincts usefully. It is to be borne in mind 
that, according to Russell, the great cultivator of instinct 
is skill. If a man is given right kind of skill, he will be 
virtuous; if he is given wrong kind of skill, iie will 
develop as wicked. 
For cultivating the above moral qualities and also 
for some other psy :;hological developments Russell favoured 
Nursery system. In almost all his treaties on education he 
admires profusely the Madame Montessori's method of 
education. The need of nursery school is caused by the fact 
that parents, and mainly uneducated parents, cannot be 
expected to possess the skill or the leisure required for 
the new and difficult art of dealing with young children. 
Again, at home children do not get the companionship of 
other children of the same age. The problem is more acute in 
the case of a small family. In a small family children 
easily get too much attention from their elders and in 
consequence they become nervy and self-centred. Furthermore, 
only rich can provide the space and the environment which 
are suitable to young children. Even such things, if provided 
privately for one child, are apt to produce the pride of 
possession and a feeling of superiority in him or her. For 
all these reasons, Russell suggests that all children must 
be sent to a school from the age of two onwards at least for 
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a part of the day. Emphasizing the merits of nursery system 
he writes : 
The nursery school, if it became universal, 
could, in one generation, remove the profound 
differences in education which at present 
divide the classes, could produce a population 
all enjoying the mental and physical 
development which is now confined to the most 
fortunate, and could remove the terrible dead 
weight of disease and stupidity and 
malevolence which now makes progress so 
difficult.^ 
The nursery school occupies intermediate position between 
early training of character and subsequently giving him/her 
proper instruction. It carries on both at once, and each by 
the help of the other, with instruction gradually taking a 
larger share as the child grows older. 
We have seen Russell's contention that the building 
up of character is mainly a matter important for the early 
years and it ought to be completed by the age of six. It 
should not be taken to mean that a character cannot be 
spoilt after that age. There is no age at which untoward 
3. On Education, p.811. 
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circumstances or environment will not do harm. What Russell 
intends to say is that after the age of six, a boy or girl 
who has been given the right early training, ought to have 
habits and desires which will lead in the right direction if 
certain care is taken of the environment. After this age 
school authorities should lay stress upon purely 
intellectual progress. It will not be necessary to give much 
time or thought to moral questions, because such virtues may 
develop naturally from purely intellectual training. 
The purpose of intellectual training should be partly 
to satisfy pupil's curiosity and partly to give him skill 
required in order that he may be able to satisfy his 
curiosity for himself. The knowledge which is imparted 
should be imparted for an intellectual purpose, not to prove 
some moral or political conclusion, which is according to 
Russell the biggest drawback of the traditional education. 
Russell gave much emphasis on students' curiosity and even 
said that teachers must endevour to stimulate certain 
fruitful kinds of curiosity among pupil. Even if curiosity 
takes directions which lie outside the school curriculum 
altogether; they must not be discouraged. 
Interestingly Russell does not advocate complete 
liberty in the sphere of education. It is really amazing to 
know that an outspoken protagonist of liberty is advocating 
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authority in the realm of education. According to Russell, 
although liberty is to be respected in education, some 
departure from liberty is unavoidable if children are to be 
taught anything. Authority in education is to some extent 
unavoidable. Hence he says that libert is to be respected 
in education as much as it is compatible with instruction. 
The educators "have to find a way of exercising authority in 
accordance with the spirit of liberty." Russell opines that 
where authority is unavoidable what is needed is reverence. 
A man who is filled through and through with the spirit of 
reverencecan only educate well. He writes : 
The teacher without reverence, or the 
bureaucrat without reverence, easil . despises 
the child...He thinks it is his duty to 
'mould' the child : in imagination he is the 
potter with clay. And so he gives the child 
some unnatural shape, which hardens with age, 
producing strains and spiritual 
dissatisfactions, out of which grow cruelty 
and envy, and the belief that other must be 
4 compelled to undergo the same distortions. 
The spirit of reverence is little respected in 
4. Principles of Social Reconstruction, p.102. 
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education where it is conducted by the States or Churches. 
Whereas Mill has opposed state education on the ground that 
it crushes the spirit of liberty, Russell has opposed both 
state and Church, since they lack spirit of reverence. Such 
education only aims at maintaining the existing order. 
Almost all education has a political motive its efforts 
are directed towards strengthening some group, national, 
religious, or social interest in opposition to other groups. 
In the main it is this motive which determines the subjects 
taught, the knowledge offered and the knowledge withheld. 
Hardly an thing is done to foster the inward growth of mind 
and spirit. All this results from lack of reverence to 
individuality : Explaining the importance of reverence 
Russell Writes : 
The man who has reverence will riot think it 
his duty to 'mould' the young. He feels in all 
that lives...something sacred, indefinable, 
unlimited something individual and strangely 
precious, the growing principle of life, an 
embodied fragment of the dumb striving of the 
world. In the presence of a child he feels an 
unaccountaDle humilty a humility not 
easily defensible on any rational ground, and 
yst somehow nearer to wisdom than the easy 
self-confidence of many parents and teachers. 
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The outward helplessness of the child and the 
appeal of dependence make him conscious of the 
responsibility of a trust. His imagination 
shows him what the child may become, for good 
or evil, how its impulses may be developed, or 
thwarted, how its hopes must be dimmed and the 
life in it grwo less living, how its trust 
will be bruised and its quick desires replaced 
by brooding will. All this gives him a longing 
to help the child in its own battle; he would 
equip and strengthen it, not for some outside 
end proposed by the state or by any other 
impersonal authority, but for the ends which 
the child's own spirit is obscurely seeking.^ 
For Russell, the man who has such reverence is 
suitable'.to wield the authority of an education without 
infringing the principle of liberty. 
Although Russell criticizes the way in which 
education is'* conducted by the state or the churches, still 
he thinks that primary education should be in the hands of 
the state authority. In his Portraits from Memory he 
criticizes Mill for opposing the state education. He says 
5. Ibki , pp.102-3. 
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that the only alternative to state for primary education is 
church. If Church is given this task the condition instead 
of improving will only, worsen. 
For controversial subjects such as history, religion 
and the like Russell prescribes a radical solution. History 
of any country, taught presently as to show that it is in 
all respects superior to all other countries. Every state 
wishes to promote national pride. And it is done by teaching 
the children a biased history. Such false ideas only serve 
to keep alive a "bigoted nationalism" and in consequence 
encourage strife. Hence Russell suggests that for 
maintaining good relations between states one of the first 
steps would be to submit all teaching of history to an 
international committee whose task will be to prdouce 
neutral textbooks free from patriotic bias 
Those who are engaged in educating think that it is 
necessary to instil certain mental habtis, like obedience 
and discipline, ruthlessness in the struggle for worldly 
success, a passive acceptence of the teachers wisdom, and so 
on, in pupils. Russell admits that some amount of obedience 
and discipline are indispensible for giving instruction and 
maintaining order in a class. But amount needed for these 
purposes are much less than is demanded now. What makes 
obedience necessary in schools is the large classes and 
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overworked teachers. Those who do not have experience of 
teaching think that teachers can reasonably be expected to 
work as many hours as bank clerks. Such Overwork results in 
intense fatigue and irritable nerves. Thye can, therefore, 
only be performed by exacting greatest amouni of obedience. 
Russell contends that if education is taken 
seriously, it should be conducted in a quite different 
manner. Educators must have strong determination to keep 
alive the minds of children, at any expense, just like the 
determination to secure victory in war. Pupils ought to be 
given that small amount of teaching which gives them 
delight. Teachers ought to be given only as much 
teaching-load as can be done with actual pleasure in the 
work, and also with an awareness of the pupils mental needs. 
If it is done, says Russell, the "result would be a relation 
of friendliness instead of hostility between teachers and 
pupil, a realization on the part of most pupils that 
education serves to develop their own lives and is not 
merely an outside imposition, interfering with play and 
demanding many hours of sitting still." A greater 
expenditure of money securing leisure for teachers, and 
natural love of teaching are indispensible for effecting 
such a change. 
6. Ibid, p.110. 
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As we have mentioned Russell has devoted much less 
attention to the higher or university education. What he 
says, however, is pertinent. He begins with the assumption 
that only a minority of the population is capable of 
profiting from education prolonged as far as the age of 
twenty-two. He, there-Sore, raises the question : Who are to 
be selected for higher education? Presently, we see that the 
chief qualification for getting higher education is the 
ability of their parents to pay the costs. Russell did not 
favour this. He is of the view that at the age of eighteen 
an youth is capable of doing useful work. But if the state 
conscripts an youth for study instead of work, there should 
be an assurance that the investment is sound. 
The above point of Russell about higher education has 
great relevance in the context of our own country. Nowadays 
it is seen that the huge investment made in higher education 
does not give intended results. Youths after receiving 
higher education from premier educational institutions 
either swithch over to some other professions where there is 
little scope to apply the skill they have received from 
institutions or emigrate to some other countries. For 
bringing this tendency to an end character building in 
childhood, what Russell has emphasized, may go a long way. 
Universities, for Russell, exist for two purposes. It 
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trains men and women for certain professions and it should 
pursue learning and research without regard to immediate 
utility. In his theory of education Russell suggests that 
teachers in universities should themselves be engaged in 
research and should not be required to become adepts in 
pedagogy. 
Wheather a student enters the university for the 
pursuit of "pure learning" or for professional training, 
according to Russell, he should be chosen because he 
possesses the required skill and not because he belongs to a 
special class or happens to be the offspring of wealthy 
parents. 
Russell's theory of education, as we have seen, has 
not lost its relevance with the passage of time. On the 
contrary, it has become more relevant today than it was in 
his own time. Being a highly gifted man he could clearly 
foresee a theory of education which future will call for. He 
spoke not merely as a theorist, but also as a practical 
experimentar. It is one thing to write bravely about 
education as it should be and quite another to subject 
oneself to the ordeal of translating one's percepts into 
action. 
Russell first states the general aims of education 
and then he proceeds to indicate how to attain these ends at 
140 
various genetic levels. It shows his clarity of vision and 
honesty of purpose. He is absolutely right in saying that 
pupils should be regarded as ends, not means. The school 
exists for them, and not they for the schools. The end to be 
desired is a good character, or to use a modern term, a good 
personality. A good personality, according to him, consists 
of vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence. He 
has imparted a special meaning to all these qualities. 
Vitality, for him, is not to be regarded as mere physical 
strength, but rather as the ability to take interest in the 
outside world and to enjoy existence. Courage is contrasted 
with fear and repression. Sensitiveness is a corrective for 
merely animal vitality and courage. Intelligence begins with 
curiosity and is inclusive of such qualities as 
open-mindedness, truthfulness, capacity to cooperate with 
others, and to stand alone with one's convictions if 
necessary to maintain personal integrity. Russell's 
treatment of such problems as fear, punishment, 
truth-telling, etc., conforms in general to what is now 
called progressive education. 
A question may arise in any inquiring mind : Is there 
any connection between Russell's ideas on politics and his 
ideas on education? It is certain that there is a close 
connection and in fact they are inextricable. Our claim is 
supported by his effort at his Beacon Hill school to create 
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from scratch the kind of human being he supposed the world 
needed. If the bad impulses can be channeled into a good one 
through education then it will facilitate the implementation 
of a political system that Russell thought desirable. It is 
for this reason that his educational treatise give more 
emphasis on child education then higher education. 
In his book Education and the Social Order the 
connection between politics and education becomes more 
prominent. The first and last chapter of this book devote 
exclusively to the issue whether education is for the 
individual or for the citizen. He admits that the 
option whether education should train good individuals or 
good citizens is too gross, and that in almost ar^ term it 
is a dilemma. After a lot of vacilation he writes : 
The idea of education as merely affording 
opportunities for natural growth is not, I 
think, one which can be upheld by a person who 
7 realizes the complexity of modern societies. 
Again he writes with evident reluctance : 
Considered sub specie acternitatis, the 
education of the individual is to my mind a 
7. Russell, B., Education and Social Order, George Allen 
Unwin Ltd, London, 1932, p.43. 
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finer thing than the education of the citizen, 
but considered politically, in relation to the 
needs of the time, the education of the 
Q citizen must, I fear take the first place. 
From the above it is clear that Russell was caught in 
a dilemma. When he found no way of getting out of it and it 
became evident that the two were not reconcilable, he 
recluctantly delivered his judgement in favour of the latter 
option, i.e., good citizens. But Russell passionately wants 
a conception of citizenship shorn of national bias and "free 
of doctrinal restraint." 
There is another important point where Russell's 
political and educational ideas meet. In Principles of 
Social Reconstruction Russell raises the question whether an 
educational system dominated by the national state is one 
which really best serves the interests of humanity. 
According to him, "education is, as a rule, the strongest 
force on the side of what exists and against fundamental 
change." What makes him worried is the conception that 
educational institutions may creats , even by inadvertance, 
a powerful force on behalf of the national and ideological 
8. Ibid, pp.27-28. 
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status quo, thus inhibiting the very possibility of radical 
social reform. For the same reason, as we have seen earlier, 
he feels that the national bias in the teaching of history 
sows vicious seeds. Hence comes his suggestion to submit 
all teaching of history to an international commission. 
During the Second World War, and with the same 
problem in mind, Russell wrote "Proposal for an 
9 
International University." His idea was that teaching and 
research should be conceived of as the performance of a duty 
to mankind as a whole, rather than to some subordinate class 
or nation. to facilitate this a truly international 
university should be created. It would explicitly strive to 
further the ideal of international government. There 
research attuned to international co-operation would be 
promoted and textbooks free of national bias might be 
written. The curriculum would be wide-ranging, but there is 
an implication that it should be dominated by science and 
history. Russell even went into details on the question of 
trusteeship, and selection of staff and students. 
Predictably, such guidelines aroused the ire of many 
liberals. What is iteresting is that this was found 
offensive in precisely the way, and for essentially the 
same kind of reasons, that pacifists found offensive his 
9. The Fortnightly, July 1942. 
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acceptance of powerful military force by an international 
government. Russell is consistent in politics and education 
on this matter, and seems to be the clearer and more 
venturesome thinker . 
There is nothing fundamentally unsound in Russell's 
university idea: how different might have been the armaments 
race, how different the lot of "the wretched of the earth" 
in the Third World, if, sinc.e the Second World War, nuclear 
and space research, to mention two examples, could have been 
concentrated in such an international university, under 
auspices where the ideal of mutual co-operation was 
explicity honoured. We should be grateful to Russell for his 
proposal, despite the fact that it got nowhere at all. 
Russell had correctly perceived that new and more fearful 
competitions might arise from the War's destruction; and his 
idea was born from a desperate wartime plea that the time 
demanded of us, in education, "hope and new vision." 
Russell's search that can a reform of education 
reform society, make war less likely, economic justice more 
likely, tolerance more widespread and humane, has helped to 
keep these ideals from eroding into banality and to give 
these an international orientation. What Russell envisages 
i^ an educational reform of the psychological structure of 
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mankind. There are many, philosophers who think that with a 
radically altered political structure it is possible to 
build a new hunanity. Russell did not share this view 
because he saw the deepest root of the evil and thought that 
as long as it was not plucked out completely no remedial 
measure was likely to be permanent. Ronald Jager puts it 
beautifully thus : 
Russell is closer to the prophets and the 
preachers who have despaired of new political 
institutions unless first the hearts of men 
are changed. He shares the creed of the 
liberal and empirical tradition, a secular 
gospel of salvation not through politics but 
through culture and education. What is worst 
in national patriotism, its incipient 
militarism, will fade only when education no 
longer feeds it. What is best in national 
patriotism, the pride of its service to 
distressed peoples, will be safe only when 
education can induce a human compassion for 
the oppressed deeper and more powerful than 
impulsive hatred for the oppressor. It is thus 
that Russell wants philosophy to envision, and 
education to mould, loyalties to the world and 
to mankind. The resolution of the perpetual 
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dialectic in Russell's thought between freedom 
and organization, between the individual and 
authority, a view struggling for articulation 
through many books for over sixty years, does 
not issue in accents of heroic theory, but 
only in earthly wisdom, a wisdom that is 
willing to place no fundamental faith in 
institutions unless they are truly 
international, unless their basis is as broad 
as mankind. For the rest, the free iran must 
retain his freedom. 
10. Jager Ronald, The Development of Bertrand Russell's 
Philosophy, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1972, 
p.459. 
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II. ON POPULATION PROBLEM 
Containing the rapid expansion of population has been given 
overriding importance in recent past. The problem which is 
now fully accentuated has been foreseen by Russell and he 
has suggested specific measures for the containment of it. 
On the one hand, he was very Worried about the fast grovth 
of population in some specific parts of the globe; on the 
other, he expressed concern for "diminishing of more 
civilized races" of the world rather looking strange 
particularly a liberal like Russell, since it reveals a kind 
of complex of so-called "superior" i.e. white people. 
It was Malthuse who first pointed out that the rapid 
growth of population had certain upleasent consequences. The 
conseuqnces he foresaw can be best explained in terms of the 
law of diminishing returns. This law states that after a 
certain amount of labour and capital is applied to a piece 
of land, any further increase of labour and capital will not 
yield a proportionate return. That is to say, supposing from 
an acre of land, by means of a given amount of labour and 
capital, we can raise a certain number of bushels of wheat, 
and then supposing we double the amount of labour and 
capital to that same amount of land, we will not get twice 
as many bushels of wheat as we got before. It follows that 
if we possess just enough land to provide a comfortable 
sustenance for two billion persons, we may not have enough 
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to provide a comfortable sustenance for four billion or more 
than this. Again, it follows that any increase in population 
in any given area beyond a certain point entails increase of 
poverty. 
Russell admits that there are certain merits in 
MaJthuse's view. At the same time, he thinks, it is partially 
mistaken. He says that in agricultural field the law of 
diminishing returns becomes true at a certain point, not 
before this. If a man is given a certain area of virgin 
soil, he cannot produce as much as he would have produced if 
he had helpers. Again, a modern agriculturist whose farm is 
industrialized needs less number of helpers. But he needs 
expensive machinery, which is only profitable when it is 
employed over a large arexand also a number of men ready to 
give support. For example, he needs a railway to market his 
produce, a telephone, fertilizers which may be brought from 
a considerable distance, and so on. the consequence of all 
this is that a very considerable population is required to 
reach the maximum production per head. Until this line of 
maximum production is reached, production obeys a law of 
increasing return. Russell draws two conclusions from this 
: First, in any given state of technique increase in 
population in a sparsely populated area may result in 
increase of prosperity. Second the development of scientific 
149 
technique "tends to increase the optimum destiny of 
population." 
Although by the above arguments Russell tried to push 
back the Malthusian limit, he was aware of the weaknesses of 
these agruments. It becomes evident when he writes, 
"...there is...a very considerable possibility that increase 
of population may outstrip improvement in technique, and 
therefore cause a general lowering in the standard of 
life."^ This, in fact, is happening in large parts of the 
World, e.g. in South-East Asia, most parts of Africa, and 
tropical parts of Latin America. In these parts modern 
medicine has brought about a fall in death-rate, but not in 
birth-rate. 
Mathuse held that there are three ways for crubing 
population growth by moral restraint, vice, and misery. He 
had little hope of moral restraint and as a clergyman he 
condemned vice. He, therefore, advocated misery. Russell 
could not agree with Malthuse in regarding birth-control as 
vice. For him, what is needed to preserve mankinc^ from 
wretchedness must not be lebelled vice. Hence he favours 
universal instruction in birth-control, with penalties for 
1. Russell, B., New Hopes for a Changing World, George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1960 p.44. 
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those who have too many children. Russell does not tell us 
what exact number of children a couple should have to tackle 
the population problem effectively. From his various 
writings it may be inferred that he will prefer two or three 
children in a family. In any case, he will not prefer a lone 
child from a couple since, as he repeatedly points out in 
his book On Education, it puts various impediments to 
child's mental development. 
Population problem, according to Russell, can be 
better responded regionwise or nationwise, not in the world 
as a whole. The reason for this is that the problem is 
exceedingly acute in some regions or nations, whereas in 
some other regions the population is stationary. The world 
at present is divided into two sharply contrasted groups : 
there are nations where both birth-rate and death-rate are 
low, again there are nations where both are high. Nations 
belonging to former category have a nearly stationary 
population and hence have achieved a standard of life which 
is high and improving. Nations belonging to the latter group 
have a rapidly increasing population and therefore their 
standard of life is low and deteriorating with the passage 
of time. For arresting the fast growth of population in 
these countries spread of education is a very significant 
step, according to Russell. He does not think that 
industrialization alone can bring down the birth-rate. Hence 
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the two important measures suggested by Russell for 
arresting population growth are spread of education and 
methods of birth control. 
Sometimes it is argued that by means of technical 
advances a continually growing population can remain 
prosperous for an indefinite period. Refuting this argument 
Russell says that if population continues to increase, 
however slowly it may be, it will surely surpass any 
assigned limit. Again, if.the population increases beyond a 
certain point, the earth will yield less since a large area 
of earth's surface must be withdrawn from agriculture. 
There are many who oppose birth-control. Against them 
Russell says that if they are acquainted with the 
airthemetic of population rate of increase and decrease, 
they will have to admit that their opposition would result 
in a perpetuation of needless mortality. The ancient belief 
( 
that birth-control is a moral or religions vice is no longer 
suited to our circumstance and hence be discarded. Unless 
birth-rate is diminished, argues Russell, any measure to 
bring about prosperity will be not more than a brief 
temporary improvement. He says that it is cetainly possible 
to lift human life from the perpetual burden of toil and 
sorrow. But if this is to be done, it must be admitted that 
our power over nature has its limits. With excessive labour 
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it is possible to produce engough only for a certain amount 
of population, not more than this. It is probable that 
improvements in technique will increase the size of the 
population that can be provided prosperity to some extent, 
but there must always be a limit. When the birth-rate is 
excessively high, population will press to surpass this 
limit. Warning the Western powers Russell Writes, "...if the 
West continues to monopolize the benefits of low birth-rate, 
war, pestilence and famine must continue and our brief 
emergence from these ancient evils must be swallowed in a 
2 new flood of ignorance, destitution and war." 
Russell drew attention to the another facet of 
population problem which was generally overlooked by social 
thinkers. We have seen in some parts of the world population 
is tending to become stationary because of fall in 
birth-rate as well as death rate, whereas in some other 
parts, and this part constitutes of three-fourth of the 
world, population is increasing at a tremendous rate. 
Russell feared that the ultimate result of these two 
opposing trends may lead to virtual extinction of the most 
civilized races of the (again whites' superiority complex?) 
World or at least diminution of their number, since 
they inhabit in those areas where birth-rate as well as 
6. Ibid, p.110. 
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death-rate both have fallen. He writes, "...a diminution, if 
continues unchecked, means ultimate extinction, and we 
cannot desire to see the most civilized races of the world 
3 disappear." 
The population question is thus twofold : We have to 
guard against too rapid increase of population, and we have 
also to guard against an alarming decrease in some regions. 
The former danger is old and exists still in many countries, 
while the latter danger is new and is confined to some 
developed countries. Russell holds that the proper course in 
any country, which is threatened with an actual decrease, 
will be an experimental diminution of the financial burden 
of children until the point is reached where the birth-rate 
is such as to maintain the existing population. In such a 
country the expenditure for upbrining children should be 
borne by Government or by community. 
Another measure suggested by Russell is that 
countries which have more women than men should allow 
unmarried women to have children. In England, for example, 
the number of women is higher than men. Hence the law of 
3. Russell, B., Marriage and Morals, George Allen & Unwin^ 
London, 1958, p.195. 
monogamy and custom compel many women to remain childless. 
If moral code is altered and custom tolerates the unmarried 
mother, there is no doubt that a great many of the women who 
are at present condemned to celibacy would choose to have 
children. Russell writes : 
Strict monogamy is based upon the assumption 
that the numbers of the sexes will be 
approximately equal. Where this is not the 
case, it involves considerable cruelty to 
those whom arithmetic compels to remain 
single. And where there is reason to desire an 
increase in the birth-rate, this cruelty may 
be publicly as well as privately 
4 undersirable. 
4. Ibid, 198. 
III. ON SEX AND MARRIAGE 
This is an area where few philosophers have dared to 
approach. In spite of strong advocacy of scientific outlook 
in all other spheres of knowledge, any scientific 
investigations into sex are considered as wicked and viewed 
with suspicion and alarm. Somehow sex and sin are still 
regarded as synonymous terms. Russell's treatment of these 
subjects set off such a strom of protest that he was legally 
deprived of a specially created post of professorship at the 
City College of New York in 1940. 
In fact Russell did not spend considerable time in 
dealing with sex and related matters. As Robert E. Egner 
puts it: "Russell spent about one per cent of his time 
dealing with sex, but the general public thought it was 99 
per cent."^ It is his unconventional views on these matters 
that incensed the puritans. Marriage and Morals, On 
Education, and Portraits from Memory mainly these three 
books contain his views we propose to discuss in this 
section. Interestingly, it is for his book Marriage and 
Morals that Nobel Prize has been conferred on him in 1950. 
The decision to confer this prestigious prize on 
e Russell,and particularly for this book shqked many so-called 
1. Egner, R.E., Bertrand Russell's Best, Unwin Books, 1975, 
p.60. 
Ib'B 
moralists. As one theologician put it:" How could this beast 
of human race ccept any prize?" 
A close perusal of Russell's writings reveals that he 
actually did not give any indecent view about sexual 
matters. What he reallj stressed is that our attitude 
towards sex needs to be changed. If scientific investigation 
is allowed in this field also, it will result in good not in 
bad. There is nothing wrong in saving this. Recently even in 
India man^ sexologists and psychologists also have stressed 
the same need. Most parents, for instance, do nto show any 
undue apprehension about their children watching a 
television programme that deals in depth on subjects such as 
the psychological causes of war or why we must build a 
better nuclear defence system. But most parents would be 
horrified if a television programme is created to explore 
openly and frankly, a candid examination of the most 
effective techniques in sexual intercourse with live model 
demonstrations. Recently it has been charged that many 
movies are not fit for public view because of obscene 
scenes. 
In his attempt to build up a sexual morality, Russell 
raises the question that whether men, women and children 
should be kept in artificial ignorance of facts relating to 
sexual affairs. He argues that ignorance on such matters is 
exceedingly harmful to the individual. Therefore any system 
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which demands the perpetuation of such ignorance is not 
desirable. Sexual morality., according to him, "must be such 
as to commend itself to well-informed persons and not to 
depend upon ignorance for its appeal."^ Russell seems to 
have been prompted by the view that right conduct can never 
be promoted by ignorance. 
In traditional course parents and teachers try to 
keep the children in ignorance of sexual matters. If 
children ask any question relating to sex their curiosity is 
suppressed by either by sharp rebuke or by concealing the 
facts. But sexual impulse is a very powerful one. Sooner or 
later children learn facts from other friends who relate 
them secretly, and as a result of parental teaching regard 
them as dirty. Once they know the fact, they come tc feel 
that they have been systematically deceived by those to whom 
they had looked for guidance and instruction. Their attitude 
towards their parents, towards marriage, and towards the 
opposite sex is thus irrevocably poisoned. 
Few men or women, says Russell, who have had a 
conventional upbrining have learnt to feel decently about 
sex and marriage. Their education has taught them that 
deceitfulness and lying are considered virtues by parents 
2. Marriage and Morals, p.77. 
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and teachers. The^ f feel that sexual relations, even within 
marriage, are more or less disgusting. This attitude makes 
marriage unsatisfying to both men and women. 
Artificial mystery made about sex by the elders only 
increase the natural curiosity of the young on the subject. 
If adults treat sex exactly in the same way as they treat 
any other topic, giving the child answers to all his 
questions and just as much information as he desires or can 
understand, the child will never arrive at the notion of 
obscenity. Russell argues that sexual curiosity, like every 
other curiosity, dies down when it is satisfied. Therefore 
the best way to prevent young people from being obsessed 
with sex is to tell them just as much about it as they care 
to know. On the basis of his experiment conducted among 
children in his Backon Hill School, Russell came to the 
conclusion that nastiness in children is the result of 
prudery in adults. Hence the only way to avoid indecency is 
to avoid mystery. 
Russell has set forth some of the conditions for 
making marriage a happy companionship. According to him, the 
aim of marriage is not only sexual satisfaction. For making 
marriage a happy one love plays very important role. Love is 
something far more important than sexual intercourse. Again, 
Russell believes that civilized people cannot full y satisfy 
their sexual instinct without love. He writes : 
Love has its own proper ideals and its own 
intrinsic moral standards. These are obscured 
both in Christian teaching and in the 
indiscriminate revolt against all sexual 
morality which has sprung up among 
considerable sections of the younger 
generation. Sex intercourse divorced from love 
is incapable of brining any profound 
satisfaction of instinct. I am not saying that 
it should never occur, for to ensure this we 
should have to set up such rigid barriers that 
love also would become very difficult. What I 
am saying is that sex intercourse apart from 
love has little value ana is to be regarded pnmanlyas 
experimentation with a view to love."' 
Another condition which makes marriage happy is the 
similarity of tastes of both the partners. People with 
multifarious tastes and pursuits will be apt to desire 
congeniality in their partners. If they do not get this they 
are bound to feel dissatisfied. 
Third condition which contribute to the happiness of 
marriage, according to Russell, is "paucity of unowned women 
3.. Marriage and Morals, p. 103. 
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and absence of social occasions when married men meet 
respectable women." If there is no possibility of sexual 
relations with any women other than one's wife, most men, 
except in abnormally bad cases, will find it quite 
tolerable. The same thing applies to wives. 
One of the most important causes of unhappiness in 
marriage, thinks Russell, is bad sexual education. Most men, 
for example, do not realize that a process of wooing is 
necessary after marriage, and many educated women do not 
realize what harm they do to marriage by remaining reserved 
and physically aloof. All this could be made right by better 
sexual education. On account of bad sexual education 
presently there is a widespread belief among women that they 
are morall';j superior to men on the ground that the^ have less 
pleasure in sex. This attitude make frank companionship 
between husbands and wives impossible. 
To avoid unhappy conjugal life, which may be caused 
by any of the above reasons, many thinkers often suggest 
divorce as an easy solution. But Russell does not recognize 
divorce as a solution of the troubles of marriage. He thinks 
that where a marriage is childless divorce may be often the 
right solution, but where there are children the stability 
of marriage is a matter of considerable importance. Russell 
puts the above points tersely thus : 
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It is... possible for a civilized man and woman 
to be happy in marriage, although if this is 
to be the case a number of conditions must be 
fulfilled. There must be a feeling of complete 
equality on both sides; there must be no 
interference with mutual freedom; there must 
be the most complete physical and mental 
intimacy; and there must be a certain 
similarity in regard to standards of values. 
(It is fatal, for example, if one values only 
money while the other values only good work). 
Given all these conditions, I believe marriage 
to be the best and most important relation 
that can exist between two human beings. If it 
has not often been realized hitherto, that is 
chiefly because husbands and wives have 
regarded themselves as each other's policemen. 
If marriage is to achieve its possibilites, 
husbands and wives must learn to understand 
that whatever the law may say, in their 
4 private lives they must be free. 
4 . Ibid. , p . U 5. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
RUSSELL'S MORAL AND RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY 
In this chapter we propose to discuss two important 
constituents of Russell's social philosophy his moral and 
religious philosophy. These two topics will be discussed 
separately, not for that his views on these issues have no 
connection, but for that it will facilitate to throw light 
that each sheds on its own subject. 
I. HIS MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Those who are acquainted with Russell's Writings on 
social and political questions, they know that Russell held 
very strong moral convictions. His life-long endeavour was 
to promote such ethical values as peace, kindness, love, 
reason, and the like. Despite this Russell gave 
comparatively less attention to the discussion of ethical 
theories. His contribution to theoretical, as opposed to the 
applied, philosophy of morals is contained, mainly in his 
three published works the essay on "The Elements of 
Ethics" (reprinted in Philosophical Essays), his book 
Religion and Science, and Human Society in Ethics and 
Politics. Apart from these three sources, some elements can 
be found scatteredly in some other works. And ultimately a 
very illuminating exposition of his stand is given in "Reply 
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to Criticism" which has been written to respond to critics' 
objectiions.^ 
There are three distinct stages in the development of 
Russell's ethical views. Let us get a bird's eye view of 
these three stages which will be critically discussed later. 
First, in the beginning of the century in his early 
phase Russell, following G.E. Moore, was a realist in 
ethics, as he was in metaphysics, or in ethical terminology 
an "objectivist". He believed that ethical judgements were 
true or false in just the same way as any other judgements 
are ture or false. That is to say, good and evil, right and 
wrong, were objective features of the universe. They are 
just as real and independent of us as the greeness of grass 
or the hardness of table. Values are as much fact as facts 
are. Russell takes this stand in some of his essays and 
again it is endorsed in his review of Moore's Principia 
2 
Ethica in 1904. This stand is again expounded in detail, 
with copious attributions to Moore, in the essay "The 
Elements of Ethics". 
Second, following santayana's criticism of his views 
1. "Reply to Criticism" has been appended to The Philosophy 
of Bertrand Russell ed. by P.A. Schilpp. 
2. Review of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica, Independent 
Review, V.II, March 1904, pp. 328-333. 
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in 1912, and also his own simultaneous abandoning of 
metaphysical realism for logical atomism, Russell adopted 
what he sometimes called "subjectivism". This came in two 
stages, beginning about 1914. First came the negative stage 
when he urged the dismissal of ethical considerations from 
the scientific approach to philosophy. He writes in 
Mysticism ajid__Logic; 
Driven from the particular sciences, the 
belief that the notions of good and evil must 
afford a key to the understanding of the world 
has sought refuge in philosophy. But even from 
this last refuge, if philosophy is not to 
remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief 
3 must be driven forth. 
Next, he set forth the positive belief that 
judgements of value were primarily expressive of taste, 
attitude and emotion, without cognitive content. They were 
not amenable to proof or even rational defence. The best 
that reason can do is to try to harmonize ethical feelings. 
This is hinted at in Justice in War-Time (1916), mentioned 
briefly in An Outline of Philosophy (1927), later in 
Religion and Sience (1935), and still defended in the "Reply 
3. Russell, B., Mysticism and Logic, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, London, 1917, p.30. 
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to Criticism" (1944). This stage of Russell's view thus 
covers a period of about thirty years, from the beginning of 
the First World War to the end of the Second World War. 
It is in this period that he inspired the 
formulation, through his stray suggestions, the development 
of a theory now popularly known, as 'emotivism', which is 
associated with logical positivism. But Russell took no 
prominent part in the development of emotivism. It may be 
supposed that he was too involved in substantive moral 
issues to develop a philosophical theory about moral 
concepts, for this was the period during which he first 
appeared on the world stage as an effective public moralist. 
Third, Russell began to propound in the early fifties 
the rudiments of a more objective ethics. He found it 
increasingly intolerable to believe that there was no 
rational foundation for ethics. In Human Society in Ethics 
and Politics Russell adumbrates a moral theory which may be 
called naturalism. There, for the first time, he concludes 
that ethical terms are definable: e.g. 'goodness' is 
definable in terms of satisfaction of desires. He offers a 
set of meta-ethical principles which , he says, can be -rue 
or false in the same way in which scientific principles can 
be true or false. He had come to think that just as physics 
began with the private data of perception and built up its 
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objective structures, it might be possible for ethics to 
achieve objective validity from subjective data in a 
parallel way. 
These are the three stages of Russell's moral 
philosophy which he held in different periods. Let us 
consider each of these stages in somewhat more detail. 
In the first stage Russell defends a position which 
is closely modelled, as he acknowledges, on that which his 
friend G.E. Moore had adopted in Principia Ethica. His early 
moral philosophy is a kind of intuitionism, though it was 
Moore's term, not Russell's. Moore held that the fundamental 
principles of ethics, those which attributed goodness or 
intrinsic value to a certain kind of things, though known to 
be true, were incapable of proof. Moreover, ethical values, 
said Moore, were a peculiar non-natural property. They are 
simple and indefinable though capable of being directly 
apprehended (through intuition). Russell is in agreement 
with Moore in maintaining the above view. He writes. 
Thus good and bad are qualities which belong 
to objects independently of our opinions, just 
as much as round and square do; and when two 
people differ as to whether a thing is good 
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only, one of them can be right, though it may 
4 be hard to know which is right. 
Russell agreed with Moore in maintaining that most 
moral philosophy of the past had foundered on the mistaken 
attempt to reduce goodness to other natural properties. They 
had thus denied the uniqueness of ethics in denying the 
uniqueness of value. Moore held that the value property of a 
thing its goodness was based upon, and indeed 
necessarilly connected with, the intrinsic nature of that 
thing. It was in no way reducible to other natural 
properties. However, he maintained that we could have 
certainty about judgements of intrinsic value, though we 
could not give reasons, evidence, or proof of them. 
The above view of Moore is accepted by Russell 
completely. In fact, it is hard to believe that Moore worked 
out his view totally independent of Russell. As colleagues 
and friends, they were influencing each other's 
philosophical opinions. Our inference is substantiated by 
Moore's admission that he had been more influenced by 
Russell than by any other single philosopher.^ 
4. Russell, B., Philosophical Essays, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd, London, 1966, p.21. 
5. Moore admitted it in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, ed. 
by P.A. Schilpp, pp.15-16. 
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At this time both Russell's and Moore's writings were 
full of indefinable terms and indemonstrable premisses. In 
"The Elements of Ethics" Russell holds that it is the 
business of philosophers to ask for reasons as long as 
reasons can legitimately be demanded. But he gives some 
concessions to ethical judgements since they are judgements 
of intrinsic value, in which the simple quality, intrinsic 
goodness, is involved. He writes: 
In this, as in all philosophical inquiries, 
after a preliminary analysis of complex data 
we proceed again to build up comple things 
from their simpler constituents, starting from 
ideas which Vve understand though we cannot define 
them, and from premisses which we know though 
we cannot prove them. 
A typical problem for the utilitarians is that in 
evaluating actions by their consequences they seem to take 
no account of human motive. Russell makes a tentative 
contribution to this problem in a brief and subtle 
discussion that takes account of conscience, prudence, moral 
reflection and motives. His view can be presented in -terms 
of his distinction between subjectively right action and 
objectively right action. 
6. Russell, B., Philosophical Essays, p.15. 
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It is possible that on the basis of evidence 
available where A and B are the only available lines of 
action X validly concludes that A is the course that would 
produce the most good. X is then conscious bound to do A, 
and A is subjectively right. But if, unknown to X, A would 
inevitably have a bad upshot, and much less good then B, 
then B is the objectively right action. Given such a 
situation which is not at all unusual what is the 
justification to say that x's duty or obligation where 
really lies? 
Qn this point Moore is uncompromising. He does not 
recognize the subjectively right action. According to him, 
our sole duty and obligation lies, whether we know it or 
not, whether we like it or not, with what is objectively 
right, with what has the best total consequences. Russell by 
contrast confines the range of moral and immoral action to 
the terrain of the subjectively right, even though, 
according to him, this cannot be understood without appeal 
to the objectively right, and, he hastens to add, to what I 
think is objectively right. It is to be noticed that Russell 
is not a strict utilitarian here because he acknowledges 
that we sometimes ought to do what as it turns out is 
objectively wrong. 
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A question may arise tiere: When we say something is 
good in what sense we attribute goodness -to it? Suppose we 
make two statements one, pleasure is good and second, this 
fountain pen is good. Are we attributing goodness to both 
the statements in the same sense? Russell, like Moore, did 
not enter into any subtle discussion to answer this question 
(at least I did not come across any such discussion). 
Nevertheless, taking some clues from their writings we can 
try to answer the above question. 
Two sorts of goodness may be distinguished 
intrinsic goodness (understood by Moore's formula as the 
value feature of "that which ought to exist on its own 
account"), and specimen goodness (understood as the value 
feature of something which is an excellent specimen of its 
kind). Now let us come back to our original problem, i.e., 
in what sense we attribute goodness to something. Russell, 
like Moore, makes no distinction between the two kinds of 
goodness discussed above. Moore tried to pretend he simply 
was not talking about this later sort of goodness and he 
chose examples in such a way that he somehow avoided the 
question. But Russell was less circumspect. He did not 
clearly see the distinction between the above sorts of 
goodness and got involved into a more crucial problem. 
171 
There was a very serious snag about the word 
'intrinsic' that prevented both Moore and Russell from 
distinguishing intrinsic good from good specimen. The sang 
was that 'intrinsic' called attention to the fact that the 
goodness in question was dependent on the intrinsic nature 
of the thing in question. This may be thought to be true for 
both intrinsic goodness and specimen goodness. But this is 
not at all an adequate reason why we should not distinguish, 
say, the goodness of pleasure from, say, the goodness of an 
automobile. The fact that there can be no evidence for the 
claim that pleasure is intrinsically good is no reason at 
all for holding that there can be no evidence for the claim 
that this is a good automobile. That this point escaped 
Russell's notice in one way, and Moore's in another way, was 
a circumstance that had serious and very different 
consequences for their later developments. 
A thought-provoking reference can be found in 
Russell's Philosophical Essays. There he writes : 
We speak of a good picture, a good dinner, and 
so on, as well as of a good action. But there 
is a great difference between these two 
meanings of good. Roughly speaking, a good 
action is one of which the proble effects are 
good in the other sense. It is confusing to 
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have two meanings for one word, and we 
therefore agreed ...to speak of a right action 
7 rather than good action. 
It is implied from the above, and the context also makes it 
clear, that a good picture or a good dinner are things 
which, according to Russell, are goods that ought to exist 
on their own account, i.e., intrinsic goods. Moore, however, 
would have regarded a good picture or dinner, like a good 
action, as examples of what he called "instrumental goods" 
(good as a means). A good picture for Moore would be good as 
a means to someone's one kind of pleasure, a dinner good as 
a means to someone's other type of pleasure or happiness. It 
would not be an intrinsic good. Thus Moore and Russell 
implicitly and unknowingly had conceived of entirely 
different ideas about what we called specimen 
goodness specimen goodness were instrumental goods to 
Moore and intrinsic goods to Russell. 
By assimilitating specimen goodness to intrinsic 
goodness Russell did three things. First, he tried to 
understand both of these in terms of "what ought to exist on 
its own account" (which made him vulnerable to santayana's 
criticism). Second, he funnelled into his emotivism the 
6. Ibid, p.110. 
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confused idea that all value judgements were of the same 
kind being, as he supposed, all matters of fact. It led 
him to think that all these are matters of emotion, desire, 
and taste. Third, he got himself committed to the curious 
view that when we call a dinner good we can offer no reason 
to support our judgement. T,hat all we could do was to intuit 
this fact. It is to be remembered that Russell is still a 
realist. By committing to the above view Russell put^himself 
in a difficult circun-£tance and this difficult circumstance 
suggests that Russell will soon be hankering for a new 
theory. 
Three problematic and interrlated ideas, accpted by 
Moore and Russell, were crucial for later developments in 
moral philosophy. One is the idea that propositions 
ascribing intrinsic value, though true or false as the case 
may be, were incapbale of proof, not even open to evidence. 
The second is that the value property ascribed (intrinsic 
goodness) was declared to be a unique property, a 
nc»i:-natural property. The third is that this property was 
held to be indefinable, i.e., it could not be explicated in 
terms of any other properties. 
SUBJECTIVISM 
In the second phase Russell abandoned his early realist 
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position in etbics. Actually this was the phase of gradual 
withdrawl from the entire realistic metalphysics. Thus 
Russell slid into subjectivisn;. Now we find him in the camp 
of emotivists, more as a sponsor than as a leader. He 
defected from one camp and emerged as a champion of the 
opposition. "Good" and "evil", he says in Mysticism and 
Logic, are just not philosophical terms at all, and in 
particular they do not refer to objective features of the 
universe. 
That Russell was fully conscious of this shift 
becomes evident from the follwoing lines: 
When I was young, I agreed with G.E. Moore in 
believing the objectivity of good and evil. 
Santayana's criticism in a book called Winds 
of Doctrine, caused me to abandon this view, 
though I have never been able to be as bland 
Q 
and comfortable without it as he was. 
George Santayana, then a Harvard philosopher, did a 
witty and devastating job on Russell's ethics, and by 
implication on Moore's. Santayana's criticism does not 
consist of an analysis of the logic of that ethics. The 
mixture of logical skill, mockery, and insight with which 
8. Portraits from Memory, p.90. 
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Santayana undermined the foundation of Russell's objectivism 
can be illustrated by a few quotations.Santayana writes: 
From this correct (good is indefinable), if 
somewhat trifling, observation, however, Mr. 
Russell, like Mr. Moore before him, evokes a 
portentous dogma. Not being . .able to define 
9 good, he hypostasises it. 
That the quality 'good' is indefinable is one 
assertion, and obvious; but that the presence 
of this quality is unconditioned is another, 
and astonishing. My logic, I am well aware, is 
not very accurate or subtle; and I wish Mr. 
^Russell had not left it for me to discover the 
connection between these two propositions 
...Right and left are indefinable ...yet 
everything that is to the right is not to the 
right on no condition, but obviously on the 
condition that that someone is looking in a 
certain direction; and if someone else at the 
same time is looking in the opposite 
direction, what is truly to the right will be 
truly to the left also. If Mr. Russell thinks 
9. Winds of Doctrine, p.140. 
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this is a contradiction, I understand why the 
universe does not please him.^® 
Food and poison are such only relatively, and 
in view of particular bodies, and the same 
material thing may be food and poison at 
once...For the human system whiskey is truly 
more intoxicating than coffee, and the 
contrary opinion would be an error; but what a 
strange way of vindicating this real, though 
relative, distinction, to insist that whiskey 
is more intoxicating in itself, without 
reference to any animal; that it is pervaded, 
as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and 
stands dead drunk in its bottle! Yet just in 
this way Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore conceive 
things to be dead good and dead bad.^^ 
Santayana's own view on these matters was a suave 
relativism of all values to each other, and especially to 
human interests. Some commentators think that santayan 
actually did not refute Moore or iilussell's view. He mocked 
it, and the theory, having lost its metaphysical support, 
came down tumbling to the floor. 
10. Ibid, p.141 
11. Ibid, p.146, 
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Hence came Mussell's acquiescence in relativism and 
emotivism. In 1925 he wrote in what I Believe : "I do not 
think there is, strictly speaking, such a thing as ethical 
knowledge. If we desire to achieve some end, knowledge may-
show us the means, and this knowledge may loosely pass as 
ethical. But I do not believe that we can decide what sort 
of conduct is right or wrong except by reference to its 
probable consequences ... All moral rules must be tested by 
examining whether they tend to realize ends that we desire. 
What we 'ought' to dsire is merely what someone else wishes 
12 us to desire". 
Critics point out that Russell's own actions belied 
his theories. But Russell regarded this criticism as a sheer 
mistake, what actually is the case is that l-iassell found it 
possible to adopt apparently different positions in 
"substantive ethics" while remaining as emotivist or subject-
vist in "pure ethics". Our claim can be substantiated by the 
following two cases. First, in his Portraits From Memory he 
described his response to the First World War thus : "I 
never had a moment's doubt as to what I must do. I have 
at times been paralysed by scepticism, at times I have 
been cynical, at other times indifferent, but when the war 
came I felt as if I heard the voice of God. I knew that it 
12. p.60 
r/s 
was my business to protest, however futile protest might be. 
My whole nature was involved ... I hardly supposed that much 
good would come of opposing the War, but I felt for the 
honour of human nature those who were not swept off their 
13 feet should show that they stood firm." 
Second, in 1936 he wrote in his pacifist tract Which 
way to Peace? : "What is right and what is wrong depends, as 
I believe, upon the consequences of actions, insofar as they 
can be foreseen (subjective rightness'). I connot say simply 
'War is wicked', but only 'Modern war is practically certain 
to have worse consequences then even the most unjust peace.' 
And if I am to argue in favour of war resistance / I must try 
13 to show that it is likely to do good." 
Comparing these two statements we may say that 
Russell's pacifism during the first World War was kantian 
whereas him pacifism before the second World War inspired 
by utilitarian view. The point to be noted here is that 
there is nothing in the foregoing passages that would have 
logically prevented Russell from taking the positions he did 
in the two cases quoted. 
Russell's subjectivism became more prominent in his 
Religion and science, there he writes:" The theory which I 
13. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory, pp.27-28. 
13. Which Way to Peace, pp.211-12. 
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have been advocating is a form of the doctrine which is 
called the 'subjectivity' of values. This doctrine consists 
in maintaining that, if two men differ about values, there 
is not a disagreement as to any kind of truth, but a 
difference of taste... The chief ground for adopting this 
view is the complete impossiblity of finding any arguments 
14 
to prove that this or that has intrinsie value." But there 
are problems in the very expositioin and conception of the 
theory of subjectivism. 
What we need here, but never find in his writings, is 
a further argument to convince us that the impossibility of 
proving that this or that has intrinsic value is a cogent 
reason, for the view that such disagreements are in no way 
factual. In his realist phase H.ussell had simply assumed 
that the impossibility of proof was just feature that 
showed, not that truth was unavailable, but that value was 
different from natural fact. To say that since no way can be 
imagined for deciding a difference as to values, hence it is 
only a difference of tastes is not a good argument. 
In 1954 Russell's book Human Society in Ethics and 
Politics was published. In the first half of that book 
Russell dealt with the fundamental concepts of ethics and in 
14. Russell, B., Religion and Science, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1960, pp.237-38. 
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the second half he dealt with the application of these 
concepts to practical politics. The first pait analyses such 
concepts as moral codes: good and bad, sin, superstitions 
ethics, and ethical sanctions. He draws the conclusion that 
ethics is not an idependent constituent, but is reducible to 
politics in the ultimate analysis. 
In the same book Russell expresses dissatisfaction 
with his own view. He begins to wonder again whether there 
is such a thing as ethical knowledge, and whether truth or 
falsehood is involved in such judgements as 'murder is 
wicked', 'happiness is good'. He admits candidly that this 
is not an easy question and it is not possible to give a 
simple answer to this. 
Again Russell thinks that ethical subjectivism is not 
tenable. His naturalism has started to erode his belief in 
subjectivism as evident from the following : 
There is another closely related question, and 
that is as to the subjectivity of ethical 
judgements. If I say oysters are good, and you 
say they are nasty, we both understand that we 
are merely expressing our personal tastes, and 
that there is nothing to argue about. But when 
Nazis say that it is good to torture Jews, and 
we say that it is bad, we do not feel as if we 
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were merely, expressing a difference of taste, 
we are even willing to fight and die for our 
opinion, which we should not do to enforce our 
view about oysters. Whatever arguments may be 
advanced to show that the two cases are 
analogous, most people will remain convinced 
that there is a difference somewhere though it 
may be difficult to say exactly what it is. I 
think this feeling, though not decisive, 
deserves respect, and should make us reluctant 
to accept al all readily the view that all eth-
1 "5 ical judgements are wholly subjective. 
One suggestion : One way to respect our moral 
sentiments here (about the instance of Jews' torture) would 
be to inquire whether it is being supposed that the Nazis 
believed the torture was intrinscial ly good or only 
instrumentally good. If the answer is latter, there might 
still be legitimate disputes about means. Russell does not 
explain this point with much clarity though the means-end 
distinction was very important to him. 
Russell viewed his entire life's work as an attempt 
to enlarge the role of reason in human affairs, but we find 
an important exception in this regard in Human Society. Here 
15. Russell, B., Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, Third Impression, 
1963, p.26. 
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he openly adopts Hume's dictum: 'Reason is and ought to be 
the slave of passions', saying it expresses a view to which 
he, like every man who attempts to be reasonable, fully 
subscribe. Now he restricts the role of reason. Reason, 
according to him signifies the choice of right means to an 
end that we wish to achieve. "It has nothing whatever to do 
with the choice of ends." About the instance we discussed 
(i.e, about the Jew's tourture) it would seem that we would 
have to know whether the Nazis' ends are in any_ respect in 
line with our ov:n before we could even formulate the 
question as to whether and where we could apply reason to 
our differences about the torture. 
Russell's view that reason can only serve as a means 
and has nothing to do with the choice ol ends is open to 
criticism. If Russell is right, there seems to be no ground 
for his further claim that it can only be a means for 
effecting ends which was in no way chosen with reason's aid. 
There is a world of difference between saying that reason 
has nothing to do with the choice of ends and saying that it 
is not, and could not be, the final or sole basis of choice. 
Russell's view would have been less vulnerable to criticism 
if he had said the latter. Because of his wobbling on this 
point, Russell misdescribes his practice as well as 
conviction. 
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II_. RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
The word "religicn" describes various phenomena which 
are numerous and complex. It may refer tc rituals, belief 
systems, blind community loyalty, magical cults, priestly 
activities, a state of mind called "religions experience", 
and so on. /.]1 of these overlap, although they sometimes are 
confliciting with each otter. Interestingly, some writers 
even gave elaborate arguments to show that Russian Cemmunism 
fulfilled the requirements of a religion. Again, there are 
thinkers who dtfcribe Nazism as a religion (though in a bad 
sense). Albert Einstein once proposed that science itself 
could serve as the religion of the devoted scientists. 
Evidently, all these descriptions of relgion are not in line 
with those popular definitions which associate religion with 
a belief in one God or in many gods. 
Without entering into the details and subtleties that 
the concept of religion involves, it may be said that 
religion is essentially unquestioned and complete surrender 
to what is recognized as the highest and most valuable. 
Religion besides a particular set of beliefs includes within 
its purview the institutionalization and observation of 
certain rituals. 
A question arises here: What then is the task of the 
philosophy of relgion? Philosophy of religion has twofold 
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tasks. On the one hand, it has the function of interpreting, 
evaluating, and integrating the data of religious 
experience. On the other, "it appraises the adequacy of the 
religious expression as an interpretation of reality". A 
philosopher is more competent then a religionist to perform 
these tasks because his (philosopher's) attitude is 
dispassionate and he is committed to free inquiry. A 
religionist, on the other hand, is passionately committed to 
a tradition, to a faith and this stands in the way of free 
inquiry. Russell being a philosopher is in a better position 
to do both the tasks just discussed. 
Russell has given less rigorous attention to 
philosophy of religion than to any other major branch of 
philosophy. From his writings it does not appear that he is 
at all concerned to develop a systematic philosophy of 
religion. In fact, he once told a group of inquiring 
students that he hardly recalled having written anything on 
the subject other than his "Free Man's Worship" and Religion 
and Science. Despite his own admission of relative neglect 
of this branch of philosophy, it is possible to piece 
together his attitude towards religion which we find 
scattered in his various writings. 
Russell's attitude towards religion is somewhat 
complex. This complex attitude he puts succinctly in his 
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"Reply to criticism".^ Here he says that religion has three 
main aspects. First, "there are a man's serious personal 
beliefs, in so far as they have to do with the nature of the 
world and the conduct of life." Second, there is theology. 
Third, there is institutionalized religion, e.g. Churches. 
Russell says that despite the vagueness of the first of 
these three aspects, the word "religion" is coming to be 
used more and-more in this sense. But philosophers are more 
concerned with the theological aspect whereas historians and 
socialogists are chiefly occupied with the third aspect, 
i.e., religion as embodied in institutions. What makes 
Russell's attitude towards relgion complex is the fact that 
although he considers some form of personal religion highly 
desirable, he does not accept the theology of any accepted 
religion and also thinks that institutionalized religions 
have done more harm than good. 
E.S. Brightman finds some sort of likeness between 
Hume's view on religion and Russell's view about the same. 
The likeness consists in each philosopher's lifelong concern 
for religion while entertaining almost a lifelong scepticism 
about the truth of religious beliefs. Hume admitted that 
although he was religious in his young life, he did not 
1. It was written to reply to the criticisms made against 
him by the various writers who contributed articles to 
The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. 
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entertain any religious belief since he began to read Locke 
and Clarke. Similarly Russell tells us that when he was a 
youth he, for a long time, accepted the argument of the 
First cause. But at the age of 18 a simple argument which he 
found in Mill's autobiography revealed to him the fallacious 
nature of the First cause argument. Russell writes, "...I 
for a long time accepted the argument of the First cause, 
until one day, at the age of 18, I read John Stuart Mill's 
Autobiography, and there I found this sentence: 'My father 
taught me the question, 'who made me?' cannot be answered, 
since it immediately suggests the further question, 'who 
made God?' That very simple sentence showed me, as still I 
2 
think, the fallacy in the argument of the First Cause." 
Hume was rendered skeptical of religion by merely beginning 
to read Locke and Clarke whereas Russell's conviction of the 
validity of the First Cause arugment was shattered by a 
trivial question about the cause of the First Cause. 
Russell's critical philosophy of religion consists 
largely of objections leveled against historical 
Christianity. He has apparently devoted little study to 
non-Christian religions or to the essence of universal 
religion. Even in his consideration of Christianity he is 
more concerned to reject it than to define it. In other 
2. Russell, B., Why I am not a Christian, George Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1961, pp.3-4. 
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words, he is concerned to express his dislike for 
Christianity than to givo an explanation of what 
Christianity is. 
The central beliefs of Christianity are 
three belief in God, belief in immoratlity, and belief 
about Christ, the belief that he was, if not divine, at 
least the best and wisest of men. Rejecting all the three 
Russell says that he does not believe in God and in 
immortality, and again he does not think that Christ was the 
best and wisest of men, although he grants Him a very high 
degree of moral goodness.^ The reasons which Russell gives 
for his rejection of Christian beliefs are numerous. 
Firstly, on psychological ground he rejects Christian 
beliefs. He thinks that there are no cogent or persuasive 
intellectual grounds for such belief. The main reason for 
belief in God, as he writes an various occasions, is that 
people are forced to have this belief from early infancy. 
Again, sometimes he writes that another powerful reason for 
such a belief is the wish for security. Since Russell had 
little reverence for tradition and did not desire for 
security, he found it easy to discard Christian beliefs. 
3. Ibid, p.2. 
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Secondly, on moral grounds Russell rejects 
Christianity. His argument runs as follows : 
...the fundamental doctrines of Christianity 
demand a great deal of ethical perversion... 
The world, we are told, was created by a God 
who is "both good and omnipotent. Before he 
created the world He foresaw all the pain and 
misery that it would contain; He is therefore 
responsible for all of it. It is useless to 
argue that the pain in the world is due to 
sin. In the first place, this is not true; it 
is not sin that causes rivers to overflow 
their banks or volcanoes to erupt. But even if 
it were true, it would make no difference. If 
I were going to beget a child knowing that the 
child was going to be a homicidal maniac, I 
should be responsible for his crimes. If God 
knew in advance the sins of which man would be 
guilty, He was clearly responsible for all the 
consequences of those sins when He decided to 
create ijian. The usual Christian argument is 
that the suffering in the world is a 
purification for sin, and is therefore a good 
thing. This argument is...only a raticmlization 
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of sadism; but in any case it is a very poor 
argument. 
Russell has given another moral argument for 
rejection of Christianity. He says that Christian religion, 
as organized in its churches, has been, and still is, the 
principal enemy of moral progress in the world. To 
illustrate his point he cit^ such example as the Roman 
Catholic prohibition of divorce even when an innocent young 
girl is married to a syphilitic man. It is correct that this 
argument of Russell and other similar instance are based on 
facts, as far as they go. But still this argument is not 
conclusive. Granted that religious prohibitions have had 
sometimes tragic or immoral effects, does it follow that 
these effects have been the predominant and characteristic 
attitude of Christianity? Can it be concluded that 
Christianity prefers human suffering? Similar arguments can 
then be advanced against the science of medicine also. Do 
not tradionally professional physicians today often oppose 
to socialize medicine? Was not the science of medicine to 
blame for centuries for the cruel loss of mothers during the 
period of childbirth? 
Russell frequently points out another moral defect in 
4. Ibid, p.22. 
1 ^ 0 
Christianity. He says that it is supported by endowments and 
that salaries are paid to the clergy. But the question 
arises can it be regarded as a defect in religion? If it is 
regarded as defect then for the same reason our educational 
system and every other endowed institution should be 
regarded as defective. If the clergy should not be paid 
salaries, why should the teacher or the physician or the 
writer be paid? Hence Russell's argument loose its logical 
or ethical force. 
Most of the time Russell overlooks the lofty maxims 
given by religions. Only occasionally he admits, e.g. in 
Free Thought and Official Propaganda, that "in certain times 
and places (religions belief) has had some good effects."^ 
Although he approves some maxims of Christianity (such as 
"Love thy neighbour as thyself") and thinks that some 
sayings of Jesus are very excellent, yet he observes that 
such good maxims are not much practised. 
Christian theolgians advance various arguments to 
prove the existence of God. In Why I am not a Christian, 
Russell runs through some of the main arguments which have 
been thought to establish the existence of God and he shows 
them all to be fallacious. He does not argue that the 
proposition that such a being exists is unintelligible or 
5. Russell, B., Free Thought and Official Propaganda, 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1922, p.3. 
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logically impossible; but maintains only that there is not 
the slightest reason to think it true. Thus, Russell finds 
the argument to a first cause to be inconsistent since it 
starts with an assumption of universal causation and ends 
with the postulation of an uncaused cause. 
In his view, the argument that there must be a God to 
redress the•imbalance of justice by administering rewards or 
punishments in a future life, simply evades the question of 
morality in this world. As Russell remarks, it is like 
aiguing that if there are bad oranges at the top of a crate, 
there must be good organes underneath to redress the 
balance. If there is a preponderance of injustice in the 
world then it is an argument against the existence of a 
benevolent deity, rather than an argument for its existence. 
It is argued that the working of the laws of nature 
implies a lawgiver. Russell shows that this argument rests 
upon an elementary confusion between the legal concept of 
law as a body of rules laid down by some authority and the 
scientific concept of law as a description of what generally 
happens. 
Another argument is the argument from design which 
relies on a supposed analogy between the organization of the 
universe and the organization of a manufactured article, 
like a clock. This analogy gives support to the conclusion 
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that the universe also has a manufacturer. But the trouble 
with this argument, as Russell points out, is that the 
analogy is false. There are many teleological systems within 
the universe, but we have no reason to think that the 
universe itself is a teleological system as a whole, for 
often it reveals that it .is not purposive and guided by an 
intelligent being having a design in his mind. 
In a broadcast debate with Father F.C. Copleston over 
B.B.C. Russell refuted the argument from contingency, and the 
argument from religious experience. The argument from 
contingency, as set out by copleston, is that since nothing 
in the world contains the reason for its own existence, 
there must be a necessary being external to the world, which 
both contains the reason for its own existence and supplies 
the reason why the world exists.® To begin with, Russell 
points out, necessity is properly ascribed not to objects 
but to propositions. Talking about the existence of a 
necessary being, or one which contains the reason for its 
own existence, is a loose way of claiming that there is 
something which is such that the proposition that it exists 
is necessarily true. But then the validity of this claim 
needs to be established. It certainly does not follow from 
6. This debate is reprinted in Why I am not a Christian 
pp.144-168. 
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the fact that empirical existential propositions are 
contingent. The spirit behind this argument is that there 
must be an explanation why the world exists. But the 
postulation of a deity does not provide an explanation, 
7 unless we can also explain why he made the world. 
About the argument from religious experience Russell 
says that not every experience of this kind is cognitive. 
The experiences which have led men to believe that their 
seeing of Satan was as vivid as those which have led men to 
believe that they were seeing God. The difficulty is to find 
a criterion for deciding when such an experience is to be 
held to be veridical. An attempt might be made to formulate 
a criterion in terms of the coherence of the accounts which 
mystics give of their experiences. Even then it will run 
into many troubles. In any case, even if there were enough 
consensus among mystics for it to be reasonable to talk of 
their apprehending some existent objects, "the effect would 
only be to widen our conception of the world". It would 
provide no evidence at all for the truth of such 
propositions as that the world had a benevolent creator. 
7. Indian philosophers, like Sri Avirobindo, are in a better 
position to meet this objection. Sri Aurobindo sa:fs that 
creation is the play of God, the Supreme Being. 
rj4 
Thus Russell wants to show that the Christian 
religion encounters all the intellectual difficulties which 
attend the belief in a transcendent deity together with many 
that it has made for itself. He is derisively scornful of 
its supertitious rituals. Russell does not believe in the 
divinity of Christ. Not only that, he does not agree that 
Christ, as depicted in the Gospels was a supremely good man. 
To prove his point Russell cited many instances of 
vindicativeness that were shown towards his opponents. 
It is correct that historically it is the more 
intolerant aspects of Christs' teaching that have had by far 
the greater influence, at least on the practices of the 
organised Christian Churches. Hence Russell is right to some 
extent in maintaining that one distinctive mark of 
g 
Christianity is its greater readiness for persecution. 
Christians have repeatedly persecuted heretics, persecuted 
Jews, persecuted freethinkers, and persecuted one another. 
They have tortured and killed thousands of innocent women on 
the pretext that they were witches. They have made the lives 
of innumerable children wretched by their sadistic 
application of the preposterous doctrine of original sin. 
Even in our own time, the Roman Catholic Church endeavours 
to ensure, by its opposition to birth control, that "a life 
8. Why I am not a Christian, p.176. 
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of torture is inflicted upon millions of human beings who 
ought never to have existed, merely because it is supposed 
that sexual intercourse is wicked unless accompanied by the 
desire for oppspring, but not wicked when this desire is 
present, even though the offspring is humanly certain to be 
9 
wretched." If Christians, in general, has become more 
humane, this is mainly due, in Russell's opinion, to the 
pressure exerted by free-thinkers. We are partially in 
agreement with Russell's contention that "'the whole 
contention that Christianity has had an elevating moral 
influence can only be maintained by wholesale ignoring or 
falsification of the historical evidence. But at the same 
time this concluslion is to some extent unfair. It ignores 
the part played by individual Christians in such moral 
advances as the abolition of the slave-trade, the more 
humane treatment of prisoners, the reform in the conditions 
of child-labour, and the opposition -o racial 
discrimination. These contributions should not be overlooked 
while making an assessment of Christianity. 
In the realm of religion Russell has applied very 
rigid standard either complete demonstration or no truth. 
He is definitely biased in applying such a rigid standard in 
9. Ibid pp.52-53. 
10. Ibid, p.176. 
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religion. Whereas in the realm of ethics and social 
philosophy his thought has moved toward "reasonable belief", 
experiment, and what one might call faith, in the realm of 
religion he was not ready to give a slight concession. Any 
rational thinker would agree that demonstrable truth in the 
sense of logically necessary proof is unattainable in 
religion. 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that Russell's demand 
for demonstrable truth in religion has become less rigorous 
as time has gone on. His vacillation can be made clear by 
the following references.. In Problems of Philosophy we found 
Russell agnostic. Here he holds that questions "of the 
profcundest interest to the spritual life" must remain 
insoluble with our present powers. Such questions as the 
permanence of consciousness and the importance of good and 
evil to the universe, he says, have no answers that arc 
demonstrably true. In "The Free Man's Worship" (1903) 
although his sceptical attitude is evident, yet he grants 
that some of the things we desire are "real goods". By 1917, 
when he reissued "Free Man's Worship" in Mysticism and 
Logic, he says that he feels less convinced than he did in 
1903 of the objectivity of good and evil. Again, in Religion 
and Science (1935) he reached the conclusion that questions 
of value, which of course are relevant to ethics and 
religion, cannot be intellectually decided at all. Values/he 
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says, lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. Science 
has nothing to say about values, and "what science cannot 
discover, mankind cannot know."^^ Thus on epistemological 
grounds Russell arrives at a complete ethical and religious 
scepticism. 
The conclusion Russell thus reached is strangely 
inconsistent with his own commitment to values such as 
freedom, happiness, kindness, and justice. If his conclusion 
is correct then there is no way of knowing whether values 
like freedom, happiness, kindness and justice are preferable 
to those like slavery, misery, cruelty, and injustice. If he 
would say that the preference for the 'higher' values is 
purely arbitrary and irrational, then his further criticisms 
of religion on axiological grounds cannot be seriously 
considered. In the "Free Man's Worship" he rejected ordinary 
religion "on the ground of the combined indifference and 
cruelty of the universe", but if cruelty and indifference 
cannot be known to be "disvalues", his argument colapses. 
In Human Soceity in Ethics and Politics Russell 
disagrees with those who say that decay of religious faith 
is the cause of all troubles which are afflicting our 
11. Russell, B. , Religion and Science, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1960, p.243. 
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nations. This is, according to him, contrary to truth. 
Citing the instance of world wars he says that what has 
happend in the world since 1914 has proceeded with a kind of 
inevitability. It is an inevitability derived not from 
external circumstances, but from the characters of the 
actors. About the first world war he writes: 
Nobody can pretend that the First World War 
was in any degree due to lack of Christian 
faith in the rulers who brought it about. The 
Czar, the Kaiser, and the Emperor of Austria 
were all earnest Christian... There was only 
one prominent politician at that time who was 
not a Christian. That was Jean Jaures, a 
Socialist who opposed the war and was 
assassinated with the approval of almost all 
Christians. In England the only members of the 
Cabinet who resigned from disapproval of the 
War were John Burns and Lord Morley, a noted 
atheist. In Germany likewise the only 
opposition came from atheists... In Russia, 
when the atheists acquired power, their first 
12 act was to make peace. All these instances 
12. Russell, B., Human Society in Ethies and Politics, 
p.215. 
only prove that the cause of conflict is the 
ancient clash of power politics. It is not 
fundamentally a clash between faith and 
unfaith or between one faith or another, but 
between mighty empires, each of which sees a 
chance of world supremacy. In so far as faith 
has anything to do with the matter, there is a 
great deal of more faith in the world than 
there was at earlier time. 
Christians hold that their faith does good, but other 
faiths do harm. Refuting this view Russell says that all 
faiths do harm. He defines faith as a firm belief in 
something for which there is no evidence. We only speak of 
13 
faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence. It 
is this substitution of emotion for evidence which leads to 
strife since different groups substitute different emotions. 
Christians have faith in Resurrection, communists have faith 
in Marx's Theory of Value. Since neither faith can be 
defended rationally, each therefore is defended by 
propaganda. Hence Russell writes : 
It is completely mysterious to me that there 
are apparently sane people who think that a 
13. Ibid, p.215. 
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belief in Christianity might prevent war. Such 
people seem totally unable to learn anything 
from history... From the time of Constantine to 
the present day there has been no shred of 
evidence to show that Christian states are 
less warlike than others. Indeed, some of the 
most ferocious wars have been due to disputes 
between different kinds of Christianity.^^ 
Religious tenets, Christian or non-Christian, are, in 
Russell's opinion, myths. There is something feeble about a 
man who cannot face the perils of life without the help of 
comfortable myths. Those who foster religious myths are 
aware, however dimly, that their opinions are not rational 
and hence they become furious when they are disputed. They, 
therefore, take recouse to persecution, censorship and 
other methods to suppress them who dare to challenge their 
myths. 
For Russell, the important thing is not what a person 
believes, but how he acts upon his beliefs. If he thinks 
that his belief is based upon reason, he will support it by 
argument, not by persecution, and will abandon it if the 
argument goes against him. But if his belief is based upon 
21. Ibid, p.144. 
211 
faith, he will realize that argument is useless and will 
therefore resort to force either in the form of persecution 
or "by stunting and distorting the minds of the young" in 
the name of education. 
The last form, i.e., distorting the minds of the 
young in the name of education, is, according to Russell, 
peculiarly dastardly act, since it takes the advantage of 
the innocence of immature minds. Unfortunately it is 
practised in a greater or less degree in the schools of 
every civilized country. 
On the basis of above reasons Russell concludes that 
mere increase of religious faith cannot cure the troubles 
which the world is facing. in fact, it is the orthodox 
dogmatic beliefs that is the root cause of all troubles, 
Russell Writes : 
I do not believe that a decay of dogmatic 
belief can do anything but good. I admit at 
once that new systems of dogma, such as those 
of the Nazis and the Communists, are even 
worse than the old systems, but they could 
never have acquired a hold over men's minds if 
orthodox dogmatic habits had not been 
instilled in youth. Stalin's language is full 
of reminiscences of the theological seminary 
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in which he received his training. What the 
world needs is not dogma, but an attitude of 
scientific inquiry, combined with a belief 
that the torture of millions is not desirable, 
whether inflicted by stalin or by a deity 
imagined in the likeness of the believer.^^ 
So far we have concentrated on Russell's criticisms 
of religions and religious belief. Turning now from his 
criticisms, let us try to explore his positive attitude 
toward religion. It has been seen that Russell is hostile to 
traditional and institutionalized Christianity. The question 
arises: Is he equally hostile to the essence of religion? 
It is possible to argue about the essence of 
religion, and come to no conclusion. But all will agree that 
religion is a concern about values, maintaining their 
dignity and observing their destiny. Therefore, inquiry 
about Russell's religion is inquiry into his attitude toward 
values. 
We have seen in one phase of his thought, Russell 
insists that there is no way of knowing validly about 
values. Yet he appeals to values and their assumed validity 
in his criticisms as well as in his practical commitments. 
21. Ibid, p.144. 
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No one who surveys the lifework of Russell can doubt either 
the sincerity of his opposition to many traditional values 
or his devotion to the values that he acknowledges and 
aspires for. In spite of his many cynical remarks, Russell's 
life has been notable for its devotion to human values, 
individual and social. Human happiness, justice, freedom, 
and co-operation have been objects of his loyalty. There are 
also thinkers who define religion in terms of growth. 
Undoubtedly, measured by this standard Russell's life and 
thought are definitely religious, i.e. commitment to certain 
higher values. 
Evidence to this that religion has had a positive and 
profound influence on Russell is available in his writings. 
He himself wrote that he was educated as a Protestant, and 
one of the texts that most impressed upon his youthful mind 
was: "Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil". As late 
as 1929 he wrote : "I am conscious that to this dav this 
text influences me in my most serious actions." Again, in 
his essay on "Useless knowledge", Russell writes: "For 
those to whom dogmatic religion can no longer bring 
comfort, there is need of some substitute, if life is 
not to become lusty and harsh and filled with trivial 
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self-assertion." Here Russell is visibly 
groping for a non- dogmatic religion. When he 
writes or. "The Ancestry of Fascism", he 
readily grants that organised religions have 
seme good elements and he favourably mentions 
specifically the Christian doctrines of 
humility, love cf one's neighbour, etc. This 
is completely not in harmony with the 
one-sided denunciations of religion which we 
find elsewhere in his writings. 
Russell admits that modern democracy has derived 
strength from the moral ideals of Christianity. We owe, 
according to him, to Christianity a certain respect for the 
individual. Another favourable statement on Christianity 
appears in In Praise of Idleness. There he writes : 
The educational machine, throughout Western 
civilization, is dominated by two ethical the 
thories: that of Christianity and that of 
nationalism. These two, wher. taken seriously, 
are incompatible... For my part, I hold that, 
where they differ, Christianity is preferable, 
17 but where they agree, both are mistaken. 
16. Russell B., In Praise of Idleness, W.W. Norton and Co., 
New York, 1935, p.52. 
21. Ibid, p.144. 
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Here is ample proof of his appreciation of religion. 
The profoundest expression of Russell's view on 
religion can be found at ifeast in four places. The best 
known is the oft-quoted "Free Man's Worship", dating from 
1903. Another profounder expression from religious 
standpoint is the essay "The Essence of Religion", published 
in the Hibbert Journal in 1912. Then, there is Principles of 
Social Reconstruction (1916) where scatteredly we find his 
views on religion. Finally, the chapter on "Effort and 
Resignation" which has been incorporated in The Conquest of 
Happiness (1930) must be necessarilly referred to. These 
sources, especially the Hibbert article, reveal the four 
essentials of Russell's religion: a sense of infinity, a 
sense of membership in the whole, resignation, and social 
justice. 
The sense of infinity refers to "the selfless 
untrammelled life in the whole which frees man from the 
18 
prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts." 
Infinity and membership in the whole are thus inseparable. 
This quality of infinity is one aspect of human experience. 
It is universal and impartial. The other aspect of man's 
life is finite, self-centred, and particular. Man's soul. 
18. Hibbert Journal (1912) pp.46-47. 
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according to Russell, is a strange mixture of God and brute, 
"a battle ground of two natures". The experience cf the 
infinite is "like the diffused light on a cloudy sea", 
"sudden beauty in the midst of strife." 
In pointing out the infinite aspect of man, Russell 
has reached very near to Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, S. Radhakrishnan, Sir Mohammad Iqbal 
and some other contemporary Indian philosophers. These 
contemporary Indian thinkers also emphasized this infinite 
aspect of man. Russell's deepest religious experience is in 
harmony with the light by which all mystics live. That 
Russell himself was aware of this is evident from his essay 
on "Mysticism and Logic". Actually in the depth of his heart 
Russell has been a more religious man than his theories or 
his attacks on religion would suggest. 
From his mystical sense of infinity and of membership 
in the whole flows the third trait of Russell's religion, 
viz., resignation. In The Conquest of Happiness he writes : 
Christianity taught submission to the will of 
God, and even for those who cannot accpt this 
phraseology, there should be something of the 
19 same kind pervading all their activities, 
19. Russell, B. , The Conquest of Happiness, George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd, London, 1930, p.236. 
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Resignation is the attitude of a participant, not of an 
outsider. Russel in his later writings pointed out that the 
trait of aloofness, which we find in G. Santayana, may be 
wise, but inferior to the attitude of service "which is a 
heritage of Christianity." 
From these views arise the fourth aspect of Russell's 
religious, attitude viz., social justice, which sometimes he 
calls love. Any adeuate religion, he tells us, will lead us 
to substitute inequality of affection by love of justice, 
and to universalize our aims by realizing the common needs 
of man. Russell wants a new religion based upon liberty, 
justice and love, "not upon authority and law and hef-faro." 
The total life of religion, as Russell conceives it, 
is the life of the sprit. He finds three sources of human 
activity instinct, mind, and spirit. The life of instinct 
includes all that man shares with the Icwer animals, all 
that is concerned with self-preservation and reproduction 
and the desires and impulses derivative from these. It 
includes all the impulses that are essentially concerned 
with the biological success of oneself or one's group. The 
life of mind is the life of pursuit of knowledge from mere 
childish curiosity up to the greatest efforts of thought. It 
(the life of mind) consists of thought which is wholly or 
partially impersonal. It is impersonal in the sense that it 
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concerns itself with objects on their own account, and not 
merely on account of their bearing upon our instinctive 
life. The life of the spirit centres around impersonal 
feeling, as the life of the mind centres around impersonal 
thought. "In this serse", writes Russell, "all art belongs 
to the life of the spirit, though its greatness is derived 
from its being also intimately bound up with the life of 
instinct". According to him, "Art starts from instinct and 
rises into the region of the spirit; religion starts from 
the spirit and endeavours to dominate and inform the life of 
20 
instinct." Reverence and worship, the sense of an 
obligation to mankind, the feeling of imperativeness and 
acting under orders which traditional relgiion has 
interpreted as Divine inspiration, all belong to the life of 
spirit. Apart from all these Russell gives much importance 
to the sense of mystery. It becomes evident when he writes: 
"...deeper than all these lies the sense of a 
mystery half revealed, of a hidden wisdom and 
glory, of a transfiguring vision in which 
common things lose their solid importance and 
become a thin veil behind which the ultimate 
truth of the world is dimly seen. It is such 
feeling that are the source of religion, and 
20. Russell, B., Principles of Social 
Reconstruction, p.143 
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if they were to die most of what is best would 
vanish out of life."^^ 
Instinct, mind, and life are all essential to a full 
life. In an ideal life all three will be developed in 
co-ordination. In such a life all three will be intimately 
blended in a single harmonious whole. Russell is aware that 
each of these has a tendency to encroach upon the others. It 
is rare to find instinct, mind and spirit in harmony among 
civilized persons at tt.e present day. Very few have achieved 
a practical philosophy which gives its; due place to each. As 
a rule, instinct is at war with either mind or spirit, and 
mind and spirit are a1 v-ar with each other. If men are to 
remain whole, it is very necessary that they should achieve 
a reconciliation of instinct, mind and force. 
Russell gives an outline of the parts that instinct, 
mind, and spirit would play in a harmonious life. Instinct, 
according to him, is the source of vitality. It is instinct 
that gives force, mind gives the means of directing force to 
attain desired ends, and spirit suggests impersonal use for 
force of a kind that thought cannot discredit by criticism. 
Mine.' has the power of impersonal thought. It enables us to 
judge critically. But Russell thinks that the unchecked 
21. Ibid, p.144. 
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activity of the mind is apt to be destructive and it 
generates cynicism. Spirit is an antidote to the cynicism of 
mind: it universalizes the emotions that spring from 
instinct, and by universalizing them makes them impervious 
to mental criticism. When thought is informed by spirit it 
loses its cruel and destructive quality. 
After this survey of Russell's religious thought, the 
question arises whether he has given expression to a 
consistent philosophy of religion. The answer that can be 
given to this question is that he has not done so. His inoods 
and attitudes, as is apparent from the above discussion, are 
conflicting. Only in pointing out the errors in traditional 
religious thought, and mainly Christianity, he is steadily 
consistent. In criticising Christianity he sometimes gives 
very trivial arguments. In his account there are many 
prejudicially selected instances and glaring exaggerations. 
His anti-religious mood becomes higher and more serious when 
he attacks the Church for its dishonesties and injustices. 
Such a mood is not conducive for any philosophic 
understanding of religion. 
Again we find another mood of Russell when he comes 
closer to an interpretation of religion. In his Religion and 
Science, this mood is evident. Here the account, i.e., the 
survey of the development of relations between religion and 
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science, is objective, and is often accompanied by judicious 
criticism. Due credit is given both to religion and to 
science at most points, although his attitude to science is 
that of a participant, whereas religion is observed 
externally. 
When Russell presents his own religious convictions, 
a totally different mood is revealed. Whether in "Free Man's 
Worship" or in Hibbert, or in the Principles of Social 
Reconstruction, Russell avows a sincere and moving faith in 
the value, the dignity, and the possibilities of a better 
life. All these prove convincingly that at least on one side 
of his nature Russell is a genuine religious mystic. 
Unfortunately, his preoccupation with negative aspects of 
religion prevented him from giving due attention to the 
empirical evidence and possibilities of positive aspects of 
religion. 
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CHAPTER— 4 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
I. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT RUSSELL'S LIBERALISM 
In this section we propose to raise certain questions about 
Russell's views discussed in the previous chapters. Our main 
endeavour will be to show the inadequacy of Russell's view 
that economic and political reforms are sufficient to ward 
off the evils which are afflicting our society. To my mind, 
there is no single panacea for all the ills of our society. 
Moreover, it will be shown that Russell's envisaged 
socialism was not a sound and systematic way of thinking. 
And finally an assessment of his moral and religious 
philosophy will be attempted. 
Russell thinks that through the economic and 
political reforms ills of our society can be remedied. He 
had reached to this conclusion in two phases. In some of his 
earlier works he only stressed the need of economic reforms. 
But later he realized the inadequacy of his view and was 
thus forced to modify it. 
We agree with Russell that mankind can rid itself of 
many evils through economic and political reforms. He is 
partially right in reminding us that a world full of 
happiness is not beyond human power to create if men so 
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desire, since the obstacles imposed by inanimate nature are 
no longer insuperable on account of tremendous scientific 
progress. However he ignores the tyranny of machine and 
technology and misuse of atomic power etc that could further 
enslave man and deprive him of his freedom, alienating him 
from society, nature, politics, religion, and ultimately 
from his own authentic self. 
Moreover we disagree with him is his view that 
reforms are sufficient for doing away with all evils which 
are caused by physical nature as well as those that come 
from defects in the character or aptitudes of the sufferer 
(these include ignorance, lack of will, violent passions, 
and so on). Russell failed to see that there are many evils 
that existed because of the human condition itself. They are 
not due to avoidable ignorance, or lack of will, or violent 
passions or anything else of that sort. In his Proposed 
Roads to Freedom, Russell talks about three types of evils : 
When we consider the evils in the lives we 
know of, we find that they may be roughly 
divided into three calsses. There are, first, 
those due to physical nature : among these are 
death, pain and the difficulty of making the 
soil yield a subsistence. These we call 
"physical evils". Second, we may put those 
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that spring from defects in the character or 
aptitudes of the sufferer : among these are 
ignorance, lack of will, and violent passions. 
These we call "evils of character". Third come 
those that depend upon the power of one 
individual or group over another: these 
comprise not only obvious tyranny, but all 
interference with free development, whether by 
force or by excessive mental influence such as 
may occur in education. These we call "evils 
of power". A social system may be judged by 
its bearing upon these three kinds of evils.^ 
Our point against Russell's view is that there are 
some evils the cure of which do not lie in economic and 
political reforms. This is not to say that such reforms are 
not desirable. We only want to stress that evils like the 
sickness of man's spirit cuts accross economic and political 
systems. There are plethora of instances of socially and 
professionally prominent and also economically secure men 
who experience sucidal depression. These sorts of troubles 
spoil human relationships and they seem to afflict people of 
both sexes, of all ages, under different social and economic 
systems. Recently a leading American newspaper highlighted 
1. Russell, B., Proposed Roads to Freedom, p.188. 
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the problem of a large segment of American citizens who, due 
to mental depression, were consuming a specific medicine. We 
know that these people are economically well-to-do. The cure 
for them is not economic reform. It requires remaking 
oneself. This process of remaking may need help and sympathy 
from others, but success or failure depends ultimately on 
the inner resources of the individual. 
Our foregoing argument shows that there is no reason 
to think that economic and political reforms can do away 
with all the sufferings of manking. These reforms can at 
best eliminate sufferings that come from social injustice, 
political systems, physical nature, defects of character, 
and abuse of power. Even on this issue there is wide-ranging 
disagreement. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that 
economic and political reforms can go a long way towards 
reducing the suffering that comes from these sources. 
Let us first see what is the end that we seek to 
realize. Once the end is made known it will be esasy to 
examine whether the reforms proposed by Russell are 
sufficient to realize that end. The end, according to 
Russell, is to realize a new system of society in which 
"life may become richer, more full of joy and less full of 
preventable evils than it is at present". He examines 
various theories as to the best means of achieving this 
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enciiH -anarchism, various forms of socialism and syndicalism. 
Russell certainly has moved beyond the range of conventional 
thinking when he proposed state action whose aim was not 
merely to provide the conditions in which individuals could 
work out their fulfilment if they wanted to, but also to 
encourage and reinforce them in this project. The means that 
Russell proposed is a social organization that performs 
these functions well. Such a society, in Russell's view, 
must be socialist in its economy. It will be socialist 
because only under socialism it is possible to curb the 
possessive impulses and desires and give full freedom to the 
creative ones for the expression of their potentiality. 
Russell maintains that evils and suffering exist in 
this world because people choose them to be there. They 
choose it because of some defect in their character. But is 
it not a fact that in an imperfect world nobility of 
character may also bring suffering? A man who resists 
tyranny because of heroic integrity of his character is 
often subjected to humiliation, repression and other 
sufferings by the powers that he resists. 
One recurring feature of Russell's writings is that 
people are too cowardly to live a life of creative impulse. 
They are afraid of not achieving worldly success and the 
only way that their fears can be removed is reformation of 
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political and economic institutions. Russell is right in 
saying that the life of creative love has an inner joy that 
is of great value. He is also right in maintaining that not 
many men live in that way. But Russell is mistaken in 
thinking that to live that life men need only summon up the 
necessary courage and vision, or failing that, have their 
fears and anxieties removed by reforms of institutions. 
Creativity is a gift and it cannot be generated by a human 
being in himself by the way Russell suggested. Reformation 
of institutions can only provide for us congenial milieu. 
But it cannot endow us with the qualities that Russell 
thought desirable. 
Russell distinguishes between, as we have seen in the 
first chapter, compossible and incompatible desires. Desires 
are compossible "when all can be satisfied by the same state 
of affairs", and incompatible when they can only besatisfied by 
thwarting other desires. Russell's above distinction seems 
to be extensionally equivalent, and the context makes it 
clear, to the distinction between right desires and wrong 
desires. Here we shall quote a passage from his own writing 
which has been written in 1943 and it will facilitate us to 
show that Russell has not understood the complexity of his 
own principle. He writes : 
What I hold practically is something like 
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Leibniz's maxim of corapossibles. I regard 
satisfaction of desires as per se good, no 
matter what or whose the desire; sometimes 
desires are compatible, sometimes not. If A 
and B desire to marry each other, both can be 
satisfied; if each desires to murder the other 
without being murdered at least one must be 
disappointed. Therefore marriage is better 
2 than murder, and love is better than hate. 
Russell's principle is far form clear. One counterexample 
will make it clear that Russell's argument is also 
fallacious. If A and B desire to kill each other, not caring 
what else happens, both can be satisfied.But if each desires 
to kill the other without being kille4 at least one must be dis-
appointed. If we follov/ 'Russell, we shall have to conclude-thatIdllirg 
each other is better than killing and not being killed_( s inc e the 
former one is compossible whereas the latter one is not). 
Would Russell accept this conclusion? 
Criticising Russell's social philosophy Eduard C. 
Lindeman Comments that his social philosophy lacks dynamism. 
Lindeman is of the view that Russell does not "furnish us 
2. Schlipp, P.A., (Ed.) The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 
Evanston, 111., 1944, p.740. 
219 
with a single authentic lever for action." A social 
philosophy, according to him, which does not lead to social 
action is incomplete. He writes : 
If science is to be the chief source of 
dynamics for the coming age, and if scientists 
are to have nothing to do with values, from 
whence are values to come? certainly not from 
religion...because for him religions spring 
from fear and are the • remnants of 
superstitions. Where are we to find the checks 
which will prevent science from producing this 
horror world which Russell describes so 
3 
glowingly. 
In the first chapter we have seen what type of 
socialism Russell advocates. His variety of socialism has 
been called by commentators "innocent" socialism.He 
completely dissociates himself fron those types of socialism 
(or communism) whose leaders are willing to deprive men of 
liberty or condone the use of violence. If it is possible to 
have socialism plus democracy, Russell will welcome that 
system. But if he is asked to take socialism without 
demacracy, he will choose democracy even though it is 
associated with a faulty political economy. 
3. Ibid, p.566. 
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In his social philosophy. Russell has warned about the 
growing danger of over-population. Ee deserves respect for 
this. But two points need to te noted here. First, he points 
out that the number of more civilized" people are 
diminishing fast due to fall in biith rate. By. the 
expression "more civilized" he refers to the white people. 
This only shows that in spite of his liberal outlook he 
could not discard the superiority complex of the whites'. 
Second, he even does net mention the problems faced by 
certain tribes or races who are on the verge of extinction 
because of being neglected by ruling class. This problem 
wholly escaped his attention. We know that governments of 
various countries are now taking several measures to 
preserve these races. 
For controlling rapid expansion of the population 
effectively Russell suggested two measures spread of 
education and birth-control. Here spread of education 
certairily has reference to universal education. But in his 
theory of education he does not mention Ibe need of 
universal education at all. Universal child education is a 
difficult task and with it many issues are involved which do 
not allow any simple solution. 
Let us now turn our attention to Russell's moral 
philosophy. We have seen in the third chapter the three 
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successive phases of his ethical views. Russell was not 
satisfied with the position he had adopted at an earlier 
period that moral judgements were expressions of wishes to 
which the distinction of truth or falsity was not 
applicable. In his later works he tries hard to justify the 
view that morality is more than a matter of individual 
taste. Morris- Ginsberg in his book On Justice in Society 
points out certain flaws in Russel's later thought. He sums 
up Russell's later view thus: (i) good is defined as the 
property of arousing in the spectator an emotion of 
approval, bad as that which arouses disapproval; (ii) a 
suivey of acts which arouse these emotions shows that on the 
whole those acts aie approved which are likely to bring 
happiness or pleasure, while opposite effects are expected 
from acts that are disapproved of; (iii) Right conduct is 
then defined as an act which, on the basis of available 
evidence, is likely to produce better effed than any other 
act that is possible in the circumstances; any other act is 
wrong. 
According to Russell, "good" is the fundamental 
category of ethics. What we ought to do is the act which is 
right. "Right" is defined as conduct which promotes what is 
good. The reason for the preference of the term "good" is 
that in Russell's view there is more agreement as to what 
effects of action are thought desirable than as to what is 
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thought right or wrong. The above definitions and 
propositions, Russell claims, "provide a coherent body of 
propositions which are as true (or false) in the same sense 
as if they were propositions of science". Ginsberg shows 
that Russell's attempt to build an objectivist ethic'on a-
subjectivistbasis presents several difficulties. 
Firstly, Russ:ell defines good or intrinsic value as 
that which satisfies desire. This implies that the 
satisfaction of one person's desire is as good as another 
person's, provided the two desires are of equal intensity.. 
Ginsberg comments that "this can only mean that it is 
Russell's desire that everyone should recognize that other 
people's desires are as good as theirs: it is certainly not 
4 
the case that everybody, in fact, desires this." In 
Russell's view it is the business of wise institutions to 
encourage what he calls impersonal desires. It should also 
induce the belief that there need be no real conflict 
between self-interest and the interests of society. He 
invents new emotion, called the emotion of impartiality, to 
this end. But to say that this is right or what ought to be 
done can mean no more than that it is Russell's desire that 
other people's desires should harmonize with his desires. 
4. Ginsberg, Morris, On Justice in Society, Penguin Books, 
Baltimore, 1965, p.27. 
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In the second place, in analysing desire Russell 
explicitly rejects the theory of psychological hedonism. 
What people desire is not pleasure but the various objects 
the attainment of which gives pleasure•Ginsberg writes : 
If further it is agreed that pleasure is not 
the nearest that we can come to the common 
quality of the great majority of approved 
actions... that we do not in fact value 
pleasures in proportion to their intensity and 
that some pleasures seem to us inherently 
preferable to others we seem to be led back to 
a theory analogous to that of Moore or of some 
Ideal Utilitarians which at one time Russell 
supported.^ 
The difficulties of Russell's view, according to 
Ginsberg, arise from the vagueness of his theory of human 
motives. In the Preface to his book Human Society in Ethics 
and Politics he explains that those critics have 
misunderstood him who have accused him of overestimating the 
part of reason in human affairs. Ginsberg says that the 
trouble actually does not lie here but rather in his 
"enormous oversimplification of the relations between 
inclination and will, reason and impulse" 
5. Ibdi, p.28. 
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Russell quotes with approval hume's assertation that 
"Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions." 
He opines that reason is concerned only with means and never 
with the ends of actions, and he seems to think that this is 
obvious. But is it so? The ends that people set are complex 
and variable, They cannot be regarded as simply given. In 
any case, means and ends are often intimately interwoven. 
Beliefs about ends and about the principles of conduct are 
far from being emotionally neutral. To say that they have no 
effect on action is contrary to plain facts. The whole 
theory of motivition thus, Ginsberg says, needs 
re-examination. 
Impulse is undoubtedly needed to incite thought, but 
thought in turn can inspire or transform impulse. Reason has 
not only a regulative but a constitutive function in 
relation to the ends of action. "A rational ethic", Ginsberg 
writes," must assume that there is such a thing as rational 
action, that intelligence has a part to play not only in 
cognition but in volition. It plays this part not merely by 
serving the natural inclinations or by overriding them and 
impelling them to confoim to a law independent of the 
desires. It does so by bringing the ends of endeavour into 
consciousness and by clarifying and systematizing them in 
such a way as to make them serve the better needs of the 
personality. The function of the practical reason is thus 
misstated if it is confined to deliberation about means." 
At heart Russell is an inveterate rationalist. He 
Wrote in Principles of Social reconstruction : "The power of 
thought, in the long run, is greater than any other human 
7 
power." But he is hampered by an undue emphasis on the 
distinction between ends and means and an oversharp 
separation of impulse and will. He says that reason can help 
us by taking into consideration all relevant desires and not 
merely those that happen to be the strongest at the moment, 
and thus to realize our desires 'on the whole'. In our 
dealing with others, Russell says, reason enjoins 
impartiality, requires us to use persuasion rather than 
force and in persuation to appeal to arguments which we 
believe to be valid. Is this because Russell believes that 
impartiality and intellectual integrity are more efficient 
than force or because they are valued for their own sake? 
That the former is the case has not been shown by Russell. He 
himself 
maintained that "Conquest by force of arms has had 
more to do with the spread of civilization than any other Q 
Single agency." If, however, impartiality and intellectual 
integrity are desired for their own sake, it is not clear 
how such desires can be described as non-rational. 
6. Ibid, p.29. 
7. Ibid, p.226 
8. Power, p.39 
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Again, it is to be added that in dealing with 
particular problems Russell repeatedly appeals to reason. 
Thus in his discussion of sexual morality he says: "Whatever 
sexual ethic may ultimately be accepted must be free from 
superstitution and must have recognizable and demonstrable 
grounds in its favour... There has to be consistency in life 
there has to be continuous effort directed to ends that are 
not immediately beneficial and not at every moment 
attractive; there has to be consideration for others; and 
g 
there shculd be certain standards of rectitude." It is hard 
to reconcile all this with the sharp separation of desire 
and reason, feeling and thought which Russell's argument 
elsewhere implies. It is also difficult to believe that we 
can ever attain to a sane and balanced view of our relations 
to our neighbours and to the world if the fundamental values 
lie outside the scope of reason. 
Now coming to his philosophy of religion we see his 
spirited, sometimes malicious, attacks on religion, the 
churches, the creeds, and all the impulses that induce 
people to be religious. Most of his essays on religion have 
been collected in why I Am Not A Christian. Religious people 
have dismissed this book as cheap pamphlettering by an angry 
9. Russell, B., Marriage and Morals, p.243. 
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heretic. This is understandable. Russell hardly makes any 
attempt to add philosophical depth to the critique. 
It is a curious and almost a forgotten fact that his 
philosophy of religion has passed through two phases which 
are sharply divided. What he thought and wrote on religion 
before 1925 is of immense interest and throws a valuable 
light on the rest of his philosophy. In this period he had 
something of an entirely different order to say about 
religion, and about its relation to philosophy. But in late 
twenties a sudden change occurred in him. From this time 
onward his writings are mostly a record of what he does not 
believe. Prior to this time whatever Russell had written on 
religious subjects showed a profound sympathy and feeling 
for the religious outlook and for the impulses that prompted 
it. But in post-late-twenty period what he wrote on 
religious subjects, with a few exception, was full of 
hostile remarks. Though the transition is very extreme and 
obvious, yet the later russell is so well-know all over the 
world that the memory of the earlier Russell has been 
almost erased from minds of his contemporaries. Seme of the 
valuable writings of his early period are : "A Free Man's 
Worship" (1903), "The Study of Mathematics" (1903), "The 
Essence of Religion" (1913), "Mysticism and Logic" (1914), 
and the last chapter of Principles of Social Reconstruction 
entitled "Body, Mind and Spirit" (1916). 
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Despite his polemics against religion and religious 
beliefs we find ample evidence of the fact that he nurtured 
religious passion at the bottom of his heart. In his letter 
to Lowes Dickinson (the letter has been incorporated in his 
Autobiography) he wrote : 
But what we have to do, and what privately we 
do do, is to treat the religious instinct with 
profound respect, but to insist that there is 
no shred or particle of truth in any of the 
metaphysics it has suggested; to palliate this 
by trying to bring out the beauty of the world 
and of life, so far as it exists, and above 
all to insist upon preserving the seriousness 
of the religious attitude and its habit of 
asking ultimate questions. 
This belief in the seriousness of the religious attitude and 
the insistence upon treating the religious instinct with 
profound respect was long an intimate part of Russell's 
intellectual bearing. It took his philosophy long time to 
drive it underground, but it was never extinguished. 
10. Autobiography, vol-1, -185-86. 
II. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In spite of all the shortcomings mentioned in the previous 
section the merit of Russell's social philsophy cannot be 
overlooked. His life-long fight for justice, equality, 
freedom and for other similar values deserves respect. One 
of the pre-eminent merits of his political philosophy is his 
advocacy of gradual reform, both in political and economic 
arena. Marxism, Syndicalism, and Anarchism, as we have seen, 
preach sudden change, they wamt to usher in a society or 
system through violent means which is radically different 
from the previous ones. This sort of change is fraught with 
dangers and it has been amply proved by some recent 
incidents. 
The advantages of gradual reform have been 
acknowledged by some other contemporary thinkers also. In 
the present century Karl Popper in his book The Open Society 
and its Enemies also advocated piecemeal reform and opposed 
any revolutionary change. Revolution, according to him, in 
its wake always brings some kind of dictationship. He cites 
the example of French Revolution and the Russian Revolution 
as a consequence of which very soon Napolean and Stalin 
appeared on the scene and undermined the goals of 
revolution. According to Popper present democracy in the 
west, particularly American society, is close to the ideal 
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of open society and any change in it should take place only 
through criticism and piecemeal reform. 
Popper does not give us any clear model of an ideal 
society of the future. Only he proposed the institutions by 
means of which one can grapple with authoritarianism. In 
this respect Russell's social philosophy is more 
comprehensive than that of Popper. Russell gives an adequate 
guideline for the society he envisaged. 
Popper agrees with Russell that any attempt to make 
heaven on earth through revolutionary method invariably 
produces hell. He proposes to adopt a critical rationalism 
as opposed to irrationalism. The former attitude emphasizes 
the use of argument and experience as the appropriate 
devices for this purpose. Popper writes : 
I may be wrong and you may be right and by an 
effort we may get nearer to the truth, is, as 
mentioned closely, akin to the scientific 
attitudes. It is bound up with the idea that 
everybody is liable to make mistake, which may 
be found by himself with the assistance of the 
criticism of others. It, therefore, suggests 
the idea that nobody should be his own judge, 
173 
and it suggests the idea of impartiality. 
But Popper overlooked repressive measures taken in 
advanced industrial societies, particularly in America, and 
defended that society. He disbelieved in any revolution and 
qualitative change by indirectly defending western 
capitalism and liberalism. It is at this point that Russell 
differs from Popper. As we have seen, in the sixties 
Russell was a bitter critic of American capitalism. 
The question often raised is whether with the passage 
of time Russell's social philosophy has lost its relevance. 
It is right that the world scenario of 1995 is quite 
different from the scenario of 1965 or 55. But the points 
Russell raised or stressed in his time have become more 
relevant to our time than his own time. The relevance of 
this has to be seen from a different perspective. With the 
disintegration of the U.S.S.R. (now defunct) cold war has 
come to an end. The end of cold war has given rise to a 
single power which believes that entire world must obey its 
diktat. The ugly nature of American policy which Russell saw 
clearly in sixties has become more prominent in recent past. 
Again, the issue of NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty) strikes the headlines of our national dailies almost 
every other day. .It is Russell who soon after the Second 
1. Popper, K.R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, (V.I.), 
London, Routledge and kegan Paul, 1980, p.237. 
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World War actively compaigned for this end and headed many 
committees, like CND, to achieve the objective of full 
disarmament. He repeteadly stressed the need of complete 
disarmament in his many writings and pointed out the dangers 
involved if nuclear arms were left in the hands of present 
possesors. 
But Russell's concept of World Government seems to be 
somewhat Utopian. Before Russell Leaonard Woolf was also a 
proponent of World Government. Russell by and large agrees 
with Woolf's plan. But it is doubtful whether such a plan 
can be implemented ever. Human nature is very complex and 
the impulse of domination is so powerful that it is really 
doubtful whether it can be suppressed fully. It is unlikely 
that any nation will be willing to sacrifice its external 
sovereignty, which is necessary for the implementation of 
Russell's plan of World Government. The only time which I 
think most conducive to implement such a plan is after some 
great war because only after such a colossal disaster poeple 
become ready to accept some drastic measure to avert future 
recurrence of the same. Such spirit soon after the disaster 
is likely to vanish. 
It should not be assumed that with the establishment 
of the UN (United Nations Organisation) Russell's dream of 
World Government has been realized. There are great 
differences between the UN and the Russell's envisaged plan. 
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If human motive is taken into account for judging any 
action then we shall have to admit that Russell's endeavour 
to save mankind from the imminent peril and his constant 
effort to bring about a society which contains less evils 
than our present one was really a noble one. His motive was 
to alleviate such evils, as he admitted in his 
Autobiography, as poverty, pain, lonliness, ruthlessness in 
war and the like. We shall conclude this thesis with the 
following three quotations which are immensely important to 
understand Russell's philosophy. 
He writes in Proposed Roads to Freedom : A 
world full of happiness is not beyond human 
power to create; the obstacles imposed by 
inanimate nature are not insuperable. The real 
obstacles lie in the heart of man and tSiecure &r 
these is a firm hope, informed and fortified 
by thought. 
In Political Ideals he writes : 
Revolutionary action may be unnecessary, but 
revolutionary thought is indispensable, and, 
as the outcome of thought, a rational and 
constructive hope. 
In Principles of Social Reconstruction he 
writes : 
A good life is inspired by love and guided by 
173 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Ayer, A.J. Russell, (Fontana / Collins, 
1972) 
2. Ayer, A.J. Logical Positivism, (The Free 
Press, New York, 1959). 
3. Ayer, A.J. Philosophical Essays, (London, 
l^acirillan & Co Ltd, 1954). 
4. Bowyer, Carlton H. Phi 1osophical 
Perspectives for Education 
(Scott, Foreswan and Company 
1970). 
5. Burr, John R. & (ed. ) Philosophy and Con t eirporary 
Goldinger, Milton Issue, (Macrrillan Goldinger, 
Milton Publishing Co., Inc, 
New York, 1980). 
6. David, L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of 
Social Science, (New York, The 
Macmi1 Ian & The Free Press, 
(1968) . 
7. Derfer, Leslie Socialism Since Marx, 
(Macmi1 Ian, London, 1973). 
8. Eastman, Max Capital, The Ccirwunist 
Manifesto and ether Writings 
of Karl Marx (Carlton House, 
New York, 1932). 
9. Egner, Robert E. Bertrand Russell's Best, 
(Unwin Books., 1975). 
10. Faurot , Jean H. The Philosopher and the State 
From Hooker to Popper 
(Chandler Publishing Company, 
San Francisco, 1971). 
11. Ginsberg,Morri s On Justice in Society, 
(Penjuin Books, Baltimore, 
1965). 
235 
12. Hart, David K. 
& (ed.) 
Downton, James V.,Jr. 
Perspectives on Political 
Philosophy, Vol. II : Machi-
avelli through Marx, (Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 
1971). 
13, Henderson, S.V.P. 
14. Jager, Ronald 
Introduction to Philosophy of 
Education, (The University of 
CHicago Press, Chicago, 1947). 
The Development of Bert rand 
Russell ' s Philosophy, (London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1972). 
15. King, J. Charles 
& (ed.) 
McGilvray, James A 
Political and Social Philosoph 
(Tranditional and Contemporary 
Readings),(McGraw-Book Company 
New York, 1973). 
16. Kolakowski Leszek Main Currents of Marxism (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
17. Lai, B.K. Cont emporary Indian Philosophy 
(Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 
1989). 
18. Marcus Herbart One-Dimensional Man, (Boston, 
Beacon Press, 1964). 
19. Marcuse , Herbart Soviet Marxism (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 
1961). 
20 . Machen , J .G . The Christian View of Man (The 
Banner of Truth Trust, London, 
1965). 
21. Mi 11, J.S. Subjection of Women (London, 
Longmans, Green, Reader, and 
Dyer, 1978). 
22. Milne. A.J.M. Freedom and Rights, (London, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1968). 
173 
23. Marty, K. Sat chidanada Studies in the Problems of 
& Bouquet, A.C. Peace (Asia Publishing House, 
Bombay, 1960). 
24. Olafson, Frederick A. Justice and Social Policy (A 
(ed.) Spectrum Book, Prentice-hal1, 
Inc., 1961). 
25. Pears, David Bertrand Russell and the 
British Tradition in 
Philosophy, (Col 1ins/Fontana, 
1967). 
26. Popper, K.R. The Open Society and its 
Enemies, vol.1 & II (London, 
George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 
19^5). 
27. Popper, K. The Poverty of Historicism 
(London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1961). 
28. Paul, Arthur Schipp The Philosophy of Karl Popper 
(ed.) (U.S.A., The Library of Living 
Philosophers, 1974). 
29. Russell, Bertrand Has Man a Future? (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1962). 
30. Russell, Bertrand Portraits from Memory, (New 
York, Simon and Schuster, 
1965). 
31 Russell, Bertrand Unpopular Essays, (London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1950). 
32. Russell, Bertrand Sceptical Essays, (New York, 
W.IV. Norton & Co., Inc., 
1928). 
33. Russell, Bertrand On Education, (London, George 
Allen & Unwin, June, 1928). 
34. Russell, Bertrand Roads to Freedom, (London, 
Unwin Books, 1966). 
173 
35. Russell, Bertrand Marriage and Morals, (London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1958). 
36. Russell, Bertrand Human Society in Ethics and 
Politics, (London, George 
Allen and Qnwin Ltd, 1963). 
37. Russell, Bertrand The Autobiography of Bertrand 
Russell, vol.1 (1872-191^), 
vol. 2 ("1914-1944;, vol. 3 
(1944-1967) , (London, George 
Allen & Unwin, 1978). 
38. Russell, Bertrand Authority and the Individual 
(Unwin Paperbacks, London, 
1977). 
39. Russell bertrand Common 5_en£e ^nd _Nucl ear 
War fa re (London, George Allen 
8. Unwin Ltd, 1959). 
40. Russell, Bertrand New Hopes for a changing World 
(London, George Allen & Unwin, 
1960). 
41. Russell, Bertrand My philosophical Development, 
(London, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, 1959). 
42. Russell, Bertrand Principles of Social 
Reconstruction (London, George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1960. 
43. Russell, Bertrand The Practical and Theory of 
Bolshevism (London, George 
Allen & Unwin, 1962). 
44. Russell, Bertrand Why I am Not a Christian, 
(London, George Allen 5 Unwin, 
1957). 
45. Russell, Bertrand Problems of Philosophy 
(London, Williams and Norgat e , 
1921). 
46. Russell Bertrand Religion and Science (London, 
Oxford university Press, 196). 
173 
47. Russell, Bertrand 
48. Russell Bertrand 
The Future of Science, (Wisdom 
Library, New York, 1959). 
The Will to Doubt (The Wisdom 
Library, New York, 1958). 
49. Russell, Bertrand 
50. Russell, Bertrand 
History of Western Philosophy, 
(London, George Allen S Unwin 
Ltd, 198A). 
Mysticism and Logic (London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1959). 
51. Russell, Bertrand Power, (Unwin Books, London, 
1962). 
52. Russell, B., Philosophical Essays (London, 
Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1966) 
53. Russell, Bertrand In Praise of Idleness (W.VJ. 
Nortron and Co., New York, 
1935) . 
54. Russell, Bertrand 
55. Russell, Bertrand 
What I Believe (New York. E.P. 
Button & Company, 1925). 
Which Way to Peace (London. 
Michael Joseph Ltd. 1936). 
56. Russell. Bertrand The Problem of China (London. 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1922). 
57. Russell, Bertrand Unarmed Victory (London, Allen 
& Unwin Ltd, 1963). 
58. Russell. Bertrand The Conquest of Happiness 
(London, George Allen & Unwin 
(1930). 
59. Schilpp. P.A. (Ed.) The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, 
(Evan st on & Chi cago. 
North-West ern University. 
19U2). 
60. Santayana, George Winds of Doctrine (London. 
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1912). 
61. Schilpp, P.A The Philosophy of Bertrand 
Russell, vol. I & II (Haper 
Torchbooks, The Academy 
Library, Evans ton). 
62. Strauss, Leo What is Political Philosophy? 
(The Free Press of Glencoe, 
Illinois, 1959). 
63. Singh, B.P. 
64. Sidney, Hook 
A Dictonary of Modern Politics 
and Political Society, (Delhi, 
Mittal Publications, 1987). 
From Hegel to Marx, (London, 
Victory Collencz Ltd, 1936). 
65, Tucker, Robert Philosophy and Myth in Karl 
Marx, (London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1972). 
RUSSELL'S ARTICLES 
66. The Free Man's Worship The Independent Review, V.I., 
Dec. 1903. 
67. Review of G.E. Moores Principia Ethica Independent 
Review, vol. II March 1904. 
68. The Essence of Religion Hibbert Journal, vol. II, Oct 
1912. 
69. Freedom 0 Authority in 
Educt i on 
Century, vol. 109, N.S, 87, 
Dec. 1924. 
70. How to Achieve World The New Leader, Mar. 6, 1948, 
vol. 331. 
71. Debate with Critic on Abolition of War. Bulletin of 
The Atomic Scientists, Apr. 1958. 
72. My Present View of the World, Encounter, Jan. 1959, vol 
12. 
73. Bertrand Russell Looks at Higher Education Today. The 
New York University Alumni News, vol.5, Jan., 1960. 
74. The Possible Future of Mankind. Harper's Bazzar, Jan. 
1960 vol.93. 
240 
75. Letter Concerning Disarmament : Bertrand Russell 
Replies to Mr. Christopher Mayhew (M.P.) encounter, 
June 1961, vol . 16. 
76. J. Duffett (ed.^. Against the Crime of Silence 
Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes 
Tribunal, Flanders, N.J., and London, 1968. 
77. Review of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. Independent 
Review, vol. II, March 190^. 
78. "Proposals for an International University". The 
Fortinghtly, July 19^2. 
* * * * * * 
